The cult of sacrifice
which developed out of the prayers in the Vedic Samhitas had a powerful
hold on the minds of the early Aryans in India. The elaborate rituals of
the cult, and the inevitable discussions which took place during its
performance, a long affair, to keep the participants busy, are said to be
responsible for doctrines which challenged the very existence of the cult.
The discussions were undoubtedly valuable in settling knotty points
connected with ritual, but some of these, at any rate, seem to have done
more harm than good. According to a passage in the Mundaka
, the cult of
sacrifice, although looked upon as a ship to take one across to the other
shores of existence, to the heavenly worlds, was itself shaky and unsafe.
In another passage
it is said that the merit
accruing from its performance is of short duration. It was thus calculated
not to lead to eternal peace, but to a life of perpetual flux.
Vedic literature is replete with references to many
problems unconnected with the present life, or to problems relating to the
origin of the world, its constituents, the next world, and imaginary
happiness as contrasted with the misery of the present life. The
foundations of Indian philosophy are thus to be sought in these free
discussions, particularly those on the famous Nasadiyasukta, now
incorporated in the tenth and concluding book of the Rigveda.
The discussions at the long sacrificial sessions were
primarily concerned with the performance of the ritual; but obviously they
could not be confined to this alone. If the performance of the sacrifice
could give everlasting results, the question of thinking on different
problems would not have arisen; but when these results were efficacious
only for a short time, man’s mind naturally turned to things eternal.
The problems discussed by the early thinkers mainly
concerned the origin of the world or universe, and to its constituents.
Life is short, and a sacrificial performance could bring only temporary
happiness, they agreed. It could not mean eternal joy; on the contrary, it
may sometimes be a source of much happiness. If that was so, it was
necessary to discover the source of eternal peace, but could eternal peace
be achieved through the life a sacrificer leads? If not, should not an
alternative be sought? This was the next question. The balance was in
favour of a new mode of life, the life of renunciation as opposed to the
life of plenty led by householder. Subsequently, the system of
ashramas or the four stages of life was evolved, and the last two,
those of vanaprastha and samnyasa, gave opportunities for
speculation on the problems of ultimate reality and absolute happiness.
Clearly, ascetic life was open not only to the Brahmin
but also to the other cultivated classes of the age. At any rate, it was
open to the kshatriyas, the warrior class, as is evident from the special
place the royal sage, Janaka, occupies in the field of philosophical
speculation. Kshatriya sages were often responsible for the instruction of
the Brahmins in some secret lore in which they were proficient.
Although Vedic literature records the names of some
thinker belonging to the ascetic cult, there must have been others outside
this narrow group. It is not easy to ascertain whether there were
non-Aryan elements within its fold; but there is no ground for
disbelieving that the non-Aryans, too, influenced the Aryan mind. For
instance, according to some, thinkers like Gosala represented ideas which
were peculiar to non-Aryan culture.
Turning to non-Vedic literature, one comes across terms
like sramanah as opposed to Brahmin. Some five types of
sramanahs including the Nigantha (Jaina) and the Ajiva (Ajivika) are
mentioned. It is likely that some of them were brought up on Brahamanic
lore, but later broke away from it. The literature Buddhists and the
Jainas frequently refer to these sects. It is clear, however, that these
sramanahs inherited several ideas from, and were often inspired by,
Vedic literature.
The tenets of these different wandering sects can be
traceback to Vedic literature, particularly the literature of the
Upanishads. In fact, the quest for the final or ultimate cause goes
back to famous Nasadiya-sukta of the Rigveda
; the idea of some
higher and happier world is to be found in the Visnu-sukta;
the concept of transmigration of the soul, that of the mortals returning
to this world, is as old as the Yamasukta
or the Hymn to the
Fathers. The inherent misery of the world and the notion of immortality,
which was not attainable by worldly possessions, have been frequently
mentioned in the Upanishads. Speculations on the ultimate cause of
the Universe are frequently met with in Upanishadic literature.
The doctrine of the Chain of Causation as conceived by
the Buddha was obviously the result of these speculations. Indeed, even
the highly developed doctrine of the Madhyamika school that, the highest
truth lies beyond the four extreme views, catuskotivinirmukta, is
represented in almost identical terms in the last paragraph of the
Mandukya Upanishad.
It stands to reason
that philosophical ideas and doctrines do not spring up unexpectedly, but
grow out of old ideas. Prof. Oldenberg has developed this theme in his
Philosophie der Upanisaden und Anfange de Buddhismus.
There is, however, no definite indication in
pre-Buddhistic literature of the well-known and important principle of
anatmavada or the doctrine of no-soul. There are vague references in
the Upanishads, particularly the Brahadaranyaka, that he body
consists of four or five elements, that at death it dissolves back into
these elements, and that no element of consciousness (samjna)
remains after death. This doctrine, however, cannot rightly be said to be
the source of the Buddhistic doctrine of anatma (or anatta); the
most that can be claimed is that it is at the root of the notions that all
wordly objects are transitory and that there is no transmigration. The
admission that various elements constitute a body which ultimately
dissolves into those very elements may indicate that the so-called
consciousness or samjna is unsubstantial as nothing of it is left
after death.
There is little information on the non-Vedic ascetic
sects, but some can be found in such works as the Suyagada, the
second book of the Shvetambara Jaina Canon in Prakrit, and in scattered
Buddhist sutras like the Samannaphala-sutta in the Digha-nikaya in
Pali, and its Sanskrit counterpart in the Gilgit MSS. These sects
naturally glorify the teachings of their own prophets, and condemn those
of their opponents. None the less some reliable information can be had
from these sources.
It may be useful to consider a few names of the ascetic
sects and the light they throw on their external characteristics. In
Brahmanical literature the names, Parivrajaka, also called Maskarin,
Tapasa and Mundaka occur, Parivrajaka literally means one who goes round
and has no permanent domicile. From a study of the rules of discipline, it
appears that these ascetics did not generally stay long at one place,
except perhaps during the rains; they were expected to wander from place
to place to place, and to have no fixed residence. Some of them carried a
bamboo staff, called mascara. These two features were probably
common to many sects, but they must have been a special characteristic of
a particular group of ascetics. The name Tapasa, for instance, suggests a
code of discipline based on tapas, or self mortification in various
forms, such as fasting, living on water and coarse food, subsisting on a
particular diet, or restricting one’s movements to a particular region,
preferably the northern or southern bank of sacred rivers like the Ganga.
It is interesting to note that a sect and an Upanishadic text bear the
same name, Mundaka. A special feature of this sect was that its members
shaved their heads. The saving of the head instead of wearing long hair
seems to have been common to both Vedic and non-Vedic sects as appears
from a reference in the Suttanipata
. There were some sects
which bore names to correspond with the mode of their dress. Some used
white garments (shvetambara), some coloured (geruya), while
others went naked. The material of the garment also seems to have been a
distinguishing feature as the term Keshakambalin applied to Ajita
indicates. The members of each particular sect, no doubt, followed the
practice of their respective teachers.
An analysis of the doctrinal or philosophical tenets of
the non-Vedic sects shows that the number of such teachers or thinkers and
their schools was very large. The Jaina sutras mention as many as 363,
while according to the Buddhist sutras the number is 62 and 63. The Jainas
group their 363 schools broadly into four, namely, the Kriyavada
, the Akriyavada, the
Ajnanavada
and the Vinayavada,
Mahavira being shown as the champion of Kriyavada. The principal tenets of
the Kriyavada school are that misery is the result of one’s own acts, and
is not caused by anything else; that release from samsara can be
secured by knowledge of the highest truth and by good conduct. The
doctrine admits the existence of soul or self, this world and the next,
the eternal and non-eternal elements in the constituents of the physical
world, birth, death, heavens and hell; and holds that there are causes of
misery which can be controlled. According to Jaina sources, Ajita
Keshakambalin is the champion of the Akriyavada which roughly corresponds
to the Lokayatika or the Carvaka school. According to this school, there
is no sin in killing, and there is nothing wrong in enjoying the pleasures
of the world The Champion of Ajnanavada may be Sanjaya whom the Buddhists
called Viksepavadin, or one who did not adhere to any view categorically.
No specific mention of any teacher who believed in the doctrine of
Vinayavada is found in Jaina sources, possibly because there were too many
to be named. Buddhist sources condemn the doctrine of Vinaya which they
seem to have called Silabbataparamasa, the doctrine of liberation through
monastic vows and conduct. Buddhists also point to the dangers of this
doctrine, namely, that it might lead either to pleasure-seeking, or to
rigidity in religious exercises. They also refer to many unanswerable and
unanswered problems. Even if these are discussed or settled, one is no
nearer the truth; on the contrary, the danger of going astray cannot
altogether be ruled out. Sanjaya seemed to have avoided answering these
questions out of fear or ignorance, while the Jainas answered these
questions out of fear or ignorance, while the Jainas answered them boldly
by their doctrine of many possibilities or Anekanta.
There are frequent references in Buddhist literature to
some six senior contemporaries of the Buddha, for instance, in the
Digha-nikaya (the Samannaphala-sutta and its counterpart in Sanskrit).
It appears from the context of these references that Ajatashatru, the king
of Magadha, met a number of these teachers and asked them each separately
to state in clear and unambiguous terms the result of their ascetic
practices. All of them were wellknown in the country as founders of
religious schools with large following. Their names and the special
doctrines they held are briefly stated in the text. It is possible,
however, that the information supplied is prejudiced as it emanates from
their opponents; in fact, the mis-statements they make are partly due to
design and partly to ignorance. All the same, it is interesting to study
their views in order to understand correctly as well as to appreciate the
views of the founder of Buddhism.
Of these six thinkers, Nigantha Nataputta, who is no
other than Mahavira, the founder, or according to the Jaina tradition the
last prophet of the present world cycle, seems to have been slightly older
than the Buddha. He preached ethical doctrines without apparently knowing
that similar ideas had been held by an incomparably senior ascetic,
Parshva. The latter is now acknowledged to be Mahavira’s predecessor and
is believed to have lived 250 years before Mahavira. Parshva’s ethical
code consisted of four rules, whereas that of Mahavira consisted of five.
Of these, the first three, viz, not to kill living things, not to
take articles of use unless they are given, and not to tell a lie, are
common to the schools of both Parshva and Mahavira. The fourth rule in
parshva’s teaching, that of aparigraha, not to have any worldly
possessions including a wife, was split up into two by Mahavira to make up
his code of five. Not to take a wife or lead a celibate life, which is the
fourth rule in Mahavira’s code, and not to have worldly possessions except
clothes, which is the fifth rule in Mahavira’s code of conduct thus seems
to have been that while Parshva and his followers were Acelakas or Naked,
Mahavira and his followers wore white garments, but refused to have any
other paraphernalia. In other words, the Jaina faith as preached by
Mahavira is the same as Parshva’s, but somewhat more modern. It was
natural, therefore, that these two schools should have become one as they
actually did some 250 years after death of Parshva, when the disciples of
Parshva and those of Mahavira met at Sravasti and brought about the Union
. Later, the Jainas
explained this fusion of schools differently by adding twenty-two prophets
to precede Parshva, thereby making Parshva the twenty-third and Mahavira
the twenty-fourth of their prophets. It would, however, be quite correct
to hold that Parshva and Mahavira independently evolved a philosophy and
religious system which had identical tenets.
In the Samannaphala-sutta
Nigantha Nataputta is
mentioned as having held the doctrine of fourfold restraint : restraint
from the use of cold water as it contains life, and form sinful activities
such as killing and sexual intercourse
. He was free from all
sins and had purified himself. In the Udumbarika-sihanada-sutta
the restraints ascribed to him are different but identical with the four
vows of Parshva.
According to Jaina sources, however, Jainism is not a
purely ethical system, but also a philosophy based on the doctrine looks
at two aspects of everything, the eternal and the non-eternal. The soul
undergoes migration according to good or bad deeds. As Jainism regards the
existence of jiva in everything, it enjoins such behaviour as does
not cause injury to any jiva. The soul becomes impure and is
engulfed by samsara if it is subjected to the influence of sense
objects. In order to keep the soul pure from their contamination, and to
secure its release, it is necessary to practise restraint. To achieve this
one must resort to or acquire right knowledge, faith and conduct. Buddhist
sources, for instances, the Anguttara, and the seventy-fourth sutta
of the Tikanipata, ridicule the Jaina doctrine, particularly its idea of
overcoming sin, its restraint on movements and its insistence on certain
types of clothing.
The next important contemporary of the Buddha was
Makkhali Gosala. He belonged to the sect of the Acelakas or Naked Ones,
and, as the first part of his name indicates, carried a staff of bamboo
(maskarin) . It is said that he was for some time a disciple of
Mahavira, but later broke away from him. Afterwards he probably founded an
independent school known as the Ajivika school. Later writers mention two
predecessors, Nanda Vaccha and Kisa Samkicca,
thus giving this school three prophets. This sect is now extinct, but
seems to have enjoyed popularity and even royal patronage. The doctrine
advocated by Gosala is styled samsara-visuddhi or the doctrine of
attaining purity only by passing through all kinds of existence. Gosala
did not believe that there was any special cause for either the misery of
human beings or for their deliverance. He did not believe in human effort,
and held that all creatures were helpless against destiny. He maintained
that all creatures, whether wise or foolish, were destined to pass through
samara, and that their misery would come to an end at the
completion of the cycle. No human efforts would reduce or lengthen this
period. Like a ball of thread, samsara had a fixed term, through
which every being must pass.
The remaining four teachers, who are mentioned as
contemporaries of the Buddha, did not leave their mark on posterity as did
Mahavira and to a lesser degree, Gosala. Of these four, Purana Kassapa
held the doctrine of
Akriya or non-action. He maintained that a man did not incur sin through
actions which were popularly known as bad, e.g., killing, committing
theft. Taking another man’s wife, or telling a lie. Even if a man killed
all the creatures on earth and raised a heap of skulls, he incurred no
sin. Similarly, he did not earn merit through a good act, or by staying on
the northern or southern bank of the Ganga; similarly, self control,
gifts, and truthfulness did not earn him any credit. The doctrine that
Kassapa preached resembles the doctrine of the Carvakas in many respects.
Ajita Keshakambalin was another contemporary of the
Buddha. He did not believe in the utility of gifts, in sacrifice, the
fruits of good and bad acts, the existence of heavenly worlds or persons
possessing higher or supernatural powers. He held that the body consisted
of four elements, into which it dissolved after death. He also held that
it was useless to talk of the next world; that both the wise and the
ignorant die and have no further life after death.
His views are similar to
those of the Carvakas, and his doctrine may be styled Ucchedavada.
Pakudha Kaccayana is probably Kakuda Katyayana as
mentioned in the Prasnopanisad. He and his views are also referred
to in the Suyagada, the Second Book of the Shvetambara Jaina Canon.
His doctrine may be called Asasvatavada. According to him, there are seven
elements, which are immutable, and do not in any way contribute to
pleasure or pain. The body is ultimately dissolved into these seven
eternal elements.
The last among these teachers is Sanjaya
Belatthiputta. Ajatashatru calls him the most foolish and the most
ignorant of all the teachers he head met. His doctrine is known as
Viksepavada, or a doctrine which diverts the mind from the right track.
According to the Samannaphala-sutta,
he always declined to
give categorical answers to problems facing the human mind. There are ten
unexplained and unanswered questions, that have always exercised the mind
of man and have frequently been mentioned in Buddhist literature, which
Sanjaya never even attempted to answer. It may be noted that these
questions were also to put the Buddha on several occasions and he, too,
declined to answer them; but his attitude towards them was altogether
different. He said that it was useless to waste time on these idle quest
as they were not conductive to human progress.
Having taken stock of the trends of philosophical
speculations before the coming of the Buddha, it will now be clear why he
thought of a new faith which at once caught the imagination of the people
and was accepted by millions.
Teachers like Pakudha Kaccayana and Ajita Keshakambalin
advocated a theory of the universe, according to which it was either
eternal or non-eternal as represented by their respective formulae:
sabbam atthi and sabbam natthi, or better still, by doctrines
known as Sasvatavada and Ucchedavada.
Gosala thought that the characteristics of all things
were predetermined, and that there was no cause or condition which
predetermined them, as represented by formulae: sabbam pubbekatahetu
and sabbam ahetu-apaccaya.
Another view was that happiness and sorrow were due to
one’s own deeds or that they were due to some other cause, as represented
by formulae; kamesu-kama-sukhallikanuyogo and
attakilamathanuyogo.
Yet another belief was that the aims or values of human
life were realized by the enjoyment of wordly pleasures, or by
self-mortification, as represented by the formulae: sukhadukkham
sayamkatam and sukhadukkam parakatam.
If the history of the philosophical thought currents at
the time were surveyed, it would be clear that both Mahavira and the
Buddha had to face thinkers who held extreme views of the four types
mentioned above and each of them had their own answer to them. Mahavira
answered the problems in terms of his Anekantavada or Syadvada, while the
Buddha’s answer was based on his Paticca-samuppada.
While Mahavira clung to
the doctrine of Attakilamatha or self-mortification, as against Kassapa,
Ajita, Gosala and Sanjaya, the Buddha preached the Majjhimapatipada
or the Middle path.
