The Tree of Enlightenment
An Introduction to the Major Traditions of Buddhism
by Peter Della Santina
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Part Four
The Abidharma
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Chapter Thirty-One
Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma
One of the functions of the Abhidharma is definition. Definition is
important
because,
to successfully communicate about a rather
technical subject, we must
know precisely
what our terms mean.
Thus I would like to look at a number of terms
used frequently and
popularly in speaking about Buddhist thought. I would like to arrive
at
an understanding
of the definitions of these terms and then relate
them to the nature of
the teachings of the
Buddha.
Buddhism has often been called a religion, a philosophy, and,
in recent
years, a
psychology. 'Religion' refers to belief in, or
recognition of, a
higher, unseen power that
controls the course of
the universe. Moreover, religion has an
emotional and moral
component and has to do with rituals and worship. Because
Buddhism does
not recognize
the existence of such a power and
does not universally emphasize
rituals and worship, it
is difficult to
categorize Buddhism in general--and particularly the
Abhidharma--as a
religion.
In its original sense, 'philosophy' means the 'love of wisdom
and
knowledge.' More
generally, it means investigation of the
nature of the laws or causes
of all being. This
definition might apply
to Buddhism except that it remains somewhat
vague, due to the
various meanings of the words 'nature' and 'being.' This has led to
two
approaches in
philosophical thinking, called metaphysics and
phenomenology.
Metaphysics is the study
of absolute or first
principles. It is also sometimes called the
science of ontology,
which
means the study of essences or, in simple terms, the study of
things in
themselves.
Phenomenology, in contrast, is the description
of things as they are
experienced by the
individual; it is the science
of epistemology, the study of things as
they are known, as
they
appear to us. Insofar as Buddhism is philosophical, it is
concerned
primarily with
phenomenology.
'Psychology' is the study of the mind and mental states. Like
philosophy, it has two
aspects--pure psychology, which is the
general study of mental
phenomena, and
psychotherapy, or applied
psychology, which is the application of the
study of mental
phenomena to the problem of disease and cure, disturbance and
adjustment. We might
explain the difference between pure and
applied psychology by means of
an analogy.
Imagine that a man
climbs to the top of a hill and surveys the
countryside without any
particular purpose in mind. His survey will take in every detail--the
hills, the woods, the
rivers and streams--without discrimination. But
if he has a purpose in
mind--for
instance, if he intends to reach
another hilltop in the distance--then
his survey will focus
on the
particular features that will help or hinder him in his progress
toward that goal.
When we speak of applied psychology or
psychotherapy, we mean a study
of the mind
and mental states
that focuses on those phenomena that will help or
hinder one's
progress
toward mental well-being.
Having looked briefly at the definitions of religion, philosophy,
and
psychology, we can
begin to see that the phenomenological
aspect of philosophy and the
therapeutic aspect of
psychology
relate best to an understanding of the Buddha's teaching.
The Abhidharma, like Buddhist thought in general, is highly
rational
and logical. If we
look closely at the methods of exposition
and argument in the
Abhidharma, we find the
beginning of
dialectics, which is the science of debate, and also the
beginning of
logical
argument and analysis. This is particularly evident in the
fourfold
classification of the
nature of questions. It is said that
familiarity with and ability to
use this classification is
indispensable
for anyone who wants to engage fruitfully in discussion
and debate
about
the Dharma, because to answer a question correctly, one has
to
understand the nature of
the question.
The first class of questions is the most direct and refers to
those
that can be answered
directly and categorically, such as 'Do
all living beings die?' To this
the answer is 'Yes,
all living beings
die.'
The second class can only be answered with qualifications, for
instance, 'Will all living
beings be reborn?' This kind of question
cannot be answered directly
and categorically
because it has two
possible interpretations. Thus it must be analyzed
and answered
individually, taking into account each of the possible meanings:
'Living beings who are
not free from the afflictions will be reborn,
but those who are free
from the afflictions,
like the Arhats, will not
be reborn.'
The third class of questions must be answered with
counter-questions,
as, for instance, 'Is
man powerful?' Here the
reference point of the question must be
determined before the
question can be answered: in other words, is man powerful with
reference to the gods or
to animals? If the former, then man is not
powerful; if the latter,
then man is powerful.
The aim of the
counter-question is to determine the reference point
that the
questioner has
in mind.
The fourth class of questions are those in which we are
particularly
interested here. These
are questions that do not
deserve an answer; the famous inexpressible
propositions to
which
the Buddha remained silent fall into this category.
Traditionally,
there are fourteen
unanswerable questions. We find them, for
instance, in the
Chulamalunkya Sutta. These
fourteen questions are
grouped into three categories:
The first category contains eight questions that concern the
absolute
or final nature of the
world: Is the world eternal or not
eternal, or both or neither; finite
or not finite, or both or
neither?
You can see that this category includes two sets of questions,
and
that both sets
refer to the world. The first set refers to the existence
of the world
in time, and the second
to the existence of
the world in space.
The second category contains four questions: Does the
Tathagata exist
after death or not,
or both or neither? These
questions refer to the nature of nirvana, or
ultimate reality.
The third
category contains two questions: Is the self identical with
or
different from the
body? While the first category of questions refers
to the world and the
second to what is
beyond the world,
this last refers to personal experience. Do we die
with our bodies,
or
are our personalities altogether different from and independent
of our
bodies?
The Buddha remained silent when asked these fourteen
questions. He
described them as a
net and refused to be drawn
into such a net of theories, speculations,
and dogmas. He said
that
it was because he was free of the bondage of all theories and
dogmas that he had
attained liberation. Such speculations, he said,
are attended by fever,
unease,
bewilderment, and suffering, and it is
by freeing oneself of them that
one achieves
liberation.
Let us look at the fourteen questions in general to see whether
we can
understand why the
Buddha took this stand. Generally, the
fourteen questions imply two
basic attitudes
toward the world. The
Buddha spoke of these two attitudes in his
dialogue with Maha
Kachchayana, when he said that there are two basic views, the
view of
existence and the
view of nonexistence. He said that
people are accustomed to think in
these terms, and that
as long as
they remain entangled in these two views they will not
attain
liberation. The
propositions that the world is eternal, that the world
is infinite,
that the Tathagatha exists
after death, and that the self is
independent of the body reflect the
view of existence. The
propositions that the world is not eternal, that the world is finite,
that the Tathagata does
not exist after death, and that the self is
identical with the body
reflect the view of
nonexistence.
These two views were professed by teachers of other schools
during the
time of the
Buddha. The view of existence is generally
the view of the Brahmins;
that of
nonexistence is generally the view
of the materialists and hedonists.
When the Buddha
refused to be
drawn into the net of these dogmatic views of existence
and
nonexistence, I
think he had two things in mind: (1) the ethical
consequences of these
two views, and,
more importantly, (2) the
fact that the views of absolute existence and
nonexistence do
not
correspond to the way things really are.
For example, the eternalists view this self as permanent and
unchanging. When the body
dies, this self will not die because the
self is by nature unchanging.
If that is the case, it
does not matter
what this body does: actions of the body will not
affect the destiny
of the
self. This view is incompatible with moral responsibility
because if
the self is eternal and
unchanging, it will not be affected
by wholesome and unwholesome
actions. Similarly, if
the self were
identical with the body and the self dies along with the
body, then it
does
not matter what the body does. If you believe that existence
ends at
death, there will be
no constraint upon action. But in a
situation where things exist
through interdependent
origination,
absolute existence and nonexistence are impossible.
Another example drawn from the fourteen unanswerable questions also
shows that the
propositions do not correspond to the way things really are. Take the
example of the
world. The world does not exist absolutely or not exist absolutely in
time. The world
exists dependent on causes and conditions--ignorance, craving, and
clinging. When
ignorance, craving, and clinging are present, the world exists; when
they are not present,
the world ceases to exist. Hence the question of the absolute existence
or nonexistence of
the world is unanswerable.
The same may be said of the other categories of questions that
make up
the fourteen
unanswerables. Existence and nonexistence,
taken as absolute ideas, do
not apply to
things as they really are.
This is why the Buddha refused to agree to
absolute statements
about the nature of things. He saw that the absolute categories of
metaphysics do not
apply to things as they really are.
As for the Buddha's attitude toward psychology, there is no
doubt that
he placed a great
deal of emphasis on the role of the
mind. We are familiar with the
famous verses in the
Dhammapada
where the Buddha speaks of the mind as the forerunner of all
mental states.
The text says that happiness and suffering result from
acting with a
pure mind and an
impure mind, respectively. We need
only look at the canonical texts to
recognize the
importance of mind
in Buddhist teachings. There we find the five
aggregates, four out of
five of which are mental, and the thirty-seven factors of
enlightenment, the majority of
which are mental. No matter where
we look, we will be struck by the
importance of mind
in the
teachings of the Buddha.
Various religions and philosophies have their particular starting
points. The theistic
religions begin with God. Ethical teachings like
Confucianism begin
with man as a social
entity. Buddhism begins
with the mind. It is therefore not surprising
that we often choose
to
describe the Buddha's teaching as a psychological one, and that wealso describe it as
psychotherapy, since the symbolism of
disease and cure is prominent in
the teaching of
the Buddha. The
Four Noble Truths are a reflection of the ancient
scheme of
disease,
diagnosis, cure, and treatment used in early medical
science, and we
might also recall that
the Buddha was called the
king of physicians.
The Buddha was interested in cure, not in metaphysical
categories. We
find his use of
various techniques of cure
throughout the discourses in the Sutra
Pitaka. For instance,
take
the Buddha's teaching about the self. In the Dhammapada the
Buddha
taught that the
wise man can attain happiness by
disciplining himself, and yet in other
places in the
discourses, we
find the Buddha expounding the doctrine of not-self, the
idea that
nowhere
in the psycho-physical components of experience is the
permanent self
to be found.
For the explanation of this apparent
contradiction, we need to look at
the Buddha's
dialogue with
Vachchhagotta, who asked the Buddha whether or not the
self
existed. The
Buddha remained silent, and after a time
Vachchhagotta left. Ananda,
who happened to
be nearby, asked
the Buddha why he had not replied. The Buddha
explained that if
he had
said that the self existed, he would have been siding with
those
Brahmins who believed in
the absolute existence of the self,
but if he had told Vachchhagotta
that the self did not
exist, it would
have been confusing for Vachchhagotta, who would have
thought,
'Previously I had a self, but now I no longer have one.' The Buddha
chose to remain
silent because he knew Vachchhagotta's
predicament. Similarly, when
confronted by
those who did not
believe in rebirth, he taught the existence of the
self, whereas to
those
who believed in the reality of karma, in the fruit of good and
bad
actions, he taught the
doctrine of not-self. This is the Buddha's
skill in the means of
instruction.
We can see how this ties in with the Buddha's rejection of absolute
categories when we
look at his use of the symbol of the water-snake. Here we find the
Buddha saying that the
factors of experience are similar to a water-snake. When a person
capable of handling a
water-snake and knowledgeable in the method ofcapturing one attempts
to catch one, he
will do so successfully.
But when a person unaccustomed to handling a
water-snake and
ignorant of how to capture one attempts it, his attempt will end in
lamentation and pain.
Similarly, phenomena--the factors of
experience--are nothing in
themselves. They are
not absolutely
existent or absolutely nonexistent, neither absolutely
good nor
absolutely
bad; rather, they are relative. Whether they result in
happiness or
pain, in progress along
the path or in retrogression,
depends not on the phenomena themselves
but on how we
handle
them.
If things are handled in the right way, through a conscious and
deliberate adjustment of
the mind, phenomena can be used for one's progress along the path. A
knife, for instance,
is neither true nor false, yet someone who grasps it by the blade is
surely in error. When
we relate to phenomena in terms of craving, ill-will, and ignorance,
this results in
suffering. When we take them otherwise, this results in happiness.
To summarize, we can use terms like 'philosophy' and 'psychology' in
relation to the
Buddhist tradition as long as we remember that we are interested in
philosophy not as it
concerns essences and absolute categories but as a description of
phenomena, and that we
are interested in psychology insofar as it
concerns psychotherapy.
These qualities of the
philosophy and
psychology of the Abhidharma are unique in the history
of human
thought. Nowhere else, in the ancient or modern world, in Asia or
the
West, has such a
phenomenology and psychotherapy evolved.
What is unique about Buddhist phenomenology and
psychotherapy
is its
rejection of the
idea of a permanent self and its affirmation of
the possibility of
liberation. In all other
systems, even those of
western philosophical phenomenology and
psychotherapy, we find
an inability to reject the idea of a permanent self--the very rejection
so characteristic of
the teaching of the Buddha and of the
Abhidharma. And nowhere within
modern
psychology do we find
that possibility of ultimate and absolute freedom
so central to the
teachings of Buddhism.
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Contents
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Update : 11-05-2002
