The
Buddhist Monastic Code
Volume I
The Patimokkha Training
Rules
Translated & Explained
by
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
(Geoffrey DeGraff)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data pending
Copyright © 1994 Thanissaro Bhikkhu
Metta Forest Monastery
PO Box 1409
Valley Center, CA 92082, USA
For free distribution only.
You may print copies of this work for your personal use.
You may re-format and redistribute this work for use on computers and
computer networks,
provided that you charge no fees for its distribution or use.
Otherwise, all rights reserved.
This book is currently out of print.
Another printing is scheduled for late 2003.
Contents
This book is
an attempt to give an organized, detailed account of the Patimokkha
training rules and the tradi-tions that have grown up around them. It is
aimed primarily at those whose lives are affected by the rules -- bhikkhus
who live by them, and other people who have dealings with the bhikkhus --
so that they will be able to find gathered in one volume as much essential
information as possible on just what the rules do and do not entail.
Students of Early Buddhism, Theravadin history, or contemporary Theravadin
issues should also find this book interesting, as should anyone who is
serious about the practice of the Dhamma and wants to see how the Buddha
worked out the ramifications of Dhamma practice in daily life.
The amount of
information offered here is both the book's strength and its weakness. On
the one hand, it encompasses material that in some cases is otherwise
unavailable in Eng-lish or even in romanized Pali, and should be
sufficient to serve as a life-long companion to any bhikkhu who seriously
wants to benefit from the precise and thorough training the rules have to
offer. On the other hand, the sheer size of the book and the mass of
details to be remembered might prove daunting or discouraging to anyone
just embarking on the bhikkhu's life.
To overcome
this drawback, I have tried to organize the material in as clear-cut a
manner as possible. In particular, by analyzing each rule into its
component factors, I have tried to show not only the rule's precise range
but also how it connects to the general pattern of mindfully analyzing
one's own actions in terms of such factors as intention, perception,
object, effort, and result -- a system that plays an important role in the
training of the mind.
Secondly, I
have provided short summaries for the rules and have gathered them,
organized by topic, in the Rule Index at the back of the book. If you are
new to the subject of Buddhist monastic discipline, I suggest that you
read the Rule Index first, to grasp the gist of the rules and their
rela-tionship to the Buddhist path, before going on to the more detailed
discussions in the body of the book. This should help you keep the general
purpose of the rules in mind, and keep you from getting lost in the mass
of details.
I am indebted
to the many people who helped directly and indirectly in the writing of
this book. Phra Ajaan Fuang Jotiko (Phra Khru Nanavisitth) and Phra Ajaan
Thawng Candasiri (Phra Nanavisitth), my first teachers in Vinaya, gave me
a thorough grounding in the subject. Ven. Brahmavamso Bhikkhu gave many
hours of his time to writing detailed criticisms of early versions of the
manuscript during the long period of research that led up to the book,
forcing me to deepen my knowledge and sharpen my presentation of the
topic. There was a brief period when he and I thought of co-authoring the
book, but the many questions that needed to be settled concerning form and
content eventually required that one person go it alone, and it fell my
lot to be that person. Still, much of the precision of the book is a
result of his efforts, even in cases where I had to differ with his
opinions.
As the
manuscript began to approach its final form, Ven. Phra Nanavarodom,
Bhikkhu Bodhi, Thiradhammo Bhikkhu, Amaro Bhikkhu, Suviro Bhikkhu, Bill
Weir, and Doris Weir all read copies of it and offered valuable
suggestions for improvement. I, of course, remain responsible for any
errors it may still contain.
I dedicate
this book in gratitude and respect to my preceptor, Phra Debmoli (Samrong
Gunavuddho) of Wat Asokaram, Samut Prakaan, Thailand, and to all my
teachers in the path of the Dhamma-Vinaya.
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
(Geoffrey DeGraff)
Metta Forest
Monastery
Valley Center, CA 92082-1409 U.S.A.
May, 1994
A .....
Anguttara Nikaya
As ..... Adhikarana-samatha
Ay ..... Aniyata
BD ..... Book of Discipline
Cv ..... Cullavagga
D ..... Digha Nikaya
Dhp ..... Dhammapada
M ..... Majjhima Nikaya
Mv ..... Mahavagga
NP ..... Nissaggiya Pacittiya
Pc ..... Pacittiya
Pd ..... Patidesaniya
Pr ..... Parajika
Pv ..... Parivara
S ..... Samyutta Nikaya
Sg ..... Sanghadisesa
Sk ..... Sekhiya
Vism ..... Visuddhi Magga
Numbers in the
references to Mv, Cv, and Pv denote chapter, section and sub-section; in
the references to D and M, discourse (sutta); in the references to S and
A, section (samyutta or nipata) and discourse; in the references to Dhp,
verse; in the references to Vism, chapter and paragraph.
Dhamma-Vinaya
![[go to top]](scrollup.gif)
Dhamma-Vinaya
was the Buddha's own name for the religion he founded. Dhamma -- the truth
-- is what he discovered and pointed out as advice for all who want to
gain release from suffering. Vinaya -- discipline -- is what he formulated
as rules, ideals, and standards of behavior for those of his followers who
went forth from home life to take up the quest for release in greater
earnestness. Although this book deals primarily with discipline, we should
note at the outset that Dhamma and Vinaya in practice function only
together. Neither without the other can attain the desired goal. In theory
they may be separate, but in the person who practices them they merge as
qualities developed in the mind and character.
"Gotami, the
qualities of which you may know, 'These qualities lead to dispassion, not
to passion; to being unfettered and not to being fettered; to
self-effacement and not to self-aggrandizement; to modesty and not to
ambition; to contentment and not to discontent; to seclusion and not to
entanglement; to energy and not to idleness; to being unburdensome and not
to being burdensome': You may definitely hold, 'This is the Dhamma, this
is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher's instruction.'" (Cv.X.5)
Ultimately,
the Buddha said, just as the sea has a single taste, that of salt, so too
the Dhamma and Vinaya have a single taste: that of release. The connection
between discipline and release is spelled out in a passage that recurs at
several points in the Canon:
"Discipline is
for the sake of restraint, restraint for the sake of freedom from remorse,
freedom from remorse for the sake of joy, joy for the sake of rapture,
rapture for the sake of tranquillity, tranquillity for the sake of
pleasure, pleasure for the sake of concentration, concentration for the
sake of knowledge and vision of things as they are, knowledge and vision
of things as they are for the sake of disenchantment, disenchantment for
the sake of dispassion, dispassion for the sake of release, release for
the sake of knowledge and vision of release, knowledge and vision of
release for the sake of total unbinding without clinging." (Pv.XII.2)
In
establishing his religion of release, though, the Buddha did not simply
set out a body of recommendations and rules. He also founded a company (parisa)
of followers. This company falls into four main groups: bhikkhus (monks),
bhikkhunis (nuns), lay men, and lay women. Although the Buddha saw no need
to organize the laity in any manner, he arranged for the bhikkhus and
bhikkhunis -- who had given up the entanglements of the household life to
devote themselves more fully to the goal of release -- to develop into
communities; and saw that they needed, as all communities do, ideals and
standards, rules and customs to ensure their stability. This need is what
gave rise to the Vinaya.
In the early
years of the Buddha's career, the texts tell us, there was no need to
formulate disciplinary rules. All of the bhikkhus in his following -- the
Community of bhikkhunis had not yet been started -- were men of high
personal attainments who had succeeded in subduing many or all of the
defilements of their minds. They knew his teachings well and behaved
accordingly. The Canon tells of how Ven. Sariputta, one of the Buddha's
foremost disciples, asked the Buddha at an early date to formulate a
Patimokkha, or code of rules, to ensure that the holy life the Buddha had
founded would last long, just as a thread holding together a floral
arrangement ensures that the flowers are not scattered by the wind. The
Buddha replied that the time for such a code had not yet come, for even
the most backward of the men in the Community at that time had already had
their first glimpse of the goal. Only when mental effluents (asava) made
themselves felt in the Community would there be a need for a Patimokkha.
As time
passed, the conditions that provided an opening for the effluents within
the Community eventually began to appear. The Bhaddali Sutta (M.65)
presents the Buddha at a later point in his career listing these
conditions as five:
Ven. Bhaddali:
"Why is it, venerable sir, that there used to be fewer training rules and
more bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening? And why is it
that there are now more training rules and fewer bhikkhus established in
the knowledge of Awakening?" [Bhaddali, who has been unwilling to abide by
the training rules, seems to be suggesting that the rise in the number of
training rules is itself the cause for fewer bhikkhus' attaining
Awakening. The Buddha, however, offers a different explanation.]
The Buddha:
"So it is, Bhaddali. When beings have begun to degenerate, and the true
Dhamma has begun to disappear, there are more training rules and fewer
bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening. The Teacher does not
lay down a training rule for his disciples as long as there are no cases
where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have arisen
in the Community. But when there are cases where the conditions that offer
a foothold for the effluents have arisen in the Community, then the
Teacher lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract
those very conditions.
"There are no
cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have
arisen in the Community as long as the Community has not become large. But
when the Community has become large, then there are cases where the
conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents arise in the Community,
and the Teacher then lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to
counteract those very conditions... When the Community possesses great
material gains... great status... a large body of learning... when the
Community is long-standing, then there are cases where the conditions that
offer a foothold for the effluents arise in the Community, and the Teacher
then lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract those
very conditions."
Thus the rules
themselves were not the cause for degeneracy in the Community, and the
conditions that provided a foothold for the effluents were not themselves
effluents. Rather, the growing complexity of the Community provided the
opportunity for bhikkhus to act on the basis of their defilements in a
growing variety of ways, and the rules -- although they could not prevent
any of the five conditions -- had to become correspondingly complex to
counteract the opportunities those conditions provided for unenlightened
behavior.
Even when
these conditions did arise, though, the Buddha did not set out a full code
at once. Instead, he formulated rules one at a time, in response to
events. The considerations that went into formulating each rule are best
illustrated by the events surrounding the formulation of the first.
Ven. Sudinna,
the story goes, had strong faith in the Buddha and had ordained after
receiving his parents' grudging consent. He was their only child and,
though married, was childless. His parents, fearing that the government
would confiscate their property at their death if it had no heir, devised
various schemes to lure Ven. Sudinna back to the lay life, but to no
avail. Finally, his mother realized that he was firm in his intention to
stay a bhikkhu and so asked him at least to have intercourse with his
former wife so that their property would have an heir. Ven. Sudinna
consented, took his wife into the forest, and had intercourse three times.
Immediately he
felt remorseful and eventually confessed his deed to his fellow bhikkhus.
Word reached the Buddha, who called a meeting of the Community, questioned
Ven. Sudinna, and gave him a rebuke. The rebuke fell into two major parts.
In the first part, the Buddha reminded Ven. Sudinna of his position as a
samana -- a contemplative -- and that his behavior was unworthy of his
position. Also, the Buddha pointed out to him of the aims of the teaching
and noted that his behavior ran counter to them. The implication here was
that Ven. Sudinna had not only acted inconsistently with the content of
the teaching, but had also shown callous disregard for the Buddha's
compassionate aims in making the Dhamma known.
"'Misguided
man, it is unseemly, unbecoming, unsuitable, and unworthy of a
contemplative; improper and not to be done... Have I not taught the Dhamma
in many ways for the sake of dispassion and not for passion; for
unfettering and not for fettering; for letting go and not for clinging?
Yet here, while I have taught the Dhamma for dispassion, you set your
heart on passion; while I have taught the Dhamma for unfettering, you set
your heart on being fettered; while I have taught the Dhamma for letting
go, you set your heart on clinging.
"'Misguided
man, haven't I taught the Dhamma in various ways for the fading of
passion, the sobering of pride, the subduing of thirst, the destruction of
attachment, the severing of the round, the depletion of craving,
dispassion, stopping, unbinding? Haven't I advocated abandoning sensual
pleasures, understanding sensual perceptions, subduing sensual thirst,
destroying sensual preoccupations, calming sensual fevers?... Misguided
man, this neither inspires faith in the faithless nor increases the
faithful. Rather, it inspires lack of faith in the faithless and wavering
in some of the faithful.'"
The second
part of the rebuke dealt in terms of personal qualities: those that a
bhikkhu practicing discipline is to abandon, and those he is to develop.
"Then the
Blessed One, having in various ways rebuked Ven. Sudinna, having spoken in
dispraise of being burdensome, demanding, arrogant, discontented,
entangled, and indolent; in various ways having spoken in praise of being
unburdensome, undemanding, modest, content, austere, scrupulous, gracious,
self-effacing, and energetic; having given a Dhamma talk on what is seemly
and becoming for bhikkhus, addressed the bhikkhus."
This was where
the Buddha formulated the training rule, after first stating his reasons
for doing so.
"'In that
case, bhikkhus, I will formulate a training rule for the bhikkhus with ten
aims in mind: the excellence of the Community, the peace of the Community,
the curbing of the shameless, the comfort of well-behaved bhikkhus, the
restraint of effluents related to the present life, the prevention of
effluents related to the next life, the arousing of faith in the
faithless, the increase of the faithful, the establishment of the true
Dhamma, and the fostering of discipline.'"
These reasons
fall into three main types. The first two are external: 1) to ensure peace
and well-being within the Community itself, and 2) to foster and protect
faith among the laity, on whom the bhikkhus depend for their support. (The
origin stories of the various rules depict the laity as being very quick
to generalize. One bhikkhu misbehaves, and they complain, "How can these
bhikkhus do that?") The third type of reason, though, is internal: The
rule is to help restrain and prevent mental effluents within the
individual bhikkhus. Thus the rules aim not only at the external
well-being of the Community, but also at the internal well-being of the
individual. This latter point soon becomes apparent to anyone who
seriously tries to keep to the rules, for they foster mindfulness and
circumspection in one's actions, qualities that carry over into the
training of the mind.
Over the
course of time the Buddha formulated more than 200 major and minor rules,
forming the Patimokkha that was recited fortnightly in each Community of
bhikkhus. In addition, he formulated many other minor rules that were
memorized by those of his followers who specialized in the subject of
discipline, but nothing is known for sure of what format they used to
organize this body of knowledge during his lifetime.
After his
total nibbana, though, his followers made a concerted effort to establish
a standard canon of Dhamma and Vinaya, and the Pali Canon as we know it
began to take shape. The Vinaya was organized into two main parts: 1) the
Sutta Vibhanga, the 'Exposition of the Text' (which from here on we will
refer to simply as the Vibhanga), containing almost all the material
dealing with the Patimokkha rules; and 2) the Khandhakas, or Groupings,
which contain the remaining material organized loosely according to
subject matter. The Khandhakas themselves are divided into two parts, the
Mahavagga, or Greater Chapter, and the Cullavagga, or Lesser Chapter.
Historians estimate that the Vibhanga and Khandhakas reached their present
form no later than the 2nd century B.C.E., and that the Parivara, or
Addenda -- a summary and study guide -- was added a few centuries later,
closing the Vinaya Pitaka, the part of the Canon dealing with discipline.
Since the
purpose of this book is to translate and explain the Patimokkha, we are
most directly concerned with the Vibhanga. It is organized as follows: The
rules in the Patimokkha are presented one by one, each rule preceded by an
origin story telling the events that led up to its formulation. In some
instances a rule went through one or more reformulations, in which case an
additional story is provided for each amendment to show what prompted it.
After the
final statement of the rule is a word-commentary, which explains in detail
most of the important terms in the rule. For many of the rules this
commentary includes one or more "wheels," or tables, giving the
contingencies connected with the rule, working out all their possible
permutations and passing judgment as to what penalty, if any, each
permutation entails. For example, the discussion of the first rule
contains a wheel that gives all the objects with which a person might have
sexual intercourse, lists them against the variables of the sort of
intercourse and whether or not the bhikkhu involved gives his consent, and
announces the penalty for each possible combination of factors.
Following the
word-commentary for each rule is a section of no-offense clauses, listing
extenuating circumstances under which a bhikkhu would be exempted from the
penalty imposed by the rule.
Finally, for
the major rules, there is the Vinita Vatthu, or List of Precedents, which
documents various cases related to the rule and gives verdicts as to what
penalty, if any, they entail.
The Vibhanga
forms the basis for most of the explanations of the training rules given
in this book. However, there are occasional questions on which the
Vibhanga is unclear or silent. To answer these questions, I have turned
either to the Khandhakas or to the commentarial literature that has grown
up around the Vinaya over the course of the centuries. The primary works I
have consulted are these:
1) The
Samanta-pasadika -- "The Thoroughly Inspiring" -- (from here on referred
to as the Commentary), a commentary on the Vinaya Pitaka compiled in the
5th century C.E. by Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa, who based his work on
ancient commentaries brought to Sri Lanka from India at an unknown date
and translated into Sinhalese. From internal evidence in Buddhaghosa's
writings -- he compiled commentaries on a major portion of the Canon --
historians have estimated that the ancient commentaries were collected
over a span of several centuries and closed in approximately the 2nd
century C.E. Buddhaghosa's work thus contains material much older than his
date would indicate.
By
Buddhaghosa's time a belief had grown up that the ancient commentaries
were the work of the Buddha's immediate disciples and thus indisputably
conveyed the true intent of the Canon. However, as we shall see below, the
ancient commentaries themselves did not make such exalted claims for
themselves.
Still, the
existence of this belief in the 5th century placed certain constraints on
Buddhaghosa's work. At points where the ancient commentaries conflicted
with the Canon, he had to write the discrepancies off as copier's mistakes
or else side with the commentaries against the Canon. At a few points,
such as his explanation of Pacittiya 9, he provides arguments against the
ancient commentaries' interpretation but then backs off, saying that the
ancient commentaries must be right because their authors knew the Buddha's
intentions. Perhaps pressure from the elder bhikkhus at the Mahavihara in
Anuradhapura -- the place where the ancient commentaries had been
preserved and where Buddhaghosa was allowed to do his work -- was what
made him back off in this way. At any rate, only on points where the
different ancient commentaries were silent or gave divergent opinions did
he feel free to express his opinions.
2) The
Kankha-vitarani -- "The Subjugator of Uncertainty" -- (the K/Commentary),
a commentary on the Patimokkha also compiled by Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa.
Although this work is largely a synopsis of material in the Commentary, it
contains some independent material, in particular a system of classifying
the offenses under each training rule into their component factors. It
also contradicts the Commentary from time to time.
3) The
Sarattha-dipani -- "The Essence-Meaning Illustrator" -- (the
Sub-commentary), a sub-commentary on the Commentary, written in Sri Lanka
in the 12th century C.E. by a Ven. Sariputta, the first Mahasami, or head
of the Sri Lankan Sangha, after that Sangha was reformed and unified under
the patronage of King Parakrama Bahu I. This work not only explains the
Commentary, but also deals with points in the Canon itself, sometimes
indicating passages where the Commentary has deviated from the Canon. It
also quotes as authoritative the judgments of three ancient texts, the
Ganthipadesa, which are no longer extant, and of Ven. Buddhadatta, a
scholar of the 4th century C.E. who wrote two extant Vinaya guides.
4) The
Vimati-vinodani -- "The Remover of Perplexity" -- (the V/Sub-commentary),
another 12th-century sub-commentary, written in southern India by a Ven.
Kassapa, who also wrote the Mohavicchedani, a synopsis of the Abhidhamma
Pitaka and Buddhaghosa's commentaries on it.
5) The
Attha-yojana -- "The Interpretation of the Meaning" -- (the
A/Sub-commentary), a sub-commentary that, unlike the works of Vens.
Sariputta and Kassapa, does little more than analyze the language of the
Commentary. This was written in the 18th century C.E. by a Burmese scholar
named Ven. Ñanakitti
From here on
"the ancient commentaries" will denote the original commentaries that
Buddhaghosa had to work with, and "the commentaries" all five works listed
above.
In addition to
the Canon and the commentaries, I have referred to the texts listed in the
Bibliography. Two of these deserve special mention here.
1) The Vinaya
Mukha, a guide to the Vinaya written in Thai in the early 20th century by
Prince Vajirañana-varorasa, a son of King Rama IV who ordained as a
bhikkhu and eventually held the position of Supreme Patriarch of the Thai
Sangha for many years. This work he wrote as part of his attempt to unite
the two major sects of the Thai Sangha. The attempt failed, but the book
is still used as the official textbook on Vinaya for the examinations run
by the Thai Ecclesiastical Board. Prince Vajirañana in his interpretations
often disagrees openly not only with the commentaries, but also with the
Vibhanga itself. Some of his disagreements with the commentaries are
well-taken, some not.
I include the
book here both for the valuable suggestions it makes for dealing with
unclear points in the older texts and because it is taken as authoritative
through much of Thailand. It has been translated into English, as The
Entrance to the Vinaya, but I have chosen to translate anew all the
passages I quote from it.
2) The Book of
Discipline, a translation of the entire Vinaya Pitaka into English by Miss
I. B. Horner. Although I have learned much from Miss Horner's work, there
are points where my translations and conclusions differ from hers. Since
many readers will want to check the information in this book against hers,
I have marked these points with a "(%)." Anyone curious as to which
interpretation is correct should check the passages in question against
the Royal Thai edition of the Pali Canon, my major source throughout this
book.
Disagreements
among the texts. One of the difficulties in trying to collate all these
various texts is that there are points on which the Vibhanga is at
variance with the wording of the Patimokkha rules, and the commentaries
are at variance with the Canon. This forces us to decide which strata of
the texts to take as authoritative. As far as discrepancies between the
Vibhanga and the rules are concerned, the following passage in the
Cullavagga (X.4) suggests that the Buddha himself gave preference to the
way the bhikkhus worked out the rules in the Vibhanga:
"As she was
standing at a respectful distance, Maha-pajapati Gotami spoke thus to the
Blessed One: 'Lord, those rules of training for the bhikkhunis that are in
common with those for the bhikkhus: What line of conduct should we follow
in regard to them?'
"'Those rules
of training for the bhikkhunis, Gotami, that are in common with those for
the bhikkhus: As the bhikkhus train themselves, so should you train
yourselves'... (emphasis added).
"'And those
rules of training for bhikkhunis that are not in common with those for
bhikkhus: What line of conduct should we follow in regard to them?'
"'Those rules
of training for the bhikkhunis, Gotami, that are not in common with those
for the bhikkhus: Train yourselves in them as they are formulated.'"
This passage
implies that already in the time of the Buddha the bhikkhus had begun
working out a way to interpret the rules that in some cases was not
exactly in line with the way the Buddha had originally formulated them.
Some people have read this passage as suggesting that the Buddha, though
resigned to this development, was displeased with it, but this would
contradict the many passages in the Canon where the Buddha speaks in high
praise of Ven. Upali, the foremost of his bhikkhu disciples in terms of
his knowledge of Vinaya, who was responsible for teaching the rules to the
other bhikkhus and who was largely responsible for the shape of the Vinaya
as we now have it. It seems more likely that the Buddha in this passage is
simply saying that, to avoid unnecessary controversy, the way the bhikkhus
had worked out the implications of the rules was to be accepted as is.
Because this
development eventually led to the Vibhanga, we can be confident that in
adhering to the Vibhanga we are acting as the Buddha would have us do. And
when we check the few places where the Vibhanga deviates from the wording
of the rules, we find that almost invariably it has tried to reconcile
contradictions among the rules themselves, and between the rules and the
Khandhakas, so as to make the Vinaya a more coherent whole. This is
particularly true with rules that touch on formal acts of the Community.
Apparently many of these rules were formulated before the general patterns
for formal acts were finalized in the Khandhakas. Thus, after the patterns
were established, the compilers of the Vibhanga were sometimes forced to
deviate from the wording of the rules to bring them into line with the
patterns.
As for
contradictions between the Commentary and the Vibhanga, this is a more
controversial area, with two extremes of thought. One is to reject the
Commentary entirely, as it is not the Buddha's word, for modern historical
scholarship has shown decisively that it contains material dating many
hundreds of years after the Buddha's passing away. This position assumes,
though, that in the areas where the Canon is vague or unclear we have
nothing to learn from the accumulated wisdom and experience of those who
have lived the bhikkhu's life before us. The other extreme is to accept
the Commentary as superseding the Vibhanga entirely, in line with the
traditional belief that grew up around it: that it was composed at the
First Council to express the true intent of those who composed the
Vibhanga and yet somehow were unable to put what they really meant to say
into the Canon itself.
Neither of
these extremes is in line with the Great Standards for judging Dhamma and
Vinaya that -- as the Maha-parinibbana Sutta (D.16) reports -- the Buddha
formulated at Bhoganagara shortly before his passing away:
"There is the
case where a bhikkhu says this: 'In the Blessed One's presence have I
heard this, in the Blessed One's presence have I received this: This is
the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher's instruction.' His
statement is neither to be approved nor scorned. Without approval or
scorn, take careful note of his words and make them stand against the
Suttas and tally them against the Vinaya. If, on making them stand against
the Suttas and tallying them against the Vinaya, you find that they don't
stand with the Suttas or tally with the Vinaya, you may conclude: 'This is
not the word of the Blessed One; this bhikkhu has misunderstood it' -- and
you should reject it. But if... they stand with the Suttas and tally with
the Vinaya, you may conclude: 'This is the word of the Blessed One; this
bhikkhu has understood it rightly.'"
[The same
criteria are to be used when the bhikkhu cites as his authority a
Community with well-known leading elders; a monastery with many learned
elders who know the tradition, who have memorized the Dhamma, the Vinaya,
and the Matika (the precursor to the Abhidhamma as we know it); or a
single elder who knows the tradition.]
In other
words, the question is not one of the authority on whose word a claim is
based, but one of consistency: Only if a statement stands up under
comparison with the Canon should it be accepted as true Dhamma or Vinaya.
The same principle holds for statements that are said to be not the word
of the Buddha, but the opinion of respected teachers.
This point is
borne out by two important passages in the texts. One is the narrative of
the Second Council, during which the bhikkhus of Vesali defended ten
practices on the grounds that they had learned them from their teachers.
The elders who judged the case, though, insisted on evaluating the
practices in terms of whether or not they adhered to the Canon. The
primary point of controversy -- the question of whose authority was
greater, the Canon's or the teachers' -- was point six:
"'The practice
of what is habitual, sir -- is it allowable?'
"'What is the
practice of what is habitual, my friend?'
"'To practice
(thinking), this is the way my preceptor habitually practiced; this is the
way my teacher habitually practiced -- is this allowable?'
"'The practice
of what is habitual is sometimes allowable, sometimes not.'" (CV.XII.2.8)
What this
means, as the elders showed in the way they conducted the meeting, is that
one's teacher's and preceptor's practices are to be followed only when
they are in accordance with the Canon.
The second
passage is the discussion of the Great Standards in the Commentary to the
Maha-parinibbana Sutta, which concludes that the commentaries are to be
accepted only where they are in agreement with the Canon. Apparently the
teachers who compiled the ancient commentaries took a more modest view of
their authority than did the elders of the Mahavihara at the time of
Buddhaghosa and did not pretend to supersede the Canon as the final word
on what is and is not true Dhamma and Vinaya.
Some may
object that to pass judgment on the Commentary is to lack respect for the
tradition, but actually it is because of respect for the compilers of the
Vibhanga that I make the following assumptions in checking the Commentary
against the Vibhanga:
1) The
compilers of the Vibhanga were intelligent enough to be consistent within
the discussion of each rule. Any explanation based on the premise that
they were not consistent should give way to an explanation showing that
they were.
2) The
compilers were well enough acquainted with the contingencies surrounding
each rule that they knew which factors were and were not crucial in
determining what is and is not an offense. Any explanation that adds or
subtracts factors from those mentioned in the Vibhanga should give way to
one that follows the Vibhanga's analysis.
3) The
compilers, in reporting the precedents in the Vinita Vatthu -- the cases
the Buddha judged against an existing rule -- were careful enough to
include all the important factors bearing on the judgment. Any explanation
that requires rewriting the precedents, adding extra details extraneous to
the Vibhanga to account for the judgment, should give way to an
explanation that can make sense out of the precedents as they are reported
and in terms of the analyses presented elsewhere in the Vibhanga.
It's not that
I take any joy in arguing with the Commentary. In fact, wherever possible,
I have been happy to give it the benefit of the doubt, and on many points
I am very much in its debt. Still, now that Buddhism is coming to the
West, I feel it is time to stop and take stock of the tradition, and to
check the later traditions against the earliest sources. This is
especially important in a way of thought and life that, from the very
beginning, has appealed to reason and investigation rather than to blindly
accepted authority. In doing this, I am simply following a pattern that
has repeated itself through the history of the Theravadin tradition: that
of returning to the original principles whenever the religion reaches a
historic turning point.
There is, of
course, a danger in being too independent in interpreting the tradition,
in that strongly held opinions can lead to disharmony in the Community.
Thus in evaluating the Commentary against the Canon, I do not want to
imply that my conclusions are the only ones possible. Important points may
have slipped my attention or escaped my grasp. For this reason, even in
instances where I think that the Commentary does not do justice to the
Vibhanga, I have tried to give a faithful account of the important points
from the Commentary so that those who wish to take it as their authority
may still use this book as a guide. If there are any points on which I am
mistaken, I would be pleased if knowledgeable people would correct me.
At the same
time, I hope that this book will show that there are many areas on which
the Vibhanga is unclear and lends itself to a variety of equally valid
interpretations. For proof of this, we need only look at the various
traditions that have developed in the different Theravadin countries, and
even within each country. For some reason, although people tend to be very
tolerant of different interpretations of the Dhamma, they can be very
intolerant of different interpretations of the Vinaya and can get into
heated arguments over minor issues having very little to do with the
training of the mind.
I have tried
to make the point throughout this book that any interpretation based on a
sound reading of the Canon should be respected: that each bhikkhu should
follow the interpretations of the Community in which he is living, as long
as they do not conflict with the Canon, so as to avoid conflict over minor
matters in daily life; and that he should also show respect for the
differing interpretations of other Communities where they too do not
conflict with the Canon, so as to avoid the pitfalls of pride and
narrow-mindedness.
This is
especially true now that monasteries of different nationalities are taking
root in close proximity to one another in the West. In the past, Thais,
Burmese, and Sri Lankans could look down on one another's traditions
without danger of causing friction, as they lived in separate countries
and spoke different languages. Now, however, we have become neighbors and
have begun to speak common languages, so it is best that we take to heart
the writings of the Chinese pilgrims who visited India centuries ago. They
reported that even after the early Buddhists had split into 18 schools,
each with its own Tripitaka and Patimokkha, and the Mahayanists had added
their texts to the tradition, bhikkhus belonging to different schools
could be found living together in the same monastery, practicing and
conducting communal business in peace and harmony. Theirs is a worthy
example. We should not let our minor differences become stumbling blocks
on our way.
My aim
throughout this book has been practical. I have avoided dealing with
academic issues concerning the authenticity and reliability of the
tradition, and instead have tried simply to report and explain what the
tradition has to say. Of course, I have had to be selective. Whatever the
unconscious factors that have influenced my choice of material, the
conscious considerations shaping this book are briefly as follows:
We are dealing
primarily with rules, but rules are not the only way to express
disciplinary norms, and the texts we are surveying express their norms in
a variety of forms: as rules, principles, models, and virtues. The
different forms are best suited for different purposes. Principles,
models, and virtues are meant as personal, subjective standards and tend
to be loosely defined. Their interpretation and application are left to
the judgment of the individual. Rules are meant to serve as more objective
standards. To work, they must be precisely defined in a way acceptable to
the Community at large. The compilers of the Canon, recognizing this need,
provided definitions for most of the terms in the rules, and the authors
of the commentaries continued this task, carrying it out with even greater
thoroughness. Thus much of this book, in reporting these texts, is
concerned with the definition of terms.
This need for
precision, though, accounts for the weakness of rules in general as
universal guides to behavior. First, there is the question of where to
draw the line between what is and is not an infraction of the rule. A
clear break-off point is needed because rules -- unlike principles -- deal
in two colors: black and white. In some cases, it is difficult to find a
clear break-off point that corresponds exactly to one's sense of what is
right and wrong, and so it is necessary to include the areas of gray
either with the white or the black. In general, but not always, the
Vibhanga's position is to include the gray with the white, and to rely on
the principles of the Dhamma to encourage the individual bhikkhu to stay
away from the gray.
Take, for
instance, the rule against masturbation. The Vibhanga limits this rule to
forbidding only those forms of masturbation that aim at ejaculation, for
if it had drawn the line anywhere else, it would have become an offense
for a bhikkhu simply to scratch himself. Thus self-stimulation that does
not aim at ejaculation is not an offense, although in many cases it is
clearly against the spirit of the Dhamma. The Vinaya Mukha notes,
disapprovingly, a number of older Vinaya guides that like to dwell on
these areas of gray and seem to delight in figuring out ways to avoid an
offense by working around the letter of the rules. In this book I am
taking a different tack: Under those rules that include large areas of
gray with the white, I have noted a few relevant principles from the
Dhamma to spell out a wise policy with regard to the gray areas -- not to
reformulate the rule, but simply as a reminder that, as noted above, the
Vinaya without the Dhamma does not suffice as a guide to the goal.
Another
drawback resulting from the need for precision in rules is that the more
precisely a rule is defined to suit a particular time and place, the less
well it may fit other times and places. The compilers of the Canon, in
order to make up for this weakness, thus provided the origin stories and
precedents to show the type of situation the rule was intended to prevent,
providing principles and models that indicate the spirit of the rule and
aid in applying it to differing contexts. In writing this book I have
often made reference to these stories, to give this added dimension.
Admittedly,
the stories do not make for inspiring reading. For example, instead of
reading about bhikkhus accepting a meal at a donor's house and then
uplifting the donor with a talk on Dhamma, we read about Ven. Udayin
accepting a meal at the dwelling of a bhikkhuni who was his former wife,
and the two of them sitting there exposing their genitals to each other.
Still, the stories do remind us that the more inspiring stories we read in
the discourses took place in a very real human world, and they also reveal
the insight and understated wit of those who framed and interpreted the
rules. The element of wit here is especially important, for without it
there is no true understanding of human nature, and no intelligent system
of discipline.
Finally, in
compiling this book, I have tried to include whatever seems most worth
knowing for the bhikkhu who aims at fostering the qualities of discipline
in his life -- so as to help train his mind and live in peace with his
fellow bhikkhus -- and for anyone who wants to support and encourage the
bhikkhus in that aim.
Rule Index
This index lists the
summaries of the training rules given in this book, organized by topic.
The Sekhiya rules have not been included, because they are short, deal
almost exclusively with etiquette, and are already organized by topic in
their own chapter. I have included short summaries of the
Adhikarana-Samatha rules, even though these summaries do not appear in the
chapter discussing those rules.
The rules are divided into
five major categories, dealing with Right Speech, Right Action, Right
Livelihood, Communal harmony, and the etiquette of a contemplative. The
first three categories -- the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path that
make up the training in heightened virtue -- show in particular how the
training rules relate to the Buddhist path as a whole.
These five categories are
not sharply distinct types. Instead, they are more like the colors in the
band of light thrown off by a prism -- discernably different, but shading
into one another with no sharp dividing lines. Right Speech, for instance,
often shades into Communal harmony, just as Right Livelihood shades into
personal etiquette. Thus the placement of a particular rule in one
category rather than another has been a somewhat arbitrary process. There
are a few cases -- such as Pacittiyas 46 & 85 -- where the reason for the
placement of the rule will become clear only after a reading of the
detailed discussion of the rule in the text.
Each rule is followed by a
two-part code. The first part, before the slash, gives the rule's number
in its section of the Patimokkha. The second part gives the page number
for the discussion of the rule in this book.
Right Speech
M.117 defines wrong speech
as lying, divisive speech, abusive speech, and idle chatter.
Lying
Making an unfounded charge
to a bhikkhu that he has committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having
him disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 8/129)
Distorting the evidence
while accusing a bhikkhu of having committed a parajika offense, in hopes
of having him disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 9/138)
The intentional effort to
misrepresent the truth to another individual is a pacittiya offense. (Pc
1/260)
Making an unfounded charge
to a bhikkhu -- or getting someone else to make the charge to him -- that
he is guilty of a sanghadisesa offense is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 76/448)
Divisive speech
Tale-bearing among bhikkhus,
in hopes of winning favor or causing a rift, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc
3/266)
Abusive
speech
An insult made with
malicious intent to another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 2/263)
Idle
chatter
Visiting lay families --
without having informed an available bhikkhu -- before or after a meal to
which one has been invited is a pacittiya offense except during the robe
season or any time one is making a robe. (Pc 46/390)
Entering a village, town, or
city during the period after noon until the following dawn, without having
taken leave of an available bhikkhu -- unless there is an emergency -- is
a pacittiya offense. (Pc 85/467)
Right
Action
M.117 defines wrong action
as killing living beings, taking what is not given, and engaging in sexual
misconduct.
Killing
Intentionally bringing about
the untimely death of a human being, even if it is still a fetus, is a
parajika offense. (Pr 3/66)
Pouring water that one knows
to contain living beings -- or having it poured -- on grass or clay is a
pacittiya offense. Pouring anything that would kill the beings into such
water -- or having it poured -- is also a pacittiya offense. (Pc 20/317)
Deliberately killing an
animal -- or having it killed -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 61/420)
Using water, knowing that
it contains living beings that will die from one's use, is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 62/423)
Taking
what is not given
The theft of anything worth
1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a parajika offense. (Pr 2/50)
Having given another
bhikkhu a robe on a condition and then -- angry and displeased --
snatching it back or having it snatched back is a nissaggiya pacittiya
offense. (NP 25/246)
Making use of cloth or a
bowl stored under shared ownership -- unless the shared ownership has been
rescinded or one is taking the item on trust -- is a pacittiya offense.
(Pc 59/415)
Sexual Misconduct
Voluntary sexual intercourse
-- genital, anal, or oral -- with a human being, non-human being, or
common animal is a parajika offense. (Pr 1/45)
Intentionally causing
oneself to emit semen, or getting someone else to cause one to emit semen
-- except during a dream -- is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 1/90)
Lustful bodily contact with
a woman whom one perceives to be a woman is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg
2/100)
Making a lustful remark to
a woman about her genitals, anus or about performing sexual intercourse is
a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 3/110)
Telling a woman that she
would benefit from having sexual intercourse with oneself is a
sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 4/115)
Getting an unrelated
bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or beat a robe that has been used at least once is
a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 4/182)
Getting an unrelated
bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or card wool that has not been made into cloth or
yarn is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 17/214)
Lying down at the same time
in the same lodging with a woman is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 6/276)
Teaching more than six
sentences of Dhamma to a woman, except in response to a question, is a
pacittiya offense unless a knowledgeable man is present. (Pc 7/280)
Exhorting a bhikkhuni about
the eight vows of respect -- except when one has been authorized to do so
by the Community -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 21/320)
Exhorting a bhikkhuni on
any topic at all after sunset -- except when she requests it -- is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 22/323)
Going to the bhikkhunis'
quarters and exhorting a bhikkhuni about the eight vows of respect --
except when she is ill or has requested the instruction -- is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 23/325)
Giving robe-cloth to an
unrelated bhikkhuni without receiving anything in exchange is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 25/326)
Sewing a robe -- or having
one sewn -- for an unrelated bhikkhuni is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 26/327)
Traveling by arrangement
with a bhikkhuni from one village to another -- except when the road is
risky or there are other dangers -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 27/329)
Traveling by arrangement
with a bhikkhuni upriver or downriver in the same boat -- except when
crossing a river -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 28/331)
Sitting or lying down alone
with a bhikkhuni in a place out of sight and out of hearing with no one
else present is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 30/335 & 45/389)
Sitting or lying down with
a woman or women in a private, secluded place with no other man present is
a pacittiya offense. (Pc 44/385)
Sitting or lying down alone
with a woman in an unsecluded but private place with no one else present
is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 45/389)
Traveling by arrangement
with a woman from one village to another is a pacittiya offense. (Pc
67/432)
Right Livelihood
M.117 defines wrong
livelihood as dissembling, persuading, hinting, belittling, and pursuing
gain with gain.
General
Deliberately lying to
another person that one has attained a superior human state is a parajika
offense. (Pr 4/79)
Acting as a go-between to
arrange a marriage, an affair, or a date between a man and a woman not
married to each other is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 5/117)
Engaging in trade with
anyone except one's co-religionists is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP
20/225)
Persuading a donor to give
to oneself a gift that he or she had planned to give to the Community --
when one knows that it was intended for the Community -- is a nissaggiya
pacittiya offense. (NP 30/256)
Telling an unordained
person of one's actual superior human attainments is a pacittiya offense.
(Pc 8/285)
Persuading a donor to give
to another individual a gift that he or she had planned to give to a
Community -- when one knows that it was intended for the Community -- is a
pacittiya offense. (NP 30/256 & Pc 82/461)
Robes
Keeping a piece of
robe-cloth for more than ten days without determining it for use or
placing it under dual ownership -- except when the end-of-vassa or kathina
privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 1/163)
Being in a separate zone
from any of one's three robes at dawn -- except when the end-of-vassa or
kathina privileges are in effect, or one has received formal authorization
from the Community -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 2/172)
Keeping out-of-season cloth
for more than 30 days when it is not enough to make a requisite and one
has expectation for more -- except when the end-of-vassa and kathina
privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 3/179)
Accepting robe-cloth from
an unrelated bhikkhuni without giving her anything in exchange is a
nissaggiya pacittiya offense. NP 5/184)
Asking for and receiving
robe-cloth from an unrelated lay person, except when one's robes have been
stolen or destroyed, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 6/186)
Asking for and receiving
excess robe-cloth from unrelated lay people when one's robes have been
stolen or destroyed is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 7/189)
When a lay person who is
not a relative is planning to get a robe for one, but has yet to ask one
what kind of robe one wants: Receiving the robe after making a request
that would raise its cost is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 8/193)
When two or more lay people
who are not one's relatives are planning to get separate robes for one,
but have yet to ask one what kind of robe one wants: Receiving a robe from
them after asking them to pool their funds to get one robe -- out of a
desire for something fine -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 9/195)
Making a felt blanket/rug
with silk mixed in it for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a
nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 11/206)
Making a felt blanket/rug
entirely of black wool for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a
nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 12/208)
Making a felt blanket/rug
that is more than one-half black wool for one's own use -- or having it
made -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 13/208)
Unless one has received
authorization to do so from the Community, making a felt blanket/rug for
one's own use -- or having it made -- less than six years after one's last
one was made is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 14/209)
Making a felt sitting rug
for one's own use -- or having it made -- without incorporating a one-span
piece of old felt is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 15/211)
Seeking and receiving a
rains-bathing cloth before the fourth month of the hot season is a
nissaggiya pacittiya offense. Using a rains-bathing cloth before the last
two weeks of the fourth month of the hot season is also a nissaggiya
pacittiya offense. (NP 24/242)
Taking thread that one has
asked for improperly and getting weavers to weave cloth from it -- when
they are unrelated and have not made a previous offer to weave -- is a
nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 26/248)
When donors who are not
relatives -- and have not invited one to ask -- have arranged for weavers
to weave robe-cloth intended for one: Receiving the cloth after getting
the weavers to increase the amount of thread used in it is a nissaggiya
pacittiya offense. (NP 27/250)
Keeping robe-cloth offered
in urgency past the end of the robe season after having accepted it during
the last eleven days of the Rains Retreat is a nissaggiya pacittiya
offense. (NP 28/252)
When one is living in a
dangerous wilderness abode during the month after the fourth Kattika full
moon and has left one of one's robes in the village where one normally
goes for alms: Being away from the abode and the village for more than six
nights at a stretch -- except when authorized by the Community -- is a
nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 29/253)
Wearing an unmarked robe is
a pacittiya offense. (Pc 58/413)
Acquiring an overly large
sitting cloth after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is
a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before
confessing the offense. (Pc 89/475)
Acquiring an overly large
skin-eruption covering cloth after making it -- or having it made -- for
one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down
to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 90/477)
Acquiring an overly large
rains-bathing cloth after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own
use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size
before confessing the offense. (Pc 91/478)
Acquiring an overly large
robe after making it -- or having it made -- for one's own use is a
pacittiya offense requiring that one cut the robe down to size before
confessing the offense. (Pc 92/478)
Food
Eating any of the five
staple foods that a lay person has offered as the result of a bhikkhuni's
prompting -- unless the lay person was already planning to offer the food
before her prompting -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 29/333)
Eating food obtained from
the same public alms center two days running, unless one is too ill to
leave the center, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 31/340)
Eating a meal to which four
or more individual bhikkhus have been specifically invited -- except on
special occasions -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 32/342))
Eating a meal before going
to another meal to which one was invited, or accepting an invitation to
one meal and eating elsewhere instead, is a pacittiya offense except when
one is ill or at the time of giving cloth or making robes. (Pc 33/348)
Accepting more than three
bowlfuls of food that the donors prepared for their own use as presents or
as provisions for a journey is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 34/352)
Eating staple or non-staple
food that is not left-over, after having earlier in the day finished a
meal during which one turned down an offer to eat further staple food, is
a pacittiya offense. (Pc 35/355)
Eating staple or non-staple
food in the period after noon until the next dawn is a pacittiya offense.
(Pc 37/362)
Eating food that a bhikkhu
-- oneself or another -- formally received on a previous day is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 38/364)
Eating finer foods, after
having asked for them for one's own sake -- except when ill -- is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 39/367)
Eating food that has not
been formally given is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 40/370)
Eating staple or non-staple
food, after having accepted it from the hand of an unrelated bhikkhuni in
a village area, is a patidesaniya offense. (Pd 1/480)
Eating staple food accepted
at a meal to which one has been invited and where a bhikkhuni has given
directions, based on favoritism, as to which bhikkhu should get which
food, and none of the bhikkhus have dismissed her, is a patidesaniya
offense. (Pd 2/483)
Eating staple or non-staple
food, after accepting it -- when one is neither ill nor invited -- at the
home of a family formally designated as "in training," is a patidesaniya
offense. (Pd 3/484)
Eating an unannounced gift
of staple or non-staple food after accepting it in a dangerous wilderness
abode when one is not ill is a patidesaniya offense. (Pd 4/485)
Lodgings
Building a plastered hut --
or having it built -- without a sponsor, destined for one's own use,
without having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa
offense. Building a plastered hut -- or having it built -- without a
sponsor, destined for one's own use, exceeding the standard measurements,
is also a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 6/120)
Building a hut with a
sponsor -- or having it built -- destined for one's own use, without
having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg
7/128)
When a bhikkhu is building
or repairing a large dwelling for his own use, using resources donated by
another, he may not reinforce the window or door frames with more than
three layers of roofing material or plaster. To exceed this is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 19/315)
Acquiring a bed or bench
with legs longer than eight Sugata fingerbreadths after making it -- or
having it made -- for one's own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that
one cut the legs down before confessing the offense. (Pc 87/471)
Acquiring a bed or bench
stuffed with cotton down after making it -- or having it made -- for one's
own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one remove the stuffing
before confessing the offense. (Pc 88/473)
Medicine
Keeping any of the five
tonics -- ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, or sugar/molasses -- for more
than seven days, unless one determines to use them only externally, is a
nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 23/236)
When a supporter has made
an offer to supply medicines to the Community: Asking the him/her for
medicine outside of the terms of the offer when one is not ill, or for
medicine to use for a non-medicinal purpose, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc
47/393)
Money
When a fund has been set up
with a steward indicated by a bhikkhu: Obtaining an article from the fund
as a result of having prompted the steward more than the allowable number
of times is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 10/196)
Taking gold or money,
having someone else take it, or consenting to its being placed down as a
gift for oneself, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 18/214)
Obtaining gold or money
through trade is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 19/220)
Bowls and
other requisites
Carrying wool that has not
been made into cloth or yarn for more than three leagues is a nissaggiya
pacittiya offense. (NP 16/212)
Keeping an alms bowl for
more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under dual
ownership is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense. (NP 21/231)
Asking for a new alms bowl
when one's current bowl is not beyond repair is a nissaggiya pacittiya
offense. (NP 22/234)
Acquiring a needle box made
of bone, ivory, or horn after making it -- or having it made -- for one's
own use is a pacittiya offense requiring that one break the box before
confessing the offense. (Pc 86/470)
Communal
Harmony
To persist in one's attempts
at a schism, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting
of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 10/140)
To persist in supporting a
potential schismatic, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a
meeting of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 11/147)
To persist in being
difficult to admonish, after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in
the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense. (Sg 12/148)
To persist -- after the
third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community -- in criticizing
an act of banishment performed against oneself is a sanghadisesa offense.
(Sg 13/150)
When a trustworthy female
lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a parajika,
sanghadisesa, or pacittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a
private, secluded place, the Community should investigate the charge and
deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having
done. (Ay 1/157)
When a trustworthy female
lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a sanghadisesa or
pacittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private place, the
Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in
accordance with whatever he admits to having done. (Ay 2/161)
Telling an unordained
person of another bhikkhu's serious offense -- unless one is authorized by
the Community to do so -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 9/288)
Persistently replying
evasively or keeping silent in order to conceal one's own offenses when
being questioned in a meeting of the Community -- after a formal charge of
evasiveness or uncooperativeness has been brought against one -- is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 12/300)
If a Community official is
innocent of prejudice: Criticizing him within earshot of another bhikkhu
is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 13/303)
When one has set a bed,
bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community out in the open:
Leaving its immediate vicinity without putting it away or arranging to
have it put away is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 14/305)
When one has spread bedding
out in a dwelling belonging to the Community: Departing from the monastery
without putting it away or arranging to have it put away is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 15/307)
Encroaching on another
bhikkhu's sleeping or sitting place in a dwelling belonging to the
Community, with the sole purpose of making him uncomfortable and forcing
him to leave, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 16/310)
Causing a bhikkhu to be
evicted from a dwelling belonging to the Community -- when one's primary
motive is anger -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 17/312)
Sitting or lying down on a
bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft in a dwelling
belonging to the Community, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 18/314)
Saying that a properly
authorized bhikkhu exhorts the bhikkhunis for the sake of personal gain --
when in fact that is not the case -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 24/325)
Deliberately tricking
another bhikkhu into breaking Pacittiya 35, in hopes of finding fault with
him, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 36/360)
Speaking or acting
disrespectfully when being admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of
the training rules is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 54/407)
Agitating to re-open an
issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, is a pacittiya offense.
(Pc 63/424)
Not informing other bhikkhus
of a serious offense that one knows another bhikkhu has committed -- out
of a desire to protect him either from having to undergo the penalty or
from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc
64/426)
Acting as the preceptor in
the ordination of a person one knows to be less than 20 years old is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 65/428)
Refusing -- after the third
announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community -- to give
up the wrong view that there is nothing wrong in intentionally
transgressing the Buddha's ordinances is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 68/434)
Consorting, joining in
communion, or lying down under the same roof with a bhikkhu who has been
suspended and not been restored -- knowing that such is the case -- is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 69/437)
Supporting, receiving
services from, consorting, or lying down under the same roof with an
expelled novice -- knowing that he has been expelled -- is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 70/439)
Saying something as a ploy
to excuse oneself from training under a training rule when being
admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the rule is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 71/442)
Criticizing the discipline
in the presence of another bhikkhu, in hopes of preventing its study, is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 72/443)
Using half-truths to
deceive others into believing that one is ignorant of the rules in the
Patimokkha, after one has already heard the Patimokkha in full three
times, and a formal act exposing one's deceit has been brought against
one, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 73/445)
Giving a blow to another
bhikkhu, when motivated by anger, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 74/446)
Making a threatening
gesture against another bhikkhu when motivated by anger is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 75/448)
Saying to another bhikkhu
that he may have broken a rule unknowingly, simply for the purpose of
causing him anxiety, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 77/449)
Eavesdropping on bhikkhus
involved in an argument over an issue -- with the intention of using what
they say against them -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 78/451)
Complaining about a formal
act of the Community to which one gave one's consent -- if one knows that
the act was carried out in accordance with the rule -- is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 79/452)
Getting up and leaving a
meeting of the Community in the midst of a valid formal act -- without
having first given one's consent to the act and with the intention of
invalidating it -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 80/455)
After participating in a
formal act of the Community giving robe-cloth to a Community official:
Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 81/458)
When the Community is
dealing formally with an issue, the full Community must be present, as
must all the individuals involved in the issue; the proceedings must
follow the patterns set out in the Dhamma and Vinaya. (As 1/511)
If the Community unanimously
believes that a bhikkhu is innocent of a charge made against him, they may
declare him innocent on the basis of his memory of the events. (As 2/512)
If the Community
unanimously believes that a bhikkhu was insane while committing offenses
against the rules, they may absolve him of any responsibility for the
offenses. (As 3/513)
If a bhikkhu commits an
offense, he should willingly undergo the appropriate penalty in line with
what he actually did and the actual seriousness of the offense. (As 4/513)
If an important dispute
cannot be settled by a unanimous decision, it should be submitted to a
vote. The opinion of the majority, if in accord with the Dhamma and Vinaya,
is then considered decisive. (As 5/513)
If a bhikkhu admits to an
offense only after being interrogated in a formal meeting, the Community
should carry out an act of censure against him, rescinding it only when he
has mended his ways. (As 6/514)
If, in the course of a
dispute, both sides act in ways unworthy of contemplatives, and the
sorting out of the penalties would only prolong the dispute, the Community
as a whole may make a blanket confession of its light offenses. (As 7/515)
The
Etiquette of a Contemplative
Training a novice or lay
person to recite passages of Dhamma by rote is a pacittiya offense. (Pc
4/267)
Lying down at the same time,
in the same lodging, with a novice or layman for more than three nights
running is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 5/271)
Digging soil or commanding
that it be dug is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 10/292)
Intentionally cutting,
burning, or killing a living plant is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 11/294)
Handing food or medicine to
a mendicant ordained outside of Buddhism is a pacittiya offense. (Pc
41/381)
When on almsround with
another bhikkhu: Sending him back so that he won't witness any misconduct
one is planning to indulge in is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 42/383)
To sit down intruding on a
man and a woman in their private quarters -- when one or both are sexually
aroused, and when another bhikkhu is not present -- is a pacittiya offense.
(Pc 43/384)
Watching a field army -- or
similar large military force -- on active duty, unless there is a suitable
reason, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 48/397)
Staying more than three
consecutive nights with an army on active duty -- even when one has a
suitable reason to be there -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 49/399)
Going to a battlefield, a
roll call, an array of the troops in battle formation, or to see a review
of the battle units while one is staying with an army is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 50/400)
Taking an intoxicant is a
pacittiya offense regardless of whether one is aware or not that it is an
intoxicant. (Pc 51/402)
Tickling another bhikkhu is
a pacittiya offense. (Pc 52/405)
Jumping and swimming in the
water for fun is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 53/406)
Attempting to frighten
another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 55/409)
Lighting a fire to warm
oneself -- or having it lit -- when one does not need the warmth for one's
health is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 56/409)
Bathing more frequently than
once a fortnight when residing in the middle Ganges Valley, except on
certain occasions, is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 57/411)
Hiding another bhikkhu's
bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle case, or belt -- or having it hid --
either as a joke or with the purpose of annoying him, is a pacittiya
offense. (Pc 60/419)
Traveling by arrangement
with a group of thieves from one village to another -- knowing that they
are thieves -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 66/430)
Entering a king's sleeping
chamber unannounced, when both the king and queen are in the chamber, is a
pacittiya offense. (Pc 83/461)
Picking up a valuable, or
having it picked up, with the intent of putting it in safe keeping for the
owner -- except when one finds it in a monastery or in a dwelling one is
visiting -- is a pacittiya offense. (Pc 84/463)
The Patimokkha
is available to us in several recensions, some in Indic languages, others
in Tibetan or Chinese translations. However, of the Indic recensions, only
one -- the Pali -- is still a living tradition, recited fortnightly and
put into practice by Theravadin bhikkhus throughout the world. This is the
recension translated and explained in this book.
The meaning of
the term patimokkha is a matter of conjecture. According to the
Mahavagga, it means "the beginning, the head (or entrance -- mukha),
the foremost (pamukha) of skillful qualities." (Mv.II.3.4) The term
serves as the name not only of the basic code of training rules, but also
of a sermon in which the Buddha enumerated the basic principles common to
the teachings of all Buddhas: "The non-doing of all evil, the performance
of what is skillful, and the purification of one's heart: this is the
Buddhas' message." (Dhp.183) Thus whatever the etymology of the term
patimokkha, it denotes a set of principles basic to the practice of
the religion.
The basic code
of training rules for bhikkhus, in its Pali recension, contains 227 rules,
divided into eight sections in accordance with the penalty assigned by
each rule: parajika, defeat; sanghadisesa, formal meeting;
aniyata, undetermined; nissaggiya pacittiya, forfeiture and
confession; pacittiya, confession; patidesaniya,
acknowledgement; sekhiya, training; and adhikarana-samatha,
settlement of issues. The following chapters will discuss the precise
meanings of these terms.
Three of these
terms, though, do not denote penalties. The aniyata rules give directions
for judging uncertain cases; the sekhiya rules simply say, "(This is) a
training to be followed," without assigning a particular penalty for not
following them; and the adhikarana-samatha rules give procedures to follow
in settling issues that may arise in the Community. Thus there are only
five types of penalty mentioned in the Patimokkha rules themselves,
ranging from permanent expulsion from the Community to simple confession
in the presence of another bhikkhu. None of the penalties, we should note,
involve physical punishment of any kind. And we should further note that
the purpose of undergoing the penalties is not somehow to absolve one from
guilt or to erase any bad kamma one may incur by breaking the rules;
rather, the purpose is both personal and social: to strengthen one's
resolve to refrain from such behavior in the future, and to reassure the
other bhikkhus that one is still serious about following the training.
In addition to
the penalties directly mentioned in the rules, there are also penalties
derived from the rules by the Vibhanga and commentaries. These derived
penalties deal with two sorts of cases: 1) A bhikkhu tries to commit an
action mentioned in one of the rules, but th
