The
Buddhist Monastic Code
Volume I
The Patimokkha Training
Rules
Translated & Explained
by
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
(Geoffrey DeGraff)
Part 5
Part Six: The Alcoholic
Drink Chapter
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51. The
drinking of alcohol or fermented liquor is to be confessed.
"Then
Ven. Sagata went to the hermitage of the coiled-hair ascetic of Ambatittha,
and on arrival -- having entered the fire building and spread out a grass
mat -- sat down cross-legged with his body erect and mindfulness to the
fore. The naga (living in the fire building) saw that Ven. Sagata had
entered and, on seeing him, was upset, disgruntled, and emitted smoke. Ven.
Sagata emitted smoke. The naga, unable to bear his anger, blazed up. Ven.
Sagata, entering the fire element, blazed up. Then Ven. Sagata, having
consumed the naga's fire with his own fire, left for Bhaddavatika.
"Then
the Blessed One, having stayed at Bhaddavatika as long as he liked, left
on a walking tour to Kosambi. Word reached the lay followers of Kosambi:
'They say that Ven. Sagata did battle with the Ambatittha naga!'
"Then
the Blessed One, having toured by stages, came to Kosambi. The Kosambi lay
followers, after welcoming the Blessed One, went to where Ven. Sagata was
staying and, on arrival, having bowed down and sat to one side, said to
him, 'What, honored sir, is something the masters like that is hard for
you to get? What can we prepare for you?'
"When
this was said, some group-of-six bhikkhus said to the Kosambi lay
followers, 'Friends, there is a strong liquor called pigeon's liquor (the
color of pigeons' feet, according to the Commentary) that the bhikkhus
like and is hard for them to get. Prepare that.'
"Then
the Kosambi lay followers, having prepared pigeon's liquor in house after
house, and seeing that Ven. Sagata had gone out for alms, said to him,
'Master Sagata, drink some pigeon's liquor! Master Sagata, drink some
pigeon's liquor!' Then Ven. Sagata, having drunk pigeon's liquor in house
after house, passed out at the city gate as he was leaving the city.
"Then
the Blessed One, leaving the city with a large group of bhikkhus, saw that
Ven. Sagata had passed out at the city gate. On seeing him, he addressed
the bhikkhus, saying, 'Bhikkhus, pick up Sagata.'
"Answering, 'As you say, Lord,' the bhikkhus took Ven. Sagata to the
monastery and laid him down with his head toward the Blessed One. Then Ven.
Sagata turned around and went to sleep with his feet toward the Blessed
One. So the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, saying, 'In the past,
wasn't Sagata respectful to the Tathagata and deferential?'
"'Yes,
Lord.'
"'But
is he respectful to the Tathagata and deferential now?'
"'No,
Lord.'
"'And
didn't Sagata do battle with the Ambatittha naga?'
"'Yes,
Lord.'
"'But
could he do battle with even a salamander now?'
"'No,
Lord.'"
Object.
Alcohol means any alcoholic beverage made from grain, yeast, or any
combination of ingredients. Examples would include whiskey, beer, vodka,
and gin. Fermented liquor means any alcoholic beverage made from flowers,
fruits, honey, sugar, or any combination of ingredients. Examples here
would include wine, mead, and rum. Together, the two terms are meant to
cover all kinds of alcoholic beverages.
There
is some controversy as to what other substances would be included in this
factor in line with the Great Standards. Since the Canon repeatedly
criticizes alcohol on the grounds that it destroys one's sense of shame,
weakens one's discernment, and can put one into a stupor -- as happened to
Ven. Sagata -- it seems reasonable to extend this rule to other
intoxicants, narcotics, and hallucinogens as well. Thus things like
marijuana, hashish, heroin, cocaine, and LSD would fulfill this factor.
Coffee, tea, tobacco, and betel do not have this effect, though, so there
is no reason to include them here.
Items
that look, smell, and taste like alcohol but are non-alcoholic also do not
come under this rule. Thus, for example, carbonated apple juice that
resembles champagne would not fulfill this factor.
Perception is not a mitigating factor under this rule. A bhikkhu drinking
champagne that he thinks to be carbonated apple juice would fall under
this factor, regardless of his ignorance.
Effort.
The Vibhanga defines drinking as taking even as little as the tip of a
blade of grass. Thus taking a small glass of wine, even though it might
not be enough to make one drunk, would be more than enough to fulfill this
factor.
According to the Commentary, the number of offenses involved in taking an
alcoholic drink is determined by the number of separate sips. As for
intoxicants taken by means other than sipping, each separate effort would
count as an offense.
Non-offenses.
The Vibhanga states that there is no offense in taking alcohol "mixed in
broth, meat, or oil." The Commentary interprets the first two items as
referring to sauces, stews, and meat dishes to which alcoholic beverages,
such as wine, are added for flavoring before they are cooked. Since the
alcohol would evaporate during the cooking, it would have no intoxicating
effect. Foods containing unevaporated alcohol -- such as rum babas --
would not be included under this allowance.
As for
alcohol mixed in oil, this refers to a medicine used in the Buddha's time
for afflictions of the "wind element." The Mahavagga (VI.14.1) allows this
medicine for use only as long as the taste, color, and smell of the
alcohol are not perceptible. From this point, the Vinaya Mukha argues that
morphine and other narcotics used as pain killers are allowable as well.
In
addition, the Vibhanga states that there is no offense in taking alcohol
in molasses and embric myrobalan -- none of the texts explain what this
means -- or in taking fermented medicines that are non-alcoholic, but
whose color, taste, or smell is like alcohol.
Summary: Taking an intoxicant is a pacittiya offense regardless of whether
one is aware or not that it is an intoxicant.
* * *
52.
Tickling with the fingers is to be confessed.
"Now at
that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were making one of the group of 17
laugh by tickling him with their fingers. Convulsed with laughter and
unable to catch his breath, he died."
There
are three factors for the full offense here.
1)
Object: another bhikkhu.
2)
Effort: One touches any part of his body with any part of one's own body
3)
Intention: in order to to make him laugh.
Object.
A bhikkhu is grounds for a pacittiya here; any unordained person, grounds
for a dukkata. The Commentary notes that even a bhikkhuni counts as an
unordained person in the context of this rule, so a bhikkhu looking for a
little fun can tickle one without incurring a penalty stronger than a
dukkata. There are occasional attempts at humor in the Commentary, and we
can probably write this off as one of them.
Effort.
This factor is fulfilled only by body-to-body contact, as defined at
length under Sanghadisesa 2. The following actions, if done with the
intent of making the other person laugh, would be grounds for a dukkata
here regardless of whether the person was ordained or not:
using
an item connected with the body -- such as a stick -- to poke at the
person;
touching an item connected with the other person's body;
tossing
or dropping things on the other person.
Intention. If one has reasons for touching the other person aside from
wanting to make him laugh, there is no penalty in doing so. Thus a bhikkhu
massaging another bhikkhu's tired back commits no offense if he
inadvertently happens to touch a spot where the other bhikkhu is ticklish.
"Result" is not a factor here. If one tickles another bhikkhu with the
thought of making him laugh, one commits the full offense regardless of
whether he actually laughs or not.
Summary: Tickling another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
53. The
act of playing in the water is to be confessed.
Here
again, the factors for the full offense are three.
1)
Effort: One jumps up or down, splashes or swims
2)
Object: in water deep enough to immerse one's ankle
3)
Intention: for fun.
Effort.
According to the Commentary, each individual effort counts as a separate
offense. Thus if one is swimming for fun, one incurs a pacittiya for each
hand or foot stroke.
Object.
Jumping up or down in water less than ankle deep entails a dukkata, as
does splashing water with the hands, feet, a stick, or a piece of tile;
playing with water in a tumbler or a bowl; or playing with such things as
sour gruel, milk, buttermilk, colored dyes, urine, or mud.
The
Vibhanga states that there is also a dukkata for playing in a boat. This
the Commentary defines as paddling a boat with an oar, propelling it with
a pole, or pushing it up on shore.
Intention. The Vibhanga defines this factor as "for a laugh," which the
Commentary translates as "for fun" or "for sport" (kiladhippayo).
The
question of swimming for fitness or exercise does not come up in any of
the texts, and seems to have been virtually unheard of in Asia until
recent times. Swimming in most Asian countries has long been regarded as a
childish form of play, and the one mention in the Canon of athletic
bhikkhus keeping their bodies in strong shape is disparaging: In the
origin story to Sanghadisesa 8, Ven. Dabba Mallaputta assigned separate
lodgings to different groups of bhikkhus -- those who studied the Suttas,
those who studied the Vinaya, those who meditated, etc. -- and, finally,
"for those bhikkhus who lived indulging in animal talk and keeping their
bodies in strong shape, he assigned lodgings in the same place, 'So that
even these venerable ones will live as they like.'" Thus it does not seem
likely that the Buddha would have recognized physical fitness as an
appropriate reason for bhikkhus to go swimming.
On the
other hand, if a bhikkhu has a medical reason for swimming -- e.g., he has
injured his shoulder, and his doctor has recommended that he swim to help
speed its healing -- this would probably count as an instance of "having
business to do in the water" and thus would come under the relevant no-offense
clause.
Non-offenses.
The Vibhanga states that there is no offense in jumping in or out of the
water, swimming, or using a boat --
if one
goes into the water not for fun but because one has business to do --
examples would include bathing or helping a person who cannot swim;
if one
is crossing to the other shore of a body of water; or
if
there are dangers -- e.g., one is escaping a fire or a wild beast.
Summary: Jumping and swimming in the water for fun is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
54.
Disrespect is to be confessed.
This
rule refers to cases where one has been admonished for one's behavior. The
factors for the full offense are two.
1)
Object: One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu, who cites a rule
formulated in the Vinaya.
2)
Effort: One shows disrespect for the bhikkhu or for the rule.
Object.
Only if the bhikkhu cites a rule in the Vinaya is this factor grounds for
a pacittiya. If he criticizes one's actions, citing standards of behavior
outside of the Vinaya -- e.g., he says that one has been insensitive, out
of touch with modern attitudes, or whatever -- this factor becomes grounds
for a dukkata.
If the
person admonishing one is not a bhikkhu, then regardless of whether he/she
cites a rule in the Vinaya or standards of behavior outside of the Vinaya,
it is grounds for a dukkata.
Whether
or not one views the admonition as valid is not an issue here. Even if the
other person is really an ignorant fool, has misinterpreted the rule, or
has cited some standard of behavior having absolutely nothing to do with
Buddhist practice, one should be careful not to show disrespect in word or
deed.
Effort.
There are two possible targets for one's disrespect -- the person and the
rule -- and two ways of showing it: by word or by gesture.
Disrespect for the person includes --
saying
things that show disrespect in either a crude or subtle way, e.g., "Who
are you to tell me?" "It's presumptuous of you to pass judgment when you
aren't in my position," "Your critical attitude shows that you have some
messy emotional problems that you would be well-advised to look into,"
"Get lost!" or "Go to hell!"
or
making a rude gesture or even a slight facial expression to show one's
contempt.
Disrespect for the rule includes --
saying,
"That's a stupid rule," "That rule doesn't apply to me;"
stubbornly repeating the action for which one was admonished (this point
is covered in Mv.IV,17.1-9);
or
making a rude gesture, saying, "This is what I think of that rule."
Further
action. If one persists in acting disrespectfully when being admonished,
one may also be subject to Sanghadisesa 12 or to a formal act of
suspension.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense if, being admonished, one states simply that one was
taught differently by one's teachers.
As the
Dhammapada (verse 76) says, one should regard a person who points out
one's faults as a guide who points out hidden treasure. If one shows
disrespect to such a guide, it is unlikely that he/she will feel inclined
to point out any hidden treasure ever again.
A good
example of how to receive admonishment was set by Ven. Ananda during the
First Council (Cv.XI.1.10). Although he was admonished for committing acts
that the Buddha had not declared to be offenses, and although he did not
see that he had committed any error, still he willingly confessed his
actions as offenses so as to show good faith in his fellow bhikkhus.
Summary: Speaking or acting disrespectfully when being admonished by
another bhikkhu for a breach of the training rules is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
55.
Should any bhikkhu try to frighten another bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.
There
are three factors for the full offense here.
Intention. One wants to frighten the other person.
Effort.
One arranges a frightening sight -- such as hanging a sheet in a dark room
so that it looks like a ghost; makes a frightening sound, etc.; or
describes dangers from ghosts, robbers, or wild animals.
Object.
The other person is a bhikkhu. Anyone who is not a bhikkhu is grounds for
a dukkata.
"Result" is not a factor here. If the three factors are fulfilled, one
commits the offense regardless of whether the other person is actually
frightened or not.
Non-offenses.
To inform another person of dangers from ghosts, robbers, etc., without
intending to frighten him/her constitutes no offense.
Summary: Attempting to frighten another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
56.
Should any bhikkhu who is not ill, seeking to warm himself, kindle a fire
or have one kindled -- unless there is a suitable reason -- it is to be
confessed.
"Now at
that time, in the winter months, bhikkhus warmed themselves, having
kindled a fire by a certain large hollow log. And in that hollow a cobra
was scorched by the fire. Coming out, it sprang at the bhikkhus. The
bhikkhus ran off every which way."
Here
again the factors for the full offense are three.
1)
Object: One is not ill.
2)
Effort: One lights a fire or gets someone else to light one,
3)
Intention: for the purpose of warming oneself.
Object.
Not ill, in the context of this rule, means that one can fare comfortably
without warming oneself. The Vibhanga makes the point that perception is
not a mitigating factor here: Even if one perceives oneself to be ill in
these terms, but actually isn't, that still fulfills this factor. What
this means is that when it is chilly outside, one should be very sure that
extra warmth is necessary for one's health before going ahead and lighting
a fire to warm oneself.
Effort.
Lighting a fire at present would include turning on the flame in a heating
system in one's dwelling for the sake of the warmth. Solar or electric
heating systems, which do not use flames, would not be included here.
If,
when not ill, one gets someone else to light a fire for the purpose of
warming oneself, there is a pacittiya in making the
order/request/suggestion, and another pacittiya when the other person
lights the fire. To return a burning piece of fuel to a fire is grounds
for a dukkata; adding new fuel to a fire -- according to the Commentary --
is grounds for a pacittiya.
Intention. There is no offense if one lights a fire, or has one lit, for
purposes other than warming oneself. Thus one may light a lamp or light a
fire to boil water, burn dead leaves, or fire an alms bowl without
penalty. The Cullavagga (V.32.1) says that if a forest fire is approaching
one's dwelling, one may light a counter-fire to ward off its approach. In
other circumstances, though, Pacittiya 10 would impose a penalty for
lighting a fire on top of "live" soil, and Pacittiya 11 would impose a
further penalty for damaging plant life.
Non-offenses.
In addition, there is no offense in warming oneself at raked-out coals or
at a fire lit by someone else (not at one's request). And there is no
offense in lighting a fire when there are dangers, which the Commentary
says refers to cases when one is bitten by a snake (and wants to make the
snake-bite medicine mentioned under Pacittiya 40), when one is surrounded
by robbers, or disturbed by non-human beings or beasts of prey.
Cv.V.14.1 allows bhikkhus to use a "fire hall," similar to a sauna at
present, for the purpose of inducing perspiration for health reasons.
According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense in lighting a fire in a
place such as this.
The
purpose of this rule is suggested by a passage in the Anguttara Nikaya
(V.219) that lists the five disadvantages of sitting around a fire: It is
bad for one's eyes, bad for one's skin, bad for one's strength and (most
importantly, in this context) groups tend to form (that can turn into
factions), and they spend their time in "animal talk."
Summary: Lighting a fire to warm oneself -- or having it lit -- when one
does not need the warmth for one's health is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
57.
Should any bhikkhu bathe at intervals of less than half a month, except at
the proper occasions, it is to be confessed. Here the proper occasions are
these: the last month and a half of the hot season, the first month of the
rains, these two and a half months being a time of heat, a time of fever;
(also) a time of illness; a time of work; a time of going on a journey; a
time of wind or rain. These are the proper times here.
"Now at
that time bhikkhus were bathing in the hot spring (at Rajagaha). Then King
Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, having gone to the hot spring with the
thought, 'I will bathe my head,' waited to one side, thinking, 'I will
wait as long as the masters are bathing.' The bhikkhus bathed until
nightfall.
"Then
King Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, after having bathed his head at the
wrong time (night) -- the gates of the city being closed -- spent the
night outside the city walls... (The Buddha learned of the incident and
rebuked the bhikkhus:) 'How can you worthless men, having seen the king,
bathe not knowing moderation?'"
The
original formulation of this rule -- with no allowance for "proper
occasions" -- seems to have been intended as a temporary disciplinary
measure for the bhikkhus who had inconvenienced the king. (There was a
similar temporary rule, against eating mangoes (Cv.V.5.1), that the Buddha
formulated when King Bimbisara had invited the bhikkhus to help themselves
to his mangoes, and some group-of-six bhikkhus went and took all the
mangoes in his park, even the unripe ones. The rule was later rescinded
(Cv.V.5.2) when the Buddha allowed bhikkhus to eat any and all fruit as
long as it was allowable in any of the five ways mentioned under Pacittiya
11.)
As for
this rule: Once the proper occasions were added, they relaxed it
considerably. For instance:
a time
of illness is any time when one does not feel comfortable without bathing;
a time
of work can involve as little work as sweeping out one's room;
a time
of going on a journey is whenever one is about to go, is going or has gone
on a trip of at least half a league (approximately 5 miles/8 kilometers);
a time
of wind and rain is whenever a dusty wind blows and at least two or three
drops of rain fall on one's body.
In
addition, the Mahavagga (V.13) tells the story of Ven. Maha Kaccana's
leaving the middle Ganges Valley and settling in Avanti, to the south.
After some time, one of his students -- Ven. Sona Kutikanna -- asked
permission to visit the Buddha. Ven. Maha Kaccana gave his permission,
together with a request to convey to the Buddha: that certain rules
inappropriate for areas outside of the Ganges Valley -- this rule among
them -- be rescinded for bhikkhus living in outlying districts. The Buddha
complied with the request and defined the outlying districts in such a way
that there is nowhere in the world outside of the middle Ganges Valley
where this rule applies.
Offenses.
For those who live in the middle Ganges Valley, the offenses for bathing
more frequently than once a fortnight outside of the proper occasions are
these: a dukkata for every time one scrubs oneself with chunam (bathing
powder) or clay (soap), and a pacittiya when one has finished bathing.
Perception is not a mitigating factor here: Even if one miscounts the
days, one is still subject to the offense.
Non-offenses.
In addition to the allowances to bathe more frequently than once a
fortnight during the proper occasions or in areas outside the middle
Ganges Valley, there is no offense in bathing more frequently if one is
crossing a river or if there are dangers. This last allowance the
Commentary explains with an example: One is being chased by bees and so
jumps into the water to escape them.
Summary: Bathing more frequently than once a fortnight when residing in
the middle Ganges Valley, except on certain occasions, is a pacittiya
offense.
* * *
58.
When a bhikkhu receives a new robe, any one of three means of discoloring
it is to be applied: green, brown, or black. If a bhikkhu should make use
of a new robe without applying any of the three means of discoloring it,
it is to be confessed.
"Now at
that time many bhikkhus and wanderers were traveling from Saketa to
Savatthi. On the way, thieves came out and robbed them. Royal officials,
coming out of Savatthi and capturing the thieves with the goods, sent a
messenger to the bhikkhus, saying, 'Come, revered sirs, let each identify
his own robes and take them.' The bhikkhus could not identify their robes.
People were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can revered
ones not identify their own robes?'"
Protocol. As this rule indicates, a bhikkhu should wear robes only that
have been marked with an identifying mark. The Vibhanga does not go into
any great detail on procedures for marking a robe, aside from saying that
the mark may be as small as the tip of a blade of grass, and can be made
with any of the colors mentioned in the rule. (The color green in Pali
also covers the color blue, so a mark made with blue ink would be
acceptable.)
The
Commentary goes into more detail: After the robe has been dyed, one should
make a round mark no smaller than the size of a bedbug's back and no
larger than the iris of a peacock's eye in all four corners of the robe,
three corners, two, or one, as one sees fit. Only round marks are
allowable. Such things as lines or angular marks (squares, triangles, or
stars) are not.
As the
Vibhanga notes, once the robe has been marked, there is no need to mark it
again, even if the mark wears off, the marked part of the robe gets torn
(%), one sews a marked cloth together with an unmarked one, or one
patches, darns, or adds a hem to a marked robe. If Bhikkhu X marks a robe
and then gives it to Bhikkhu Y, Y may wear it without having to mark it
again.
In
Thailand at present, the custom is to make three small dots in one corner
of the robe, saying,"Imam bindu-kappam karomi," (I make this properly
marked) while making each dot. This procedure does not appear in the Canon
or commentaries, but does not conflict with any of them.
The
factors for the offense here are two: object -- a new robe; and effort --
one makes use of it without first marking it.
Object.
According to the Vibhanga, a new robe here refers to one made out of any
of the six kinds of robe-cloth and not yet marked. Thus an unmarked cloth
kept for a long time is still regarded as new. The Commentary adds that
robe in the context of this rule refers specifically to robes that can be
worn over the shoulders or around the waist -- i.e., lower robes, upper
robes, outer robes, rains-bathing cloths, skin-eruption covering cloths --
and not to ordinary pieces of cloth or other cloth items such as sitting
cloths, handkerchiefs, or shoulder bags. Any cloth requisite that is not a
robe in this sense is not grounds for an offense. Shoulder cloths (ansa)
were not worn in the time of the Commentary, but would seem to fall under
this factor, as would any other item a bhikkhu might wear around his body.
Effort.
The Vibhanga defines this factor with the verb "use" (paribhunjati), while
the K/Commentary is more specific in saying that this factor is fulfilled
when one wears the robe over the shoulders or around the waist. Since the
mark is to be added only after the robe is dyed, this factor does not
cover such things as trying on a new robe while it is being sewn but has
yet to be dyed.
Non-offenses.
As noted above, there is no offense --
in
using a robe that has been properly marked;
in
using a robe whose mark has worn off (as in washing); or
in
using a robe whose marked corner has been torn off or otherwise destroyed.
There
is also no need to remark a marked robe if one sews it together with an
unmarked piece of cloth, or if one patches it, darns it, or adds a new hem
to it.
The
K/Commentary adds that if one's robes have been stolen, destroyed, etc.,
one may wear an unmarked piece of cloth without committing an offense.
Summary:
Wearing an unmarked robe is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
59.
Should any bhikkhu, himself having placed robe-cloth under shared
ownership (vikappana) with a bhikkhu, a bhikkhuni, a female probationer, a
male novice, or a female novice, then make use of the cloth without the
shared ownership's being rescinded, it is to be confessed.
Shared
ownership. As mentioned in the explanations to NP 1, vikappana is an
arrangement whereby a bhikkhu places a robe or robe-cloth under shared
ownership so that he may store it for any length of time without its being
counted as an extra cloth. One may share ownership with novices,
bhikkhunis, female probationers, and female novices, as well as with one's
fellow bhikkhus.
Passages in the Mahavagga (VIII.20.2; VIII.21.1) show that shared
ownership is intended for cloth that is being stored, and not for cloth in
use. Cloth that has not been made into a finished robe, rains-bathing
cloths being kept during the eight months of the year outside of the rainy
season, and skin-eruption covering cloths being kept when they are not
needed, may all be placed under shared ownership. The three basic robes,
miscellaneous requisites, handkerchiefs, and the sitting cloth may not. As
this rule states, when a bhikkhu wants to use a piece of cloth placed
under shared ownership, the shared ownership must first be rescinded.
Protocol. The Vibhanga to this rule explains how cloth may be placed under
shared ownership, but unfortunately the explanation is rather terse, so we
will have to discuss two alternative interpretations.
What
the Vibhanga says. One may place a piece of cloth under dual ownership
only if it is one of the six kinds of robe-cloth discussed under NP 1, and
it measures at least four by eight fingerbreadths. There are two ways of
placing it under dual ownership: in the presence of (the second owner
presumably, although this is a controversial point) or in the absence of
(again, this would seem to mean the second owner).
In the
first method, one says, "I place this robe-cloth under shared ownership
with you (plural)" or "with so-and-so." (The Pali formulae for this and
the following procedures are in Appendix V.) This is as far as the
Vibhanga explains the method, but it seems to refer to two ways of doing
the procedure in the presence of the second owner: One uses "you (plural)"
if the other owner is a bhikkhu with more seniority than oneself; and the
second owner's name if he/she is a junior bhikkhu, a bhikkhuni, female
probationer, or male or female novice. (Passages throughout the Canon show
that it was considered disrespectful to refer to a senior person by his
name in his presence. Buddhists, for instance, would never address the
Buddha as Gotama, although members of other sects often did. At Mv.I.74.1,
Ven. Ananda says that he is not worthy enough to refer to Ven. Maha
Kassapa by name, as the latter is his teacher.)
The
Vibhanga does not say how shared ownership is to be rescinded in a case
like this, although the K/Commentary gives a formula for the second owner
to say: "Use what is mine, give it away, or do as you like with it."
In the
second method, one gives the cloth to a witness and says, "I give this
robe-cloth to you to place under shared ownership." The witness then says,
"Who are your friends and acquaintances?" One then names two of one's
friends (with whom one has made an arrangement for using one another's
belongings on trust), and the witness says, "I give it to them. Use what
is theirs, give it away, or do as you like with it."
This
second method, apparently, is for use in situations where one has an extra
cloth whose time span is almost up, and one is far away from any
co-religionist with whom one has made an arrangement to use one another's
belongings on trust.
What is
happening in the procedure is that one is giving the cloth away to the
witness; the witness then places it with one as a gift to one's friends.
Since one already has permission to use their things on trust, one may
freely make use of the cloth if one wants to, or simply keep it for any
number of days if not. (See Mv.V.13.13.) Cases of placing gifts in trust
in this way are discussed in detail at Mv.VIII.31.2-3. According to those
passages, the witness has no business in giving one permission to use the
cloth after having given it to the two other people; perhaps the statement
is included to show that all sides involved -- the witness and the two new
owners of the cloth -- are agreeable to one's making use of the cloth. If
the two new owners have not previously given one permission to use their
belongings on trust, one may not make use of the cloth until they give
express permission to do so, although one may keep it for any number of
days without incurring a penalty under NP 1.
What
the K/Commentary says. The Commentary has nothing to say about these
procedures, while the K/Commentary goes into great detail, reworking the
Vibhanga's descriptions to come up with three methods.
In the
first method, "in the presence of," one says in the presence of the second
owner, "I place this robe-cloth under shared ownership with you." The
shared ownership is rescinded when the second owner/witness gives one
permission to use the cloth, give it away, or do as one likes with it.
In the
second method -- which the K/Commentary also calls "in the presence of" --
one says in the presence of a witness who is not the second owner, "I
place this robe-cloth under shared ownership with so-and-so." The shared
ownership is rescinded when the witness gives one permission to use the
cloth, give it away, or do as one likes with it.
In the
third method, "in the absence of," one gives the cloth to a witness,
saying, "I give this robe-cloth to you to place under shared ownership."
The witness says, "Who is a friend or acquaintance of yours?" One names a
friend, and the witness says, "I give it to him/her. Use what is his/hers,
give it away, or do as you like with it." The shared ownership is
rescinded when the witness says this.
There
are a number of problems with the K/Commentary's interpretations. First,
it is hard to see any practical difference between its methods 2 and 3,
why one should be called "in the presence of" and the other "in the
absence of," and in method 2 why the witness should have the right to give
one permission to use an article that strictly speaking belongs to someone
else.
Secondly, the K/Commentary's method for "in the absence of" deviates from
the Vibhanga's description of the method. In the Vibhanga's description,
the witness places the cloth under shared ownership with two of one's
friends, while in the K/Commentary's description, he/she places it under
shared ownership with one. Why this should be the case, none of the texts
explains.
For
these reasons, it would seem that the previous explanation -- that there
are two methods, as described in the Vibhanga -- is preferable to the
K/Commentary's.
The
factors for the offense here are two: object -- any one of the six kinds
of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, that one
has placed under shared ownership; and effort -- one uses the cloth
without the shared ownership's being rescinded.
The
K/Commentary notes that this rule applies not only to robe-cloth, but also
to bowls as well. There is nothing in any of the other texts on this
point, but the Great Standards would seem to support it.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense in using an item placed under shared ownership if the
shared ownership has been rescinded, or if one makes use of the item on
trust. The factors for legitimately taking an item on trust are as follows
(Mv.VIII.19.1):
1) The
other person is an acquaintance.
2)
He/she is one's friend.
3)
He/she has spoken of the matter. (According to the Commentary, this means
that he/she has said, "You may take any of my property you want.")
4)
He/she is still alive; and
5) one
knows that he/she will not mind.
These
factors are discussed in detail under Parajika 2.
The
K/Commentary's analysis of the factors involved in committing an offense
under this rule suggests that when an item placed under shared ownership
is taken on trust, the shared ownership is automatically rescinded, and
the item reverts to the status of extra cloth or an extra bowl, as the
case may be.
Summary: Making use of cloth or a bowl stored under shared ownership --
unless the shared ownership has been rescinded or one is taking the item
on trust -- is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
60.
Should any bhikkhu hide (another) bhikkhu's bowl, robe, sitting cloth,
needle case, or belt -- or have it hidden -- even as a joke, it is to be
confessed.
This is
another rule that comes from some members of the group of six teasing the
children in the group of 17. The factors for the full offense are three.
Object:
any of the requisites mentioned in the rule, belonging to a bhikkhu. Robe
here means any piece of robe material measuring at least four by eight
fingerbreadths, except for sitting cloths, which are mentioned separately.
Needle case covers not only cases that contain needles and but also empty
ones. Any requisite not mentioned in the rule but belonging to a bhikkhu
is grounds for a dukkata, as is any requisite belonging to a person who is
not a bhikkhu.
Effort.
One hides the article or has it hidden. In the latter case -- assuming
that the other factors are fulfilled -- there is a pacittiya in making the
request/command/suggestion, and another pacittiya when the other person
does one's bidding.
Intention. One is doing it as a game. The Sub-commentary makes clear that
the "game" here can either be friendly or malicious. If one hides the
other bhikkhu's requisites out of the perverse pleasure of annoying him,
or simply for a friendly laugh, one commits the full offense all the same.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense if --
not as
a game, one puts away properly items that have been put away improperly
(%), e.g., a bowl left hanging on a peg (see Cv.V.8.5); or
one
puts away an item, thinking, "I will give it back (to him) after having
given him a Dhamma talk." Dhamma talk here, the Commentary says, refers to
such admonitions as, "A contemplative should not leave his requisites
scattered around." Hiding things with this purpose in mind is sometimes an
effective way for a teacher to train his students to stop being careless
with their belongings, but it should be used with discretion, for it can
easily backfire.
Summary: Hiding another bhikkhu's bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle case,
or belt -- or having it hid -- either as a joke or with the purpose of
annoying him, is a pacittiya offense.
Part Seven: The Animal Chapter
61.
Should any bhikkhu knowingly deprive an animal of life, it is to be
confessed.
There
are five factors for the full offense here.
1)
Object: a living animal.
2)
Perception: One perceives it to be a living animal.
3)
Intention: One knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully
wants to cause its death.
4)
Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing it to die.
5)
Result: It dies as a result of one's action.
Object.
Animal here covers all common animals. As the Commentary notes, whether
the animal is large or small makes no difference in terms of the penalty,
although the size of the animal is one of the factors determining the
moral gravity of the act.
Apparently, this factor does not include beings too small to be seen with
the naked eye, inasmuch as the classes of medicine allowed in Mahavagga VI
include a number of anti-bacterial and anti-viral substances -- some
mineral salts and the decoctions made from the leaves of some trees, for
example, can be antibiotic. The Commentary's example of the smallest
extreme to which this rule extends is a bed bug egg. The four "Things Not
To Be Done," taught to every bhikkhu immediately after his ordination
(Mv.I.78.4), say that one should not deprive an animal of life, "even if
it is only an ant."
On the
other end of the spectrum, there is a parajika for deliberately killing a
human being, and a thullaccaya for deliberately killing a peta, yakkha, or
naga.
Perception. If this factor is not fulfilled, there is no offense. For
example, if one steps on bed bug eggs, thinking them to be spots of dirt,
there is no penalty.
Intention, in the Vibhanga, is described as "having made the decision
knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." According to the Commentary,
"having made the decision" refers to the moment when one "crushes" one's
indecisiveness by taking an act. Knowingly means that one knows that,
"This is a living being." Consciously means that one is aware that one's
action is depriving the animal of life. Purposefully means that one's
purpose in acting is to kill the animal.
All of
this indicates that this factor is fulfilled only when one acts on a clear
and consciously made decision to deprive the animal of life. Thus, for
example, if one is sweeping a walk, trying carefully not to kill any
insects, and yet some ants happen to die, one does not commit an offense
even if one knew that there was the possibility that some might die, since
one's purpose in acting was not to cause their death.
Effort.
The act of taking life may take the form of any of the six types of action
listed under Parajika 3:
using
one's own person (e.g., hitting with the hand, kicking, using a knife or a
club);
throwing (hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun);
using a
stationary device (setting a trap, placing poison in food);
using
magical formulae;
using
psychic powers;
commanding.
A
passage in the Mahavagga (V.10.10) deals with a case of this last
instance, in which a depraved bhikkhu tells a layman that he has use for a
certain calf's hide, and the layman kills the calf for him. Since the
bhikkhu did not give a specific command that the calf be killed, and yet
the Buddha said that his action did come under this rule, this shows that
there is no room for kappiya-vohara in this context. Whatever one says in
hopes of inciting someone else to kill an animal would fulfill this
factor.
Result.
Only if the animal dies does one incur the pacittiya here. The Commentary
to Pacittiya 74 imposes a dukkata on the simple act of striking an animal.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense in killing an animal --
unintentionally -- e.g., accidentally dropping a load that crushes a cat
to death;
unthinkingly -- e.g., absent-mindedly rubbing one's arm while it is being
bitten by mosquitoes;
unknowingly -- e.g., walking into a dark room and, without realizing it,
stepping on an insect; or
when
one's action is motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death --
e.g., giving medicine to a sick dog whose system, it turns out, cannot
withstand the dosage.
Still,
the Commentary states that if one notices even bed bug eggs while cleaning
a bed, one should be careful not to damage them. Thus, "out of compassion,
one's duties are to be done carefully." Or, in the words of the
Sub-commentary: "One's duties in looking after one's dwelling are to be
done with mindfulness well-established so that such creatures do not die."
Summary: Deliberately killing an animal -- or having it killed -- is a
pacittiya offense.
* * *
62.
Should any bhikkhu knowingly make use of water with living beings in it,
it is to be confessed.
This
rule is similar to Pacittiya 20, differing only in the factor of effort
and the way the non-offenses are defined. Here, as under that rule, the
factors for the full offense are four:
Object:
water containing living creatures. This includes things like mosquito
larvae, but not beings too small to be seen.
Perception. One knows that they are there (from having seen them or heard
that they are there, says the K/Commentary), and that they will die from
the factor of effort, defined below.
If one
is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings, then to use it in
a way that would cause their death if they were there is to incur a
dukkata.
Effort.
The Vibhanga does not go into detail on this factor, while the Commentary
defines it with examples: drinking the water, using it to wash one's bowl,
using it to cool hot porridge, dipping it out of a tank or pond to bathe
with it, making waves in a pool so that the water will splash over its
banks. The Sub-commentary suggests that this rule covers only cases in
which one is using water for one's own personal consumption, but this does
not fit with the fact that, under this rule, the Commentary explains how
one should go about cleaning out a dirty pool. (Place eight to ten potfuls
of water containing no living beings in another place that will hold the
water, and then dip the water from the pool into it.)
From
all of this, it would appear that this rule covers all cases of using
water containing living beings that are not covered by Pacittiya 20.
Unlike
that rule, though, the factor of effort here does not cover cases of
telling someone else to use water containing living beings.
Intention. This factor is fulfilled simply by the desire to use the water
As the K/Commentary notes, one need not have murderous intent toward the
living beings in order to fulfill this factor. For example, if after
perceiving that the water contains insects, one chooses to ignore their
existence and boils the water -- not to kill the insects, but to use the
water for bathing -- one commits an offense all the same.
"Result" is not a factor here. Whether or not the living beings actually
die is of no consequence in determining the offense.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense in using water --
if one
does not know that it contains living beings;
if one
knows that it does not contain living beings; or
if one
knows that the living beings it contains will not die from the use one has
in mind.
Water
strainers. Cv.V.13.1 gives permission for one to use a water strainer to
remove dirt and living beings from water before using it, and such
strainers eventually became one of a bhikkhu's eight basic requisites.
According to Cv.V.13.2, one must take a water strainer along when going on
a journey. If one has no strainer, one may determine the corner of one's
outer robe as a strainer and use it to filter water.
Summary: Using water, knowing that it contains living beings that will die
from one's use, is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
63.
Should any bhikkhu knowingly agitate for the reviving of an issue that has
been rightfully dealt with, it is to be confessed.
Issues.
An issue (adhikarana) is a matter that, once arisen, must be dealt with
formally in a prescribed manner. The Vibhanga lists four sorts:
1)
disputes concerning Dhamma and Vinaya (see Sanghadisesa 10), which the
Community must deal with by declaring which side is right and which wrong;
2)
accusations concerning offenses (see Sanghadisesas 8 & 9; Aniyatas 1 & 2),
which the Community must deal with by judging them true or false;
3) the
commission of offenses, which are to be dealt with by the offenders'
undergoing the prescribed penalties; and
4)
duties of the Community -- such as giving ordination and holding the
Patimokkha recitation -- which the Community must deal with by performing
them fully.
An
issue rightfully dealt with is one that has been handled fairly in
accordance with the procedures given in the Vinaya. Some of these
procedures are discussed under Pacittiyas 79 & 80, and the
Adhikarana-Samatha rules. If an issue has been dealt with improperly, it
may be reopened for reconsideration, but once it has been dealt with
properly it is considered closed for good.
The
factors for an offense under this rule are three.
1)
Object: an issue that has been dealt with properly.
2)
Perception: One knows that it was dealt with properly, either because one
was directly involved or one has been told of the matter.
3)
Effort: One says -- in the presence of another bhikkhu -- that it was
dealt with improperly. The Vibhanga gives the following examples of
statements that would fulfill this factor: "The issue was not carried
out." "It was poorly carried out." "It should be carried out again." "It
was not settled." "It was poorly settled." "It should be settled again."
The
Parivara (IX.3) contains a short discussion of this rule, and makes the
point that one is subject to this rule regardless of whether or not one
was involved in dealing with the issue the first time around.
Further
action. If one makes a concerted effort to reopen an issue, knowing that
it was properly dealt with, one is considered a maker of strife, and as
such is subject to an act of censure, banishment, or suspension, depending
on the gravity of the case.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense in agitating to have an issue re-opened if one
perceives it to have been improperly dealt with: e.g., dealt with not in
accordance with the rules and procedures of the Vinaya, dealt with by an
incomplete group, or -- in the case of an accusation or similar acts --
performed against someone who did not deserve it. This allowance holds
regardless of whether, in actuality, the issue was properly dealt with or
not. For example: A Community has performed an act of censure against
Bhikkhu X. One honestly believes that X did not deserve the act, and says
so to a fellow bhikkhu. In this case, one commits no offense, even if it
turns out that X did in fact deserve censure.
Summary: Agitating to re-open an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt
with, is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
64.
Should any bhikkhu knowingly conceal another bhikkhu's serious offense, it
is to be confessed.
Here
there are four factors for the full offense.
1)
Object: Another bhikkhu has committed a serious offense, which according
to the Vibhanga means a parajika or a sanghadisesa.
2)
Perception: One knows that he has committed a serious offense.
3)
Intention: One wants to hide the offense from other bhikkhus, for fear
that they will reprove or remind him of the offense (steps in the formal
inquiry into the offense) or that they will jeer, scoff, or shame him
about it (steps in his enemies' informal reaction to the news). In other
words, this factor is fulfilled if one wants to prevent a formal act from
being carried out against the offender or simply to protect him from the
jeering remarks of other bhikkhus who may dislike him.
4)
Effort: A bhikkhu who may be told of the matter is available, but one
abandons one's duty to tell him.
Object
& perception. Another bhikkhu's non-serious offenses are grounds for a
dukkata here, as are the misdeeds -- serious or non-serious -- of an
unordained person (i.e., a novice).
As for
a bhikkhu's offenses, only a serious offense that one perceives to be
serious is grounds for a pacittiya; all other possible combinations of
object and perception -- a serious offense that one perceives to be
non-serious, a non-serious offense that one perceives to be serious, and a
non-serious offense that one perceives to be non-serious -- are grounds
for a dukkata.
Effort.
The K/Commentary defines this factor as if it were a simple act of mind --
one decides that, "I won't tell any bhikkhu about this" -- but this goes
against the basic principles of the Vinaya, in which a mere act of mind is
never sufficient for an offense. It would seem better to argue from the
Vibhanga and say that this factor is fulfilled if one comes to this
decision when another bhikkhu is available.
The
Commentary says that if one abandons one's responsibility, but then later
changes one's mind and tells another bhikkhu, one has committed the
offense all the same.
It also
says that if one tells Bhikkhu X, asking him to help hide Bhikkhu Y's
offense, this also fulfills the factor of effort here. If X then abandons
his responsibility to tell, he too commits the offense under this rule.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense in not telling another bhikkhu --
if one
thinks that telling will lead to strife or a split in the Community;
if one
fears reprisals from the bhikkhu who has committed the offense;
if
there is no suitable bhikkhu to tell;
if one
is not trying to hide the offense; or
if one
feels that the wrong-doer's own behavior will betray him and thus there is
no need to tell.
Summary: Not informing other bhikkhus of a serious offense that one knows
another bhikkhu has committed -- out of a desire to protect him either
from having to undergo the penalty or from the jeering remarks of other
bhikkhus -- is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
65.
Should any bhikkhu knowingly give full ordination to an individual less
than twenty years of age, the individual is not ordained and the bhikkhus
are blameworthy; and as for him (the preceptor), it is to be confessed.
The
origin story here tells how the group of 17 came to be ordained.
"Now at
that time in Rajagaha, a group of 17 boys were friends, with the boy Upali
as their leader. Then the thought occurred to Upali's parents, 'By what
means could Upali, after our death, live pleasantly and not grow weary
(with work)?... If he studies writing, his fingers will hurt... If he
studies calculation, his breast will hurt... If he studies money changing,
his eyes will hurt. Now, these Sakyan contemplatives are of pleasing
virtue and conduct. Having eaten fine meals, they lie down in beds
sheltered from the wind. If Upali went forth among the Sakyan
contemplatives, he would live pleasantly after our death and not be weary
with work.'
"The
boy Upali heard his parents' conversation. Then he went to the boys... and
said, 'Come, masters, let's go forth among the Sakyan contemplatives.'
"'If
you go forth, master, so will we.'
"So
each of the boys, having approached his parents, said, 'Permit us to go
forth from home into homelessness.' Then the parents of the boys gave
their permission, (thinking,) 'All these boys are unanimous. They want
what is noble.'
"(The
boys) having approached the bhikkhus, asked for the going forth. The
bhikkhus gave them the going forth and full ordination. Then, waking up in
the last watch of the night, the boys (now bhikkhus) cried out, 'Give us
porridge! Give us rice! Give us food!'
"The
bhikkhus said, 'Wait, friends, until it turns light. If there is porridge,
you will drink it. If there is rice, you will eat it. If there is food,
you will eat it. But if there is no porridge or rice or food, then you
will eat having gone for alms.'
"But
even then, those (new) bhikkhus cried out as before, 'Give us porridge!
Give us rice! Give us food!' And they wet the bedding and soiled it."
The
Buddha, in rebuking the bhikkhus who had given full ordination to the 17
boys, painted a picture of the bhikkhus' life very different from that
imagined by Upali's parents:
"Bhikkhus,
how can these worthless men knowingly give full ordination to an
individual less than 20 years old? An individual less than 20 years old is
not resistant to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, the touch of gadflies and
mosquitoes, wind and sun and creeping things; or to abusive, hurtful
language. He is not the sort that can endure bodily feelings that, when
they arise, are painful, sharp, stabbing, fierce, distasteful,
disagreeable, deadly.'"
The
factors for the full offense here are three.
1)
Object: a man less than 20 years old.
2)
Perception: One knows that he is less than 20 years old.
3)
Effort: One acts as the preceptor in his full ordination as a bhikkhu.
Object.
As Mv.I.75 makes clear, a person's age for the purpose of this rule is
counted from the time of his conception in his mother's womb. Since this
is difficult -- if not impossible -- to date with any accuracy, the usual
practice in calculating a person's age is to add six months to the number
of years since his birth, to allow for the possibility of his having been
born prematurely. As the Commentary notes, a baby born after seven months
in the womb may survive, but one born after only six months in the womb
won't.
Perception. If one does not know that the individual is less than 20 years
old, there is no offense in ordaining him. If one is in doubt as to
whether or not he is less than 20, but goes ahead and ordains him anyway,
one incurs a dukkata regardless of his actual age.
Effort.
There is a dukkata for every step in arranging the ordination of an
individual one knows to be less than 20 years old, beginning with the act
of searching out a group to ordain him, looking for robes and a bowl for
him to use, etc., all the way to the second announcement in the formal act
of ordination. Once the third and final announcement has been made, the
preceptor incurs a pacittiya, and all other bhikkhus in the group who know
that the individual is less than 20 years old, a dukkata.
In any
case, if the individual is really less than 20 years old when he is
ordained, then -- regardless of whether or not he or anyone else knows of
the fact -- he does not count as a bhikkhu and is only novice. The
Commentary notes here that if he continues in this state for long enough
to become a preceptor or teacher in another person's ordination, that
person counts as rightly ordained only as long as there are enough true
bhikkhus in the group ordaining him, not counting the improperly ordained
"bhikkhu" in question.
It adds
that if one is less that 20 when being ordained, without knowing the fact,
it does not act as an obstacle to one's qualifying for heaven or the
transcendent states; but if one ever finds out the truth that one was
improperly ordained, one should immediately arrange for a proper
ordination.
Summary: Acting as the preceptor in the ordination of a person one knows
to be less than 20 years old is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
66.
Should any bhikkhu knowingly and by arrangement travel together with a
caravan of thieves, even for the interval between one village and the
next, it is to be confessed.
Here
the full offense has three factors:
1)
Object: a caravan of thieves.
2)
Perception: One knows that it is a caravan of thieves.
3)
Effort: (a) One makes an arrangement together with the caravan to travel
together and (b) one actually travels together with them as arranged (c)
from one village to another.
Object.
A caravan of thieves, according to the Vibhanga, is any group that has
committed a theft, is on its way to commit a theft, is planning to evade a
tax, or is planning to "rob the king," which the Commentary translates as
planning to cheat the government in one way or another. At present this
would include any person or group of people smuggling or trading in
contraband goods.
None of
the texts mention the minimum number of thieves needed to form a "group,"
but arguing from the Great Standards we can say that even a single thief
would fulfill this factor.
Perception. If one does not know that a person or group would count as a
caravan of thieves, there is no offense in traveling by arrangement with
them. If one is in doubt, then there is a dukkata for traveling with them
regardless of whether they actually are a caravan of thieves or not.
Making
an arrangement. According to the Vibhanga, the bhikkhu must give his
verbal consent to the arrangement for this part of the factor to be
fulfilled. In other words, if the thieves propose the arrangement, and he
agrees; or he proposes it, regardless of whether or not they agree, this
part of the factor is fulfilled. The penalty for fulfilling it is a
dukkata.
If the
thieves propose the arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his
verbal assent, then even if he does travel together as they proposed, he
commits no offense in doing so.
Going
as arranged. If a specific time frame was part of the arrangement, then
the two parties must begin traveling together within that time frame for
this factor to be fulfilled. If they happen to start out earlier or later
than arranged, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary notes,
though, that if they leave from a different spot than the one they had
arranged or go by a different route, that does not absolve the bhikkhu
from the offense
From
one village to another. There is a pacittiya for every village-to-village
interval one passes. In an area where there are no villages -- i.e., says
the Sub-commentary, where villages are farther than half a league (8 km.
or 5 miles) apart -- there is a pacittiya for every half-league one
travels together as arranged.
None of
the texts mention cases of traveling long distances within a large city,
but it would seem that in such cases -- arguing from the Great Standards
-- one would incur the full penalty in traveling from one administrative
district to the next.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense --
if the
bhikkhu and thieves happen to travel together without having made an
arrangement;
if the
thieves propose an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal
assent;
if they
leave together at a time other than that they had previously arranged; or
if
there are dangers (and the bhikkhu must join the caravan for his safety).
Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a group of thieves from one village
to another -- knowing that they are thieves -- is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
67.
Should any bhikkhu, by arrangement, travel together with a woman, even for
the interval between one village and the next, it is to be confessed.
"Now at
that time a certain bhikkhu, going through the Kosalan countryside on his
way to Savatthi, passed by the gate of a certain village. A certain woman,
leaving the village after quarreling with her husband, saw the bhikkhu and
said, 'Where are you going, sir?'
"'I'm
going to Savatthi, sister.'
"'Then
I'm going with you.'
"'As
you wish, sister.'
"Then
the woman's husband, leaving the village, asked people, 'Have you seen
such-and-such a woman?'
"'She's
going along with a monk.'
"So the
man, having caught up with them, seized the bhikkhu, gave him a good
thrashing, and set him free. The bhikkhu went and sat fuming under a
certain tree. The woman said to the man, 'That bhikkhu didn't abscond with
me. I was the one who went with him. He's innocent. Go and ask his
forgiveness.'
"So the
man asked the bhikkhu for his forgiveness."
Object.
A female human being, mature enough to know what is and is not lewd, is
grounds for a pacittiya here. Pandakas (see Sanghadisesa 2), female
yakkhas and petas, and animals in the form of a female human being are all
grounds for a dukkata.
Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Thus if one travels by
arrangement with a woman disguised as a man, one still incurs the full
penalty. Similarly, if one travels by arrangement with a pandaka, not
knowing that that's what he is, one still incurs a dukkata.
Effort
here is defined as under the preceding rule: (a) One makes an arrangement
together with the woman to travel together and (b) one actually travels
together with her as arranged (c) from one village to another. See the
preceding rule for explanations.
Non-offenses.
There is no offense --
if the
bhikkhu and woman happen to travel together without having made an
arrangement;
if the
woman proposes an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal
assent;
if they
leave together at a time other than that they had previously arranged; or
if
there are dangers.
Current
practice. In the time of the Buddha, long-distance travel was mostly by
foot, and the question of prior arrangement was what made the difference
between whether one was traveling together with someone else or simply
happened to be walking along the road at the same time. At present, when
one is taking public transport -- buses, subways, trains, and airplanes --
this is still the factor determining whether one is traveling together
with someone else or simply happens to be on the bus, etc., at the same
time. This rule thus forbids a bhikkhu from traveling together with a
woman, by prior arrangement, on the same public transport.
Private
transport, though -- such as automobiles, trucks and vans -- is an area
that different Communities treat in differing ways. Some treat it under
Pacittiya 44, rather than here, and say that a bhikkhu may sit in an
automobile with a woman as long as a knowledgeable man is present. This
holds regardless of whether the automobile is sitting still or traveling
any number of miles, and regardless of whether the woman or the man is
driving.
Other
Communities treat private transport under this rule, but say that the
prior arrangement is implicitly with the driver of the transport. If the
driver is a woman, there is a pacittiya in riding with her from one
village to the next. If the driver is a man, there is no offense,
regardless of whether or not a woman is riding along.
The
Commentary would not agree with this second interpretation, for it states
explicitly when discussing Mv.V.10.3 that a bhikkhu may ride in a cart
driven by a woman or a man. At any rate, though, this is another area
where the wise policy is to follow the practice of the Community in which
one belongs, as long as one is careful to adhere to the Vibhanga by not
entering verbally into any arrangement with a woman to go traveling
together.
Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a woman from one village to another
is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
68.
Should any bhikkhu say the following: "As I understand the Dhamma taught
by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when
indulged in are not genuine obstructions," the bhikkhus should admonish
him thus: "Do not say that, venerable sir. Do not misrepresent the Blessed
One, for it is not good to misrepresent the Blessed One. The Blessed One
would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the Blessed One
has described obstructive acts, and when indulged in they are genuine
obstructions."
And
should the bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before,
the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times so as to desist. If while
being rebuked up to three times he desists, that is good. If he does not
desist, it is to be confessed.
Obstructions. An obstruction, the Commentary says, is anything that acts
as an obstacle to the attainment of heaven or emancipation. It lists five
major types:
1)
Acts, i.e., the five anantariya kamma: patricide, matricide, the murder of
an arahant, the wounding of a Buddha, the creation of a schism in a Sangha;
2)
Defilements, i.e., firmly held wrong views (the Sub-commentary lists
determinism, fatalism, annihilationism, etc.);
3)
Fruits of past actions, e.g., birth as a neuter person, a hermaphrodite, a
common animal;
4)
Disputes, i.e., disputes with Noble Ones -- even simple contentiousness in
the mind, says the Sub-commentary -- although these are obstructions only
so long as one has not asked forgiveness; and finally, for a bhikkhu,
5)
Intentional transgressions of the Buddha's ordinances, although these are
obstacles only as long as one has not undergone the penalty called for in
the relevant rule.
The
Commentary notes that this training rule deals with a bhikkhu who holds to
the view that this last category is not an obstacle, the most common
example being the bhikkhu who believes that there is nothing wrong in a
bhikkhu's having sexual intercourse in defiance of Parajika 1.
There
are many ways that one might rationalize such an idea, and the Commentary
gives an entertaining description of one of them:
"Here a
bhikkhu... having gone into seclusion, reasons as follows: 'There are
people living the household life, enjoying the five pleasures of the
senses, who are stream-winners, once-returners, and nonreturners. As for
bhikkhus, they see pleasurable forms cognizable via the eye, hear...
smell... taste... feel (pleasurable) tactile sensations cognizable via the
body. They use soft carpets and clothing. All this is proper. Then why
shouldn't the sight, sound, smell, taste, and feel of a woman be proper?
They too are proper!' Thus... comparing a mustard seed with Mount Sineru,
he gives rise to the pernicious view, 'Why did the Blessed One -- binding
the ocean, as it were, with great effort -- formulate the first parajika
traini
