The Lotus Unleashed:
The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964-1966*
By Robert Topmiller, PhD
Eastern Kentucky University
Published by the University Press of Kentucky
---o0o---
Introduction
Vietnamese
Buddhism as a Political Force: 1963-65
“Whoever is listening, be my witness:
I cannot accept this war, I never could, I
never shall.”
[1]
Introduction: Early Manifestations of Buddhist Political Power
In May 1963, a group of students in Hue, South Vietnam,
marched through the city carrying Buddhist flags in defiance of a recent
order by President Ngo Dinh Diem. South Vietnamese security forces soon
confronted and fired on the demonstrators, killing eight young people.
Buddhists throughout South Vietnam reacted with indignation to these
killings, leading to a series of protests against the government.
Led by their charismatic leader, Thich Tri
Quang, Buddhist leaders in central Vietnam dreamed of bringing a social
revolution to Vietnam. They wanted to eradicate poverty and injustice
while bringing compassion and succor to the masses of Vietnamese whose
lives of extreme poverty rendered them susceptible to NLF promises of a
future egalitarian society under its tutelage. The growing war in the
countryside particularly concerned Buddhist leaders because of the
suffering involved and its potential to derail their social
transformation. While Diem’s Catholicism and favoritism towards Catholics
irritated Buddhist leaders who perceived that their religion was not taken
seriously by the regime, the introduction of American advisors inflamed
the nationalism and urge for peace that always stood behind the Buddhist
movement. Thus, they felt compelled to challenge Diem and his growing
dependence on the US.
Especially infuriating to Buddhists, Diem
had retained the French-imposed Decree #10, which labeled Buddhism as an
association rather then a religion. While the French had used this law to
limit the authority of Buddhists and increase the power of their Catholic
supporters, Diem’s refusal to throw out the onerous law served as a
constant reminder to Buddhists of their inferior status in South Vietnam
despite their claim to represent over 80 percent of the populace. No
longer willing to suffer humiliation from Diem and his Catholic-dominated
government, Buddhist leaders resolved to have a showdown with Diem when
the opportunity arrived.
[2]
The simmering anger in the
country finally found its expression in Hue on May 8, 1963, when Buddhists
marched to protest Diem’s recent order that banned the flying of any flag
but the national colors of South Vietnam. Buddhists objected that they
could not display their ensigns to commemorate the Buddha’s birthday,
though Catholics had recently carried papal flags while celebrating the
Silver Anniversary of Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, Diem’s brother. The
peaceful demonstration soon turned violent when riot police opened fire,
killing eight and wounding four.
[3]
As a result of the
bloodshed, Buddhist demands for equal treatment quickly resonated
throughout the nation as the movement gained strength and adherents with
each new act of defiance. The GVN, on the other hand, used force to put
down the agitation, creating even more support for the Buddhists. By the
end of May, the Buddhist Crisis had evolved into something far more
serious than an argument over flags. Many observers in the American press
and the US mission recognized that the Buddhist rebellion had exposed wide
divisions in South Vietnamese society and close to universal opposition to
Diem’s dictatorial rule. As the size and intensity of the Buddhist
rebellion grew, moreover, many commentators realized that the
Buddhists had energized a large segment of the population who wanted an
end to the police state in South Vietnam.[4]
The defining moment of the Buddhist crisis
occurred on June 11, 1963, when an elderly monk, Thich Quang Duc, sat in a
lotus position on a busy Saigon street and set himself on fire. This first
and most spectacular self-immolation during the 1963 Buddhist Crisis
stamped an image on the Vietnam War that has never faded away. While Thich
Quang Duc died in the belief that he would become a bodhisattva in calling
attention to the desperate condition of Buddhists in South Vietnam, his
act also galvanized world opinion and became a poignant example of South
Vietnamese resistance to Diem throughout the world.
[5]
More ominously for Diem, American public opinion increasingly swung toward
the Buddhists, who seemed to be battling for the most cherished American
value: freedom of religion.
[6]
Diem eventually forced the
issue by attacking the Buddhists. On August 21, 1963, GVN forces carried
out a swift, brutal subjugation of the Buddhists during the transition
period between US Ambassador Fredrick Nolting’s departure and the arrival
of the new American envoy, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Declaring martial law,
Diem implemented a curfew and imposed press censorship as security forces
carried out raids on Buddhist pagodas with great violence and repression
throughout the country.
[7]
The day after Diem’s
security forces attacked the pagodas, Lodge arrived in Saigon to take over
the American embassy. The appointment of Lodge, a well-known Republican
and former political rival of President John F. Kennedy, indicated a tough
new American attitude towards Diem. His reputation as a no-nonsense
diplomat seemed perfect for the difficult task of convincing Diem that his
government must change its relationship with its citizens to retain
American support. The selection of a prominent Republican also gave a
bipartisan slant to American policy in Vietnam and provided Kennedy with a
potential GOP scapegoat if the American position in Vietnam collapsed.[8]
Further aggravating relations with the GVN, Lodge granted asylum to
dissidents sought by GVN security forces. On September 1, three Buddhist
monks rushed towards the American embassy in Saigon, opening a bizarre chapter in American diplomatic history. One of them,
Thich Tri Quang, had been the only high Buddhist official to escape the
GVN on August 21. Thich Tri Quang’s militant, politicized brand of
Buddhism later caused the US incredible grief, but in 1963, Americans viewed him as a heroic figure
and a symbol of American resolve to force concessions from Diem. Lodge
granted the monks asylum and had special vegetarian meals brought in for
his guests, while resisting GVN demands that they be turned over to
security forces.
[9]
US leaders soon curtailed aid to the GVN
to gain leverage over Diem. The reduction in non-military aid had little
impact on South Vietnam, but the cuts provided ARVN generals with the
clear signal they had sought from the Americans that they would not oppose
a coup, which then occurred on November 1. The next day, after
spurning Lodge’s offer of safe conduct out of the country, Diem and his
brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were executed by rebellious troops. Eventually, the
clash between Diem and the Buddhists would have world-shaking implications
far out of proportion to a religious struggle in a remote corner of Asia that, ultimately, created a US
commitment leading to 58,000 American and 3 million Vietnamese deaths.
[10]
Thich Tri Quang walked out of the American embassy on November 4, 1963. His quiet departure
and the deference accorded him by both the new rulers of South Vietnam and
American officials gave no indication that in the coming years he would
lead numerous attempts to topple the South Vietnamese regimes that emerged
in the wake of the Diem coup. As a result of their impressive victory over
Diem, Buddhists emerged as a potent political force and the only
significant non-Communist opposition group in South Vietnam from 1963 to
1966. Their message of nationalism, peace and neutralism, moreover,
carried so much weight that for a short time they gained the ability to
bring down governments, veto appointments to high office and call
thousands of followers into the streets.
[11]
A great irony, however,
lies within the Vietnamese Buddhist movement during these years. Buddhists
opposed Diem because of his association with the Americans and his efforts
to find a military solution to South Vietnam’s problems. Little did they
realize that he had exerted a major effort to restrain the Americans and
that Washington had supported the November 1963 coup to gain a regime more
amenable to its will. The demise of the Diem regime created the situation
that the Buddhists fought to avoid at all costs: increased American
involvement in South Vietnam’s affairs and expansion of the war.
By destroying the Diem
regime, Buddhists produced a political vacuum filled by the US. Later
Buddhist-inspired agitation created even more instability, again
strengthening the US position in South Vietnam. This situation perpetuated
itself throughout the years of the Buddhist struggle: every effort to find
a government not under US domination led to increased American influence.
South Vietnamese, therefore, exerted less influence and control over their
affairs as the war expanded and became more violent. Just as US tactics
sparked an increased insurgency, Buddhist campaigns led to greater
American hegemony over South Vietnamese politics.
Vital differences
highlighted the 1963 and later struggles between Buddhists and the GVN.
Most Buddhist monks, nuns and lay people viewed the events of 1963 as a
struggle to preserve their way of life and a response to the suppression
of their religious freedom. From 1964 on, however, the conflict between
Buddhists and the GVN became more politically and emotionally charged. To
Buddhist leaders, nothing less than the fate of Vietnam and their
centuries-old relationship with the people remained at stake.
[12] They believed they had to save their country from a war driven by
foreign ideologies that had swept aside traditional Buddhist attitudes of
love and brotherhood. Political action evolved from their commitment to
two of the fundamental tenets of Buddhism: compassion and non-violence.
Buddhists, however, never
successfully resolved the problem of confronting a violent government with
non-violence. Often, the emotions unleashed by the Buddhist challenge to
the GVN led to dreadful savagery and destruction as the leadership lost
control of its followers, particularly students who had much to lose in a
country constantly expanding draft calls to fight an increasingly futile
and senseless war. Buddhists responded to the challenge of violence by
“finding means to avoid violence as much as possible” while confronting
adversaries with various forms of non-violent action including efforts to
address social problems caused by the war, publication of antiwar
literature, alliances with peace organizations outside of Vietnam, hunger
protests and general acts of non-cooperation with the GVN.[13]
Attempts by Buddhists to end the war,
remained consistent with the most basic precepts of Buddhism wherein they
felt compelled to bring their organizational talents and moral leadership
positions to the forefront to end the killing in South Vietnam. Regardless
of their stand on the war, many Buddhists expressed contempt for
Communism, which they viewed as a retarded form of Buddhism and a Western
concept unsuited to Vietnam. Realizing that many non-Communists had joined
the NLF, some Buddhists saw their movement as a way to lure non-Communist
elements away from the NLF into a coalition government designed to end the
war.
[14] Buddhists believed that
hastening an American exit and creating a coalition government in South
Vietnam remained the only ways to deny the NLF victory because GVN and US
actions served as the most potent recruiting tool for the NLF. Thus, the
Buddhist movement could be viewed as a last, desperate effort to prevent a
complete Communist victory in Vietnam.
Formation of the Unified
Buddhist
Church
Despite their success
in toppling Diem, Buddhists did not have an effective national
organization at the end of 1963. The multiplicity of sects in the country,
including significant numbers of both major streams of Buddhism, and the
historic autonomy of the pagoda frustrated efforts to create an effective
political vehicle to transform the victory over Diem into an association
that could challenge the GVN and end the war. The decentralized nature of
Vietnamese Buddhism, likewise, worked against a nationwide establishment
while the liberal doctrinal basis of Buddhism invited the factionalism
that plagued the movement. Buddhist leaders retained the ability to call
thousands of followers into the streets when they articulated a popular
message, but they seldom had the means to hold the separate factions
together for an extended period of time. In the end, they temporarily
overcame the severe regional, political and ideological divisions in the
movement to challenge the GVN. Nevertheless, although politically
powerful, the organized Buddhist movement never represented a majority of
Vietnamese Buddhists.
[15]
Buddhists spent the
first part of 1964 attempting to fashion an adequate organization.
Recognizing the need to project a united voice in opposing the war and
carrying out political and religious activities, they announced in January
the formation of a national association, the Unified Buddhist Church (UBC),
which combined elements of eleven different sects and the Theravada and
Mahayana streams of Buddhism.[16] Despite the creation of the
UBC, seven major groupings of Buddhism still existed in South Vietnam: the
UBC, Chinese Buddhists, Vietnamese Theravada Buddhists, Khmer Theravada
Buddhists, Hinayana Buddhists, Hoa Hao Buddhists, and non-UBC Southern
Buddhists.
[17]
Much of the conflict
within the UBC arose over the issue of neutralism. While Thich Tam Chau,
the nominal leader of the Buddhists, advocated a pro-government,
anti-neutral stance, Thich Tri Quang, leader of the Vien Hoa Dao
(Institute for the Propagation of the Faith, the political arm of the UBC),
and his followers wanted the GVN and the NLF to work out their problems
and implement a Vietnamese solution, such as a coalition government, to
end the war. Increasing levels of American interference in South
Vietnamese affairs and growing violence in the country, moreover,
strengthened the faction calling for neutralism.
The struggle over the
proper role of Buddhism had deep roots. Vietnamese Buddhists argued with
increasing ferocity throughout the century about the suitable character of
Buddhism in a society permeated with violence and injustice. The
disagreement raged between those who saw work for social justice and peace
as proper for Buddhist clergy and those who emphasized religious values
and removal from the world.[18]
These conflicts often operated on different levels influenced by age,
education, region, family background, rank in the religious hierarchy and
attitudes towards authority, exacerbated by regional divisions, the bane
of most attempts to achieve unity in modern Vietnam.[19] Buddhism, therefore, never spoke with one voice in Vietnam,
particularly given the myriad attitudes within its organizations.
Some Buddhists
perceived the deep distress in South Vietnamese society over the war and
responded with calls for peace. Sensing significant war weariness after a
quarter-century of conflict, Thich Nhat Hanh introduced a resolution
calling for an end to the fighting during a conference of monks early in
1964.[20]
A diminutive, gentle-looking monk who radiated serenity and
compassion, he eventually became an eloquent spokesman for peace in
Vietnam by focusing on the moral malaise that had descended on the country
as a result of the rapid changes brought on by the conflict. He also
helped reintroduce the concept of Engaged Buddhism, a militant social
activism that ignored both sides of the hostilities and concentrated on
bringing succor to its victims.[21]
In contrast to the
open, unassuming Thich Nhat Hanh stood Thich Tri Quang, leader of the
radical antiwar faction in the UBC. An enigmatic figure who projected an
aura of intensity with his stern bearing and obscure pronouncements, he
remained the best-known Buddhist monk to Americans in Saigon.
[22] American images of Thich Tri Quang, and Buddhists generally,
changed dramatically in 1964. Often referred to as a provocateur and a
schemer by Americans, Thich Tri Quang became the personification of evil
to the US embassy and much of the press. Numerous articles speculated on
his motives, his possible Communist connections and his thirst for power.
Yet, his actions and words changed very little between 1963 and 1964. A
hero for contributing to the demise of Diem, he appeared extremely
dangerous when he challenged the GVN and questioned American involvement
in South Vietnam. Nor was the bewilderment over Thich Tri Quang confined
to the US government and the American press; many Buddhists also found his
tactics and message confusing.
[23]
Another Buddhist monk,
Thich Tam Chau, represented the conservative mainstream faction of
Vietnamese Buddhism. A small, thin man with unremarkable features, he
reveled in the publicity and prestige accorded him as the official head of
South Vietnamese Buddhism, while opposing the political and social
activism of the younger monks. An ardent anti-Communist and refugee from
North Vietnam, he stressed moderation and opposition to the NLF, but he
attempted, at the same time, to hold the fragile Buddhist movement
together.
[24]
Thich Tam Chau and Thich
Tri Quang eventually engaged in a bitter battle for control of the
organization. In fact, if unanimity is possible in any discussion of the
Vietnam War, it comes closer over the impact of the struggle between the
two leaders of the movement. Almost all Buddhists agree that their
personal rivalry, which reached its climax during the Buddhist Crisis of
1966, hurt the movement badly, causing confusion among their followers and
making it easier for the GVN to suppress the UBC.
[25]
Despite their different
approaches, all three men had a vital stake in democracy. The outburst of
political activity that followed Diem’s death ended official repression of
Buddhists, gained them an equal voice in shaping government policy and
enabled the hierarchy to counter the growing influence of ARVN generals.
All three equated the survival of Buddhism with upholding the national
character of Vietnam.[26]
US/Buddhist Relations
The
relationship between the US government and Buddhists was one of escalating
tension after 1963 because significant cultural and philosophical
differences clouded their discourse and both held fundamentally different
worldviews. Much of the difficulty in ascertaining the true nature of the
Buddhist movement resulted from a changed relationship between Washington
and the American press in 1964. As historian Clarence Wyatt points out,
after the Buddhist Crisis of 1963, the US embarked on a new program of
“maximum candor” to bring the press over to its point of view. Given that
they suffered from a critical shortage of personnel in South Vietnam,
American reporters depended on US sources for information on the war and
the political situation in
South Vietnam.
[27]
When Maxwell Taylor, a career military officer with little patience for an
indigenous South Vietnamese peace movement, assumed control of the
American embassy in 1964, his hostility towards the Buddhists soon found
expression in US press reports.
On the other hand,
Vietnamese responses to American actions flowed mainly from their
religious and cultural orientation. Although Buddhism has had a
significant impact on its development, the most important religious
influence in Vietnam and the rest of East Asia is ancestor worship. Every
Vietnamese home has a family altar with pictures of earlier generations
who receive homage for their wisdom and respect for the wrath that can
descend on a household failing to give proper respect to its ancestors. By
worshipping one’s ancestors, a person becomes linked to the past and is made extremely conscious of the
importance of tradition in society. A culture that venerates its ancestors
naturally places the family at the center of society and shows great
respect for elderly people because they speak with the wisdom of
experience and history. It is not hard to imagine the impact someone like
Nguyen Cao Ky, South Vietnam's Prime Minster from 1965-67, with his
youthful impetuosity and playboy image, had on a society so closely in
touch with its history. In the same fashion, scholars stand at the top of
the social hierarchy and military people at the bottom, reflecting the
Confucian emphasis on attaining social harmony through benevolent action
by the ruled and the ruler.
Buddhism came to
Vietnam in the early part of the Christian era by way of China and India.
Vietnamese Buddhism, heavily influenced by China, absorbed elements of
Taoism, Confucianism and ancestor worship along with the veneration of
local deities. The emphasis in northern and central Vietnam came mainly
from the Mahayana school of Buddhism, which predominated in Vietnam,
China, Korea and Japan. Mahayana Buddhism, which developed several
centuries after the death of the Buddha, focuses on achieving social
justice and assisting others to reach enlightenment and worships a
multiplicity of deities. Theravada Buddhism, which prevails in Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Laos, Burma, Cambodia and among ethnic Cambodians in the
southern part of present-day Vietnam, is more fundamentalist and
conservative, places greater emphasis on monasticism and focuses on the
Buddha alone.
Buddhists, in general,
subscribe to a number of beliefs drawn from Hinduism. One of the most
important is the concept of karma wherein Buddhists believe that an
individual’s station in life is determined by actions in a previous
existence. Good actions confer higher status while immorality can cause
one to return as an insect or snake or some other unfortunate creature.
Most Vietnamese lay people belong to the Pure Land school of Buddhism and
trust that their actions today can influence their fate tomorrow. Thus,
they have faith in the importance of performing meritorious acts to ensure
that their future will be easier. Many monks and nuns, on the other hand,
subscribe to Thien (better known as Zen), a discipline that teaches that
the key to liberation can be attained through meditation on a seemingly
incongruous statement or question.
Despite the doctrinal
differences between Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, both streams place
the concept of compassion and non-violence at the center of their
ideology. Non-violence, however, constitutes more than a strategy to win
expanded civil rights or other political goals. It is a way of life that
respects the rights of every living creature.[28] Therefore, Buddhist
attempts to end the war remained consistent with the most basic precepts
of Buddhism. Buddhists had traditionally participated in battles
against foreign invaders. Pagodas had served as supply depots and centers
of resistance during the struggle with the French, and Vietnamese monks
had historically taken an active role in political affairs, particularly
in the campaign to expel the Chinese.
[29] Thus, they sensed no contradiction in upholding the rights
of the people against an oppressive government and a foreign invader.
[30]
Buddhist efforts to
bring democracy to the country resulted from more than a political
strategy to end the war. Buddhism is inherently egalitarian, and most
monks and nuns had grown accustomed to working in a system where the
majority ruled. Buddhists consider all people equally responsible for
their actions and follow the Protestant principle wherein individuals and
groups who disagree with the will of the body are encouraged to form their
own assemblages. The Sangha (monks, nuns and lay people) conducts its
business democratically, and Zen teaches its adherents to seek true freedom from the restraints of
traditional thinking. Thus, Buddhists naturally believed in a democratic
system as a vehicle to express the people’s will and voice objections to
the misrule, rampant corruption and infighting of the GVN.[31] The absence of a
legal system to redress grievances with the GVN, moreover, led Vietnamese
to turn for leadership to Buddhist monks and nuns, the intellectual and
moral guides of the nation. Buddhists, however, saw democracy more as an
expression of the popular will to end the war than the special-interest
pluralism common to American political discourse.
Washington eventually directed enormous hostility towards the Buddhists
because neither side could part the cloud of misunderstanding that
separated them. Each followed significantly different approaches to life
and considered its system to be superior to the other. Buddhist logic
particularly rejected US involvement in South Vietnam while Washington
simply could not understand how groups like the Buddhists could even
consider talking to the Communists, much less joining them in a coalition
government. Buddhist efforts to seek an accommodation with the NLF seemed
tantamount to treason to US officials.
Further compounding
tensions, it was simply incomprehensible to US officials steeped in Cold
War thinking about the malevolence of Communism that the Buddhists would
want to seek an accommodation with the NLF. Many members of the US mission
assumed that Buddhist leaders were naive in their assessment of the NLF.
Yet, Buddhists had formed what they believed to be a realistic appraisal
of the dangers of a coalition government and decided that the risk of a
Communist power grab outweighed the destruction wrought by the US military
in South Vietnam. They may have been naive in assuming they could join
with the non-Communist elements to
control the Communists in the NLF, but they had a far more realistic
assessment of the possibility of a US victory and the ability of the NLF
to prolong the stalemate on the battlefield until the US gave up and
withdrew its forces.
Western and Asian
cultures also have different approaches to conflict. The West, especially
the US, considers the direct approach the hallmark of business practice
and discourse in general. Asians, however, value indirectness and Asian
philosophy enhances this approach. Confucianism stresses the importance
of attaining social harmony while Taoism emphasizes accord with the
universe. Both philosophies denigrate violence and the use of force to
gain power.[32] Zen particularly
focuses on the use of obscure or indirect questions and statements to
create puzzlement, which, it is hoped, will force the listener to look at
the situation in a new and unexpected way. Thus, what Americans often
considered deceitful or dishonest behavior on the part of Vietnamese
actually reflected their cultural emphasis on avoiding the outward
appearance of conflict.[33]
While some Americans
remained sure of the excellence of their system, many Vietnamese Buddhists
suspected differently. Considering American thinking to be one-dimensional
and believing that the West remained in the midst of a spiritual quandary,
they perceived that Buddhism had the ability to solve their problems.[34] Thus, both groups considered their philosophy superior to
the other while dismissing the other side’s belief system.
Finally, Buddhist
philosophy had a major impact on Vietnamese views of the US. Religious
historian Trevor Ling has characterized the development of Buddhism as an
explosion of rational thought over the problem of human suffering, an
argument that would shock Americans
who viewed Buddhist prelates as wandering ascetics uninterested in the
cares of this world.[35]
Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) and his followers, however, set out to
discover why humans suffer. They concluded that people ail because they
crave things like money, possessions, power, long life or fame. After
considerable reflection, the Buddha realized that the major difficulty for
humans resided in the fact that the things they yearn for are impermanent
and in a state of decay. Thus, they never satisfy the people who covet
them. In fact, the more people get, the more they want, so that many
humans live a life of increasing demands and downward spiraling
unhappiness. The Buddha recognized that the key to enlightenment and
escape from the endless cycle of birth, death and rebirth lay in the
renunciation of craving. By destroying desire, he argued, humans could
find true happiness. In addition, the Buddha taught that everything humans
needed to complete this process existed within them. From this great insight, Buddhists developed the concept of
non-attachment to all things, including ideology.
Many Buddhists
found American capitalism repulsive and believed they understood what
drove American actions in Vietnam more than the US did. Some sensed that
American problems had resulted from efforts to protect its wealth and
power, which were in a state of decay. Therefore, even though the US held
more riches than any other country in the world, it hungered for more
while going to fantastic lengths to protect what it had. Given that
Communism threatened American treasure and power, the US had to combat it
to preserve its affluence. Buddhists realized the futility of the
American effort. They could see where the America's longing for security
had led them while Vietnamese appetites brought on by the adoption of
American habits and mores seemed sure to destroy their society also.
Closely aligned with
the idea of non-attachment is compassion. Even though most suffering is
self-inflicted, the Buddha called on his followers always to practice
non-violence and compassion. Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh has advanced
the argument that full shelves in Western grocery stores while people
starve in the Third World constitutes a form of violence. Yet, he argues
that the great wealth of the West has done nothing to cure the intense
religious crisis that has gripped it for most of this century. He claims
that the vast riches of the West have created a situation where the more
the nations owned the more they wanted to protect, leading to a ruinous
arms race that further deprived the poor of their share of the world’s
resources.
[36]
Another difficulty came
from the bipolar attitude of American officials. In their Cold War view,
one must either support the US or the Communists. Those who stood in the
middle and attempted to steer a course between the two ideologies appeared
more dangerous than anyone else. The idea of rejecting both seemed
incredible since American logic said either one is with us or against us.
After all, what good is a superpower-dominated bipolar world if groups
decline to sign up with either side? Thus, American leaders could not
understand neutrality, while Buddhists opposed adherence to any ideology.
Zen logic
also rejected the basis of the Cold War. Zen teaches that the key to
enlightenment lies in understanding the true nature of the universe while
specifically refuting duality and adherence to any belief system. Zen
holds that that the normal dichotomous descriptions that split the world
into two spheres cannot provide an accurate understanding of human
existence. Zen practitioners only begin to sense the proper character of
the world when they move to this more nuanced understanding of the
universe. Thus, the philosophy that informed many Buddhist monks and nuns
in Vietnam rebuffed Cold War ideology and the American argument that
Communism had to be confronted in Vietnam. Adding to American confusion,
Zen remains almost incomprehensible to a person unprepared for its unique
qualities, vague statements, slaps in the face and weird humor. In fact,
in Zen, enlightenment comes all at once like a thunderclap when the
disciple finally senses the precise makeup of the universe.
[37]
Buddhism had survived
for two thousand years in Vietnam by understanding the transitory nature
of power. Buddhist clerics have often opposed the government but always
retained close ties to the people. Thus, they remained very shrewd in
understanding their relationship with their fellow Vietnamese. Buddhist
prelates depended on the Sangha for their daily necessities while the
laity looked to the clergy for leadership and moral guidance. Out of this
symbiotic relationship grew the interdependence that represents the
essence of Vietnamese Buddhism. After all, what is more rational than
wanting to survive? Equating their future with the people meant Buddhist
monks and nuns had to attempt to stop the war while adhering to
traditional Buddhist concepts of compassion and non-violence.[38]
Significantly different philosophical and worldviews ensured that
Americans and Buddhists would clash over the issue of war or peace in
Vietnam. Neither side particularly tried to understand the other while
each considered its system superior.
One great
exception to the Buddhist approach towards the war occurred in the Mekong
Delta among Hoa Hao Buddhists. Founded in 1939 by a charismatic young
healer named Huynh Phu So, Hoa Hao Buddhism matched the conditions and
lifestyle of the peasantry of the area well. Realizing that extreme poverty and ties to the land prevented
many peasants from participating in Buddhist rites, Huynh Phu So called
for a Buddhism bereft of clergy and temples. Instead, he combined ancestor
worship with Buddhist ritual and invited his followers to practice their
religion at home. At the same time, stories of miraculous healing on his
part greatly enhanced his reputation with the people of the region.
In 1947, the Communists
captured, tried and secretly executed the founder of Hoa Hao Buddhism
because they feared his growing influence in the anti-French resistance.
Then they dismembered his body and dumped it into a river so that his
followers would not expect him to be reincarnated. However, because no one
ever recovered the corpse, many Hoa Hao expect him to return some day as a
Buddha who will bring them peace and happiness. Not surprisingly, Hoa Hao
people never forgave the Communists for assassinating their founder and
became fervently anti-Communist, joining the French against them and later
the South Vietnamese government against the NLF. As a result, the Hoa Hao
opposed efforts by Buddhists to negotiate with the NLF, instead choosing
to fight the Communists until the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975.
[39]
The Impulse Towards
Neutralism
With Diem's removal in
1963, the Buddhist movement appeared triumphant. Their fervent desire to
end an increasingly violent war in the countryside and create a situation
where Vietnamese could decide their fate irrespective of Cold War
rivalries seemed to Buddhists to be realized with the installation of the
new government of General Duong Van Minh. After Diem’s fall, moreover, South Vietnam’s future looked bright. Newspapers
sprang up, political parties proliferated, and for the first time in its
brief history, open discussion began on the direction of the country.
Severe tensions soon
arose, however, over the extent of freedom allowable in a country at war.
A widespread feeling that the US had engineered the Diem coup to bring a
more representative government to South Vietnam contributed to a rising
tide of democracy and later extreme disillusionment when it failed.[40] Unfortunately, the US squandered the immense political capital it
had gained with the Diem coup by moving away from its often-stated
commitment to democracy in favor of stability because it remained chiefly
concerned with defeating the insurgency.[41]
NLF activity increased
dramatically in the weeks after the coup, leading to an agonizing US
reappraisal on the progress of the war. Within a short time, Washington
discovered that the uprising in the countryside ranged far wider than US
officials had realized and that the war would soon be lost without an
extraordinary reversal in the field. The contradictions inherent in the
creation of South Vietnam and the intense power of Vietnamese nationalism,
combined with Diem’s inept rule, foreclosed any possibility of a speedy
victory.[42]
At the same time, Minh
assessed the war weariness among the people and began to hesitate in
prosecuting the war. A popular Buddhist general commonly referred to as
Big Minh due to his unusual height for a Vietnamese, he formed a
government of prominent civilians and like-minded military leaders with
the goal of seeking a neutral solution to the war through a negotiated
settlement with the NLF.
Minh’s labors to
terminate the fighting created powerful adversaries because Washington
opposed any move towards neutralization, which seemed tantamount to total
defeat akin to the “loss” of China in 1949. While US leaders feared the
domestic recriminations that would follow a withdrawal from South Vietnam
in an election year, Minh's efforts also alienated a number of ARVN
generals who owed their positions and power to a continuation of the
struggle and American financial support. Although a number of officers
formed dissident organizations to challenge Minh, in the end, General
Nguyen Khanh led the group that seized power and attempted to form a
military dictatorship.[43]
Khanh’s January 1964
coup temporarily ended any opportunity to stop the war through
negotiations. A short, pudgy, goateed, jaunty character, Khanh seemed like
a breath of fresh air when he told the Americans he had overthrown the
government to prevent it from embracing a neutral solution to the
conflict. He appeared forceful, energetic and dedicated to pursuing the
war with vigor, and his government outlawed neutralism.[44] Thus, the US threw its full weight behind Khanh and his
argument that South Vietnam could not afford democracy while war raged in
the countryside. General Maxwell Taylor, US ambassador to South Vietnam
during the second half of 1964, claimed that President Johnson’s concern
over the possibility of more coups in South Vietnam led him to instruct
his policy makers to advertise Khanh as the clear favorite of the US. As
Taylor remembered, “When it was all over, there was no doubt that he was
the ‘American boy,’ at least for the time being.”[45]
Yet, the replacement of
one dictator with another caused the country to seethe with discontent.
While pleasing the US with his get-tough attitude towards the war, Khanh
could not bring political unity to South Vietnam. Over time, he moved
closer to the US and further from his own citizenry, setting the stage for an explosion of protest
against his government, which he himself ignited in August 1964.
The
First Buddhist Crisis of 1964 - Anarchy in South Vietnam
Like
Buddhists, South Vietnamese Catholics also had to adjust to a new
political situation. The fall of Diem and efforts to remove members of his
Can Lao party from official positions threatened Catholics with a loss of
their privileged position in South Vietnam. In addition, tension between
Khanh and members of the largely Catholic Dai Viet party reflected their
fear of the potential for radical political change in favor of groups less
dedicated to carrying out the war.
[46]
In May, Thich Tri Quang
charged the government with a lack of commitment in removing former Diem
bureaucrats and asserted that many government officials continued to
persecute Buddhists. While Khanh unquestionably wanted to prevent renewed
Buddhist protests, he understood that many of his most effective officials
were fervently anti-Communist Catholics. By removing these elements, he
would seriously undercut his ability to combat the growing NLF menace,
create a severe reaction in right-wing groups like the Dai Viet and most
likely provoke his American sponsors, who wanted the war prosecuted with
greater effort.
[47]
Khanh decided to
mollify the Buddhists with other actions. As a partial palliative, he
executed Ngo Dinh Can, Diem’s brother and the virtual warlord of the Hue
area, and decided to prosecute Major Dang Sy, the Catholic officer who had
issued the order to open fire on Buddhist demonstrators in May 1963.
[48] Vietnamese Catholic Bishops, however, objected strenuously to the
possibility of a trial, claiming that public opinion had been stirred up
against Dang Sy through a concerted public relations campaign. Khanh also
moved quickly to preempt Buddhist efforts to challenge his rule by
repealing Decree #10, the hated law that declared Buddhism to be an
association rather than a religious organization.
[49]
Tensions coursing
through the Catholic community contributed to growing opposition to Khanh.
Objecting to perceived favoritism towards Buddhists by Khanh officials and
Lodge, 35,000 Catholics demonstrated in Saigon on June 7, 1964. Most of
the protesters objected to the removal of Catholic officials and claimed
they were now subjected to the same discrimination they had been accused
of by Buddhists when Diem held power.
[50]
Increased activity by
the Dai Viet party, however, created a much more dangerous situation for
Khanh. A right-wing, nationalist party formed in the 1930s, the Dai Viet
absorbed many elements of the Can Lao party and, thus, hewed to a
pro-Catholic, anti-Communist line.
Many key army officers belonged to this group and watched Khanh
closely in hopes he would falter and they could seize power. One of their
leaders, Nguyen Van Thieu, eventually ruled South Vietnam from 1967 to the
end of the war.
[51]
Through the adroit use of
personal diplomacy and concessions, Khanh temporarily cooled the passions
of Buddhists and Catholics. His ability to confront issues head-on and
meet with opposition parties enabled him to continue in office even with
the deteriorating situation in the countryside, despite serious questions
concerning the viability of his government and reservations over his
ability to confront a concerted challenge. Indeed,
although numerous hostile forces besieged
Khanh during his early months in office, his ability to confront these
groups contrasted favorably with
Diem’s moves the previous summer. In August, however, his political
instincts deserted him when the Gulf of Tonkin incident emboldened
him to increase his power.
Khanh declared
a state of emergency on August 8, 1964. Claiming that South Vietnam needed
a new martial spirit to combat increased Communist insurgency and wage a
possible war with North Vietnam, he suspended a number of civil liberties
and imposed a national curfew.
[52] In seeking to divert
attention from his power grab by focusing on the threat from the North,
Khanh misjudged popular attitudes in calling for an expanded war from a
society sick of conflict. This seemed particularly true in view of the
fact that US reprisals against North Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin
incident had already inflamed Vietnamese emotions by signaling an increase
in the fighting.
Nine days
later, Khanh promulgated a new constitution and declared himself president
of South Vietnam.
[53] His seizure of increased power along with his suspension of civil
liberties created a widespread belief that he wanted to establish a
military dictatorship. Buddhists particularly understood this would wreck
any chance to end the war. Suddenly, the burst of democratic activity that
had been the fruit of the hard-fought victory against Diem seemed
endangered. Thus, the country rapidly erupted into a state of frenzied
anarchy and more instability as students carried out another round of
ferocious demonstrations similar to those of 1963. While students engaged
in violent protests, Buddhist leaders organized huge anti-government
demonstrations and worked behind the scenes to influence Khanh.
[54]
Adding to the chaos in the
streets, simmering tensions between Catholics and Buddhists exploded into
religious warfare. On August 24, fighting broke out in Danang between
large groups of Catholic and Buddhist students, while other Buddhist
students roamed the streets of Hue
enforcing a school boycott.
On August 25, some 10,000 Buddhists attacked and burned to the
ground a Catholic village near Danang in what Time referred to as
“an anti-Catholic pogrom.” Danang soon witnessed large mobs of Catholic
and Buddhist students surging through its streets in search of each other,
resulting in horrific violence and atrocities. Soon religious violence
spread to Saigon and other urban areas of South Vietnam, contributing to
an image that the country had descended into a primordial kind of anarchy.
Press reports of soldiers and police witnessing rioting and violence with
no response added an almost surreal quality to the apparent collapse of
South Vietnamese society.
[55]
Disregarding appalling
violence and disorder, Khanh refused to move to restore order. The events
of 1963 paralyzed him; a strong move against the rioters and more
instability, he feared might turn the Americans against him as with Diem.
On the other hand, many high-ranking ARVN officers expressed astonishment
over his refusal to confront the demonstrators. So did Ambassador Taylor,
who urged him not to give in to the Buddhists because concessions might
encourage them to seek more accommodations from the GVN. This echoed the
same reasoning Diem had used the previous year when he refused to grant
Buddhist demands. Khanh certainly knew this, perhaps Taylor did not, but
in light of Diem’s experience, it is not surprising that Khanh ignored
Taylor.
[56]
Life in the cities
contributed to the Buddhist ability to mobilize mass action and the NLF to
recruit new members since both groups competed for the same disaffected
elements. Josef Reisinger, of the Far Eastern Economic Review,
illustrated the effects of thousands of refugees moving to the cities when
he characterized Saigon in August 1964 as a filthy city with garbage and
litter lying uncollected, while in the streets, “Beggars were everywhere:
old men, women, crippled and children.”
He described the malaise affecting the Vietnamese: "Two decades of terror,
fighting and death have sapped the citizens of this country of their
energy and will to struggle for an unknown ‘freedom.’ Sickened and
demoralized, they have lapsed into an almost traditional fatalism: What
Buddha wishes will come to pass."
[57]
In addition, America’s neo-colonial assault
on Vietnamese culture exerted an extreme psychological effect on many
South Vietnamese so soon after independence from
France. This was often illustrated by the orgy of senseless violence that
raged through the cities of South
Vietnam. In many cases, students acted as a leaderless mob intent only on
destruction. They focused on religious differences, which were simpler to
identify, rather than the pain they felt over the destruction of their
culture. The anarchy in the streets convinced many US officials that they
needed to exert greater control over the GVN to carry on the war.
Khanh responded to the sudden expression of
Buddhist political power by offering to meet with Buddhist leaders. The
Buddhist hierarchy took advantage of the opportunity to press their cause
by demanding an immediate cessation of the president's dictatorial powers,
calling for a purge of Catholics in the GVN and advocating the formation
of a government that followed the popular will.
[58] Khanh quickly agreed, but damaged
himself further in Vietnamese eyes when he told them that he had to check
with the Americans before concluding an agreement.
[59]
After five days of
unparalleled violence and protest, Khanh withdrew the new constitution and
resigned. Emboldened by Khanh’s vulnerability and repelled by his
weakness in confronting the rioters, a Catholic faction of the Military
Revolutionary Committee (MRC), the
group of generals who ostensibly ran the country, blocked him from
regaining full power in the new government. On August 27, the MRC
appointed a triumvirate of generals - - Khanh, Minh and General Tran Thien
Khiem - - to form a caretaker government that would rule until a new
government could be formed. The makeup of the triumvirate reflected the
major power groups that emerged from the crisis: Minh, favored by the
Buddhists due to his support for neutrality; Khiem, the Catholic leader of
the Dai Viet faction in the army; and Khanh, supported by the US, but
temporarily aligned with the Buddhists.
[60]
An inherently unstable
expedient sure to fade quickly, the triumvirate left the US with no
government to control. As a result, Americans began dictating to
individual factions in the country. Hence, Buddhist efforts to remove
foreign influences from their country had ensured that the only stable
force left in South Vietnamese politics was an entity totally alien to
Vietnamese culture: the US. Thus, Washington, rather than Khanh, the
Buddhists, ARVN or the NLF, became the dominant factor in South Vietnamese
politics.
Although
Khanh’s ineptitude had plunged South Vietnam into chaos, Taylor insisted
that the US would not support a government without him. Thich Tri Quang
and Thich Tam Chau also endorsed Khanh to prevent a possible military coup.
[61] As a result, Khanh continued to run South Vietnam given that the
support of the Buddhists and Americans meant he could rule without
consulting the others.
[62]
Nevertheless, Americans remained extremely concerned about the Buddhist
alliance with Khanh because the embassy could exert little control over
them.
Finally, on August 29
the GVN moved to restore order. Despite the arrest of five hundred
protesters, the rioting continued, leading troops to open fire on the
demonstrators. The MRC declared martial law, with a curfew and the closing
of all schools in Saigon. Police and ARVN leaders sternly warned students
and other demonstrators that no further protests would be tolerated.
[63]
The Buddhists appeared
victorious. Their power had increased dramatically in less than two
weeks, and they had paid an incredibly small price for their victory. No
sweeping arrests of monks, no raids on pagodas, no repression and, most
significantly, no self-immolations had accompanied their struggle. With
virtually no support left besides the US, Khanh quickly embraced the
opportunity to gain Buddhist backing when they presented their demands to
him on August 25.
American Retort
Concerned over
the possibility of the GVN’s imminent collapse and increasingly doubtful
of Khanh’s ability to rule, Washington reacted to the chaos in South
Vietnam with great anxiety. At the height of the disorder, Washington
announced its unqualified support for Khanh and indicated it would oppose
any attempt to oust him. Bui Diem, a prominent South Vietnamese
politician and later ambassador to the US, expressed the irony of the
American position by pointing out that US plans to escalate the conflict
seemed threatened by the increased instability in South Vietnam. Diem
placed the anarchy in South Vietnam on America’s doorstep, arguing that
its preference for security over democracy had inflamed much of the urban
populace of South Vietnam.[64]
Having fought so hard against Diem for freedom, many South Vietnamese were
astounded to see the champion of liberal democracy disregard their
aspirations and support a military dictatorship.
[65]
In the same fashion,
many Americans turned on the Buddhists with a level of hostility formerly
reserved for the NLF.[66]
Admitting that Thich Tri Quang was not a Communist, the CIA nevertheless
labeled him “a fanatic nationalist, undoubtedly anxious to see the US out
of Vietnam at the earliest possible moment.”
[67]
Taylor ominously described him as “the most effective and dangerous
politician in Vietnam” and warned that the Buddhist leader “may have
ambitions extending beyond Vietnam.”[68] General William
Westmoreland, commander of American forces in South Vietnam, argued that
Thich Tri Quang “wanted a dominant voice in the government,”
[69] while the American Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, had
referred to him several months earlier as “an ambitious, dangerous,
unpredictable, powerful, political force antagonistic to Khanh’s
government.”
[70]
US journalists lashed out
at Thich Tri Quang as well. In June 1964, Time called him “a
frail, hot eyed monk ... [who] has managed to confuse everyone about his
political loyalties.”
[71] By September, the magazine
viewed him as “an ambitious, probably neutralist and possibly
pro-Communist intriguer.”
[72]
America, a Catholic
magazine indulging in the tortuous logic of the Cold War, charged falsely
that Thich Tri Quang was a “former activist with the Communist Viet Minh
and is therefore Communist trained.”
[73]
American journalists also
found the events of August extremely unsettling. Peter Grose of the New
York Times argued that the last week of August had represented “a
shattering week for the present program of the United States to defend
Southeast Asia.”
[74]
Time, referring to the fall of the Khanh regime as “perhaps
the most critical setback to date” for the US, decried the actions of
groups who seemed oblivious to the importance of the war against the
Communists.
[75] Newsweek argued that Buddhists no longer felt content with
religious hegemony and now sought political power while complaining that
they lacked a coherent political platform.
[76]
The constant disorder in
the country led Taylor to grow increasingly pessimistic over the ability
of the GVN to defeat the NLF. He concluded that the instability and
weakness of the GVN could in time force the US to attack the Communists to
free South Vietnam from their grip. Tragically for the US and Vietnam,
Taylor’s assessment led him to advocate offensive action against the DRV
to stave off a South Vietnamese collapse.
[77] Thus, Buddhist peace efforts led the ambassador to conclude that
only an American expansion of the war could forestall a GVN move to settle
the conflict.
August 1964 constituted a
stunning reversal for the US as officials began to understand the depth of
opposition in the country to the GVN and continued war. Increasingly, the
GVN seemed hopelessly enfeebled and the Buddhists appeared almost
invincible, leading American leaders and journalists to blame the NLF for
the anarchy. While Buddhist power had been exaggerated by the US and the
GVN, Buddhist muscle-flexing genuinely concerned both governments given
that Washington could not accept that its presence in South Vietnam
sparked the instability that it decried.
Continuous Chaos
The perceived
powerlessness of the Khanh regime and general ARVN dissatisfaction over
his capitulation to the Buddhists soon created more volatility in South
Vietnam. While Buddhists asserted
themselves, ARVN generals seethed over Khanh’s weakness. On September 13,
dissident military officers attempted to overthrow Khanh. The coup only
lasted one day after Nguyen Cao Ky (commander of the Vietnamese Air Force
and later prime minister of South Vietnam) refused to desert Khanh and
threatened to bomb the rebels.
[78]
Nevertheless, the attempted overthrow indicated the deep concern many ARVN
officers felt over Buddhist domination of Khanh.
[79]
Some commentators,
however, understood the Buddhist position. Following the coup, The Far
Eastern Economic Review editorialized that “there is a growing body of
opinion which holds that the war against the Viet Cong is anyway a
hopeless one.” It called on the US to negotiate because “it is undeniable
that the neutralist solution would probably be the most accurate
reflection of the desires of the majority of the South Vietnamese.”
[80] Historian Marilyn Young agrees, arguing that “Any government in
Saigon that aspired to popular support was likely to seek peace with the
NLF and in time probably reunification as well.”
[81]
To forestall further
coup attempts, Duong Van Minh announced the names of the High National
Councilors (HNC) on September 17. This group, made up of distinguished
South Vietnamese civilians, aimed to return South Vietnam to non-military
rule by writing a provisional constitution and selecting an interim
legislature to govern until it took effect. On October 25, the HNC named
Phan Khac Suu temporary head of the government.
[82]
Meanwhile, Buddhists
issued their boldest appeal for peace to date. On September 24, the
journal of the UBC, Hai Trieu Am (Voice of the Rising Tide),
published “Urgent Prayers of a Suffering People,” which called for a
negotiated settlement and for the combatants to refrain from killing each
other. More importantly, the article referred to NLF cadres as brothers, a
powerful indicator of the
fratricidal nature of the steadily expanding war. The GVN promptly shut
the journal down, leading Buddhists to launch a new publication.
[83]
Thus, what the United
States feared most had emerged from the Buddhist challenge to Khanh. He
seemed increasingly under Buddhist control as the country lurched from
military dictatorship to collective rule to civilian government to
attempted government by coup ending in another seemingly bedeviled effort
to return to legal constitutional rule in South Vietnam. Yet, this too was
destined to fail. No government operating under the control of the US and
advocating expanded war could survive if the populace had the opportunity
to express its will.
The Second
Buddhist Crisis of 1964
Suu’s
appointment of Tran Van Huong as prime minister of the provisional
government and successor to Khanh soon incited significant opposition
within Saigon. Some Vietnamese called for his ouster on the grounds that
he seemed too old and lacked fresh ideas, while student groups objected to
his proclamation that demonstrations would not be tolerated.
[84]
While many complained that Huong had not purged Diemist elements from his
regime, others argued that by appointing civil servants with previous
government experience rather than politicians espousing new ideas, the GVN
ensured that nothing would change. By ignoring religious groups in making
appointments, moreover, Huong quickly gained the enmity of both Catholics
and Buddhists.[85] Unlike Khanh, Huong confronted agitators with force, threatening potential protesters with immediate conscription into ARVN, a
response remarkably similar to Diem’s when faced with dissent in 1963.
[86]
Within a week, the city
again exploded in antigovernment fury. Although Huong blamed the
disturbances on disgruntled political figures and insisted that religious
organizations refrain from political activities, Buddhist leaders almost
immediately joined students in demanding Huong’s ouster, leading
exasperated government leaders finally to use regular army units to quell
the disturbances.[87] As in the disorders of August, the GVN threatened arrested
protesters with trial and summary execution before military tribunals.[88]
After the GVN imposed
martial law on Saigon, Buddhist leaders closed the headquarters of the UBC
and organized a campaign of non-cooperation to topple the Huong regime.
[89] On November 29, a
spontaneous sit-down strike in Saigon led ARVN troops to wade into the
crowd and disburse it with rifle butts. When authorities reported that a
number of weapons had been seized, along with documents implicating the
NLF in the protests, Huong claimed the march represented part of an NLF
plan to seize control of the city or even overthrow the government.
[90] Thich Tri Quang, Thich Tam Chau and Thich Tinh Khiet
responded by initiating a forty-eight-hour hunger strike as part of their
non-violent retort to the Huong regime. On December 16, Buddhists
intensified their opposition to the GVN when several hundred Buddhists
joined the hunger strike.
[91]
Once again, the absence of
a popular government had sparked opposition to the GVN. Constant Buddhist
references to the will of the people acknowledged what just about everyone
in the US government and the GVN knew but feared to say: few people wanted
the war to continue. Nevertheless, Taylor worked assiduously to establish
peace between Huong and the Buddhists. The irony was inescapable for
anyone who noticed: the US, which had opposed Diem because he rejected
compromise with the Buddhists and objected to Khanh he did, now found
itself saddled with another Diem-like figure who refused to grant
concessions to the Buddhists. In this case, however, Huong received
considerable encouragement from Taylor to stand up to the Buddhists.[92]
Other events soon
temporarily swept aside US concerns with the Buddhists. On December 20,
ARVN generals dismissed and arrested some members of the HNC and granted
additional authority to Suu and Huong.[93] When he heard about the coup, the latest manifestation of the
instability driving him to distraction, Taylor exploded in a burst of
anger, dressing down the coup leaders and demanding that Khanh report to
the embassy to explain the latest takeover.[94]
Khanh
retorted that if Taylor wanted to talk with him, he should come to his
headquarters.[95] The next day, in a barely disguised swipe at Taylor and the US,
Khanh announced that ARVN wanted to fight for the Vietnamese people rather
than to fulfill the aims of another nation. Young claims that, at this
point, Taylor insisted that Khanh quit and Khanh threatened to ask for
Taylor’s recall.[96]
The struggle between
Huong and the Buddhists now receded into the background as deteriorating
relations between Khanh and Taylor moved to center stage.[97]
For the remainder of the year, as they struggled privately and publicly,
Taylor increasingly questioned Khanh’s ability to rule, while Khanh
threatened to have Taylor declared persona non grata. On a more
fundamental level, Khanh began talking to the NLF about a possible
negotiated settlement, which brought the full weight of the US against
him.
[98]
Buddhist Setbacks in 1965
At the end of August 1964,
Buddhists seemed the overwhelming victors as they moved from opposition to
support of the status quo and restoration of civilian government. They
discovered by year’s end, however, that they had won a hollow victory.
Like most popular grass-roots movements, they remained more effective at
expressing and directing resistance than at forming policy or leading a
government. Their enhanced position resulted more from the weakness of the
GVN than their own power.
For Washington, 1964
ended worse than it had begun, with the GVN in complete disarray and the
US on the verge of attacking North Vietnam. Bui Diem saw this as the
inevitable result of a decade of blunders in South Vietnam, where “The
American policy of boosting whoever happened to grab power, for the sake
of elusive stability, was now reaping its harvest.”[99] McNamara argues
that, at this stage, the US should have pushed the GVN to the point where
a decision to conform to US plans became inescapable. Then, he suggests,
the US should have withdrawn from South Vietnam.
[100]
Following the fall of
Huong in January 1965, South Vietnam seemed close to realizing peace.
Khanh increasingly identified with the aspirations of the Buddhists to
create a neutralized South Vietnam, leading the US to encourage ARVN
generals to overthrow his regime. Even though the Americans successfully
jettisoned Khanh, as historian David Kaiser points out, "remarkably, the
pro-American anti-Communist political forces within South Vietnam had
steadily lost ground since mid-1963 not merely to the Communists but also
to non-Communist neutralists led by the Buddhists, the only non-Communist
political force that could develop a mass following."
[101]
After the expulsion of
Khanh in February, South Vietnam embarked on a period of civilian rule
under Dr. Phan Huy Quat. His zeal to lead the nation effectively and to
slow the rush toward an expanded conflict suffered constant interference
from the Armed Forces Council, which held real power in the GVN, and the
US, which had decided to confront the NLF militarily in South Vietnam.
[102]
Nevertheless, Quat
attempted to bring a measure of stability to the GVN and end the fighting.
Buddhists reacted by launching a “Peace Above All” campaign, which
demanded “an early end to this fratricidal war,” the expulsion of foreign
combatants and negotiations to end the conflict.
[103] Quat’s plan to parley with the NLF, however, provoked
significant hostility among South Vietnamese Catholics and other
anti-Communist elements. As a result, the generals dissolved his
government during the summer of 1965.
In the interim, a number
of indigenous peace movements arose. Increasingly sickened by the rising
cost of the war, citizens launched three different peace campaigns
simultaneously in Saigon during 1965. The GVN crushed all of these
efforts, sending a clear signal to Vietnamese of the danger of outright
calls for peace. Nevertheless, as journalist Takashi Oka argued at the
time, “the simple, uncomplicated, totally understandable popular ache for
peace remains.”
[104]
In May, a Buddhist-organized peace rally in Saigon
witnessed thousands of Vietnamese calling for the creation of a “peace
cabinet.”
[105]
In December, the patriarch of the UBC, Thich Tinh Khiet, implored the
contending forces to open talks to end the war.
[106]
Even the American CIA
sensed the deep desire for peace on the part of many Vietnamese. It
commented in February 1966 that a GVN plan to whip up more support for the
war “well may backfire since the generals may find that the people really
want peace and not war.” Donald
Ropa, a member of the National Security Council staff, predicted in
January 1966 that the growing refugee problem and a drastic increase in
civilian casualties could “generate resentment against the U.S. or the
Saigon government, and pressure for peace-at-any-price by pacifist
elements such as the Buddhists.”[107]
Following Quat’s
overthrow, power devolved to Nguyen Cao Ky. Known for his colorful dress,
love of gambling, indulgence in late-night activities, imprudent
statements and bravado, Ky immediately set a new course for the GVN,
proclaiming a permanent state of emergency, declaring war on North Vietnam
and placing the country in a heightened state of military preparation.
[108] Aside from expanding the draft, an action sure to trouble restive
student organizations, he announced a number of austerity measures and
imposed capital punishment without trial for numerous offenses,
particularly profiteering and black marketing.
[109]
More ominously for
Buddhist peace activists, the US in 1965 introduced ground forces and
implemented a sustained bombing campaign against the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam). William Colby, CIA station chief in Saigon, claims that GVN
weakness had persuaded most American officials that the Communists would
emerge victorious by the end of 1965 without the introduction of American
forces.[110] Thus, US leaders decided to bomb the DRV in February in retaliation
for attacks on US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. Mounting worries
about the safety of the Danang airbase convinced Washington to land 3,500
Marines at Danang in March to guard the facility. Before long, American
forces began patrolling to seek out insurgent military formations.
As combat operations expanded, Washington
discovered that PAVN and NLF forces easily matched the American build-up.
In July 1965, Johnson decided on a major escalation in troop levels and
the bombing campaign. Although the number of American forces rose to
200,000 by January 1966, the US appeared no closer to victory, leading the
American president to insist that more effort be placed on winning the
political side of the war through pacification.
Thus, the US engaged in a
number of half-hearted attempts to pursue an accommodation with the DRV up
to February 1966. Most peace efforts, however, accompanied or preceded
major US escalations of the fighting, causing the DRV to doubt the
sincerity of US peace offers. In fact, as historian George Herring points
out, “the United States had no real desire to begin serious negotiations
at a time when its bargaining position was so weak.” Nevertheless, a
highly publicized bombing halt at the end of 1965 raised hopes that the US
could negotiate a way out of the war. But, the persistent American
position that a non-Communist regime had to emerge from the talks
precluded any settlement with the NLF or the DRV.
[111]
For Buddhist leaders, Ky’s
war preparations, along with the introduction of US combat forces,
represented a stunning defeat. Certain that a genuinely representative
government would negotiate with the NLF and end the war, Buddhists now
recognized that ARVN generals, with no real constituency of their own,
would never allow an election where the will of the people prevailed to
end the war through negotiations. Believing that the war must eventually
be settled at the conference table rather than on the battlefield, Thich
Tri Quang and his followers concluded that they must challenge the GVN
while the relative weakness of Ky allowed them one last chance to grasp
peace from the jaws of war.
[112]
Conclusion
The US, which had stood by
helplessly as the Khanh government collapsed in August and the Huong
regime disintegrated in January, again faced the situation it feared most:
more instability. The successful Buddhist attack on Khanh and Huong,
moreover, destroyed any hope that future governments could retain domestic
political support while expanding the war. In a search for stability,
subsequent governments moved closer to the US, surrendered their
independence, and found themselves unable to counter American demands to
broaden the conflict. Similarly, the upheaval and anarchy of the Buddhist
crisis convinced many non-Communist Vietnamese that they must support an
American-sponsored dictatorship rather than see South Vietnam descend
again into chaos. Thus, in a totally unexpected way, the US became the
beneficiary of the Buddhists’ victory. While some Buddhists demanded a
transition to civilian rule as the price of their continued support of any
government, realization of their goal of peace proved to be far more
elusive than Buddhists originally thought. Their quest for reconciliation
between the warring parties created more instability, revolving door
governments and, as always, expanded US intrusion.
While some Buddhists,
particularly the Thich Tri Quang faction, wanted to establish a middle way
between the violence of the US and the NLF, their movement suffered from a
fatal flaw. Given that they had no weapons or areas of refuge and had to
operate within the territory of one of the two main forces, they could be
destroyed at any time and had to maneuver between two more powerful
adversaries. In a democratic political system, the Buddhists could have
had a decisive impact due to the popularity of their antiwar position, but
their vulnerability remained the most significant aspect of their
movement. They understood that the absence of democracy posed great danger
to the people of Vietnam. As a result, they exerted great efforts to
establish a civilian government devoid of dictatorial elements. Although
Buddhist power had been exaggerated by the US and the GVN, Buddhist
muscle-flexing genuinely terrified both governments. Yet, Washington
could not accept that its presence in South Vietnam sparked the
instability that it decried. While Buddhist leaders rejoiced over the
possibility of civilian rule and the opportunity to end the war, American
officials viewed with foreboding increased manifestations of Vietnamese
nationalism and Buddhist political power. Indeed, Thich Tri Quang and the
UBC became the American scapegoats for their failure to understand events
in the country.
A number of factors
converged in 1965 to call forth the Buddhist Crisis of 1966. The
initiation of sustained bombing operations against North Vietnam in
February, the introduction of US ground forces at Danang and the rise of
indigenous peace movements within South Vietnam in March, the ascension of
Air Marshal Ky to the premiership in June, and the return of Lodge as US
ambassador in August sparked a clash between Buddhists dedicated to ending
the war through a transition to popular democracy and representative
government and a GVN equally devoted to expanding the conflict. Indeed,
the stage was set for a dramatic confrontation between the proponents of
war and peace. Both sides realized that free elections and representative
democracy could fundamentally alter the makeup of the GVN and establish a
new course for South Vietnam. Soon Buddhists would risk everything on a
campaign to bring representative government to their country.
* The Lotus Unleashed can
be ordered directly from the University Press of Kentucky or from
Amazon.com. All profits from the sale of this book go to children in
Vietnam suffering from the ravages of Agent Orange.
[1]
Thich Nhat Hanh address to Kyoto Conference on Religion and Peace,
October 16-21, 1970.
[2]
Robert
Mole, Vietnamese Buddhism (Washington, DC, 1967), 57-65, and
“Buddhism in Vietnam: 1968,” The
Asia Foundation
(San Francisco, 1968), 17-20, 110-20.
[3]
David Halberstam,
“Buddhists Mourn Vietnam Victims,” New York Times (May 29,
1963), 5.
4 “Buddhists in
Saigon Mark May 8 Clash With Regime,” New York Times (May 22,
1963), 3, and “Saigon Replaces Three in Dispute,” New York Times
(June 2, 1963), 2.
5 Thich Thien-An,
Buddhism and Zen in
Vietnam
(Rutland, VT, 1975), 172-91, and David Halberstam, “Diem Asks Peace In
Religious Crisis,” New York Times (June 12, 1963), 7. See
Chapter Six for a more detailed discussion of self-immolation.
[6]
United States Printing Office, Foreign Relations of the United
States: Vietnam Volume IV, 1963, (Washington, 1991), “Telegram
From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam,” July 2, 1963,
443-44; David Halberstam, “Diem Regime Under Fire,” New York Times
(July 7, 1963), 4:5; and United States Printing Office, Foreign
Relations of the United States: Vietnam Volume IV, 1963
(Washington, 1991), “Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the
Department of State,” August 14, 1963, 565-67.
[7]
“Buddhists Seized,”
New York Times (August 21, 1963), 1.
[8]
Ellen J. Hammer,
A Death In November (New York, 1987), 168-98, and Dean Rusk, As
I Saw It (New York, 1990), 440.
[9]
David Halberstam,
“Ranking Saigon Buddhist and 2 Aides Flee Into American Embassy,”
New York Times (September 2, 1963), 1; United States Printing
Office, Foreign Relations of the United States: Vietnam Volume
IV, 1963 (Washington, 1991), “Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to
the Department of State,” (September 9, 1963), 136-37; and “US to
Refuse Saigon Plea,” New York Times (September 3, 1963), 3.
[10]
United States
Printing Office, Foreign Relations of the
United States: Vietnam
