The
Buddhist Monastic Code
Volume I
The Patimokkha Training
Rules
Translated & Explained
by
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
(Geoffrey DeGraff)
Part 4
Part Two: The Living Plant
Chapter
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11. The damaging of a living
plant is to be confessed.
"Now a certain Alavi bhikkhu
was chopping down a tree. The devata living in the tree said to the
bhikkhu, 'Sir, do not chop down my dwelling to build a dwelling for
yourself.' The bhikkhu, paying no attention, continued chopping and
injured the arm of the devata's child. The devata thought: 'What if I were
to kill this bhikkhu right here?' Then another thought occurred to her:
'But no, that wouldn't be proper. What if I were to inform the Blessed One
of this matter?' So she went to the Blessed One and on arrival informed
him of what had happened.
"'Very good, devata. It's
very good that you didn't kill the bhikkhu. If you had, you would have
produced much demerit for yourself. Now go, devata. Over there is a vacant
tree. Go into it.' (The Commentary adds here that the tree, being in the
Jetavana Monastery, was one of the choicest pieces of devata real estate
in those days. Other devas coming to pay their respects to the Buddha also
made a point of paying their respects to the devata living in this tree.
At any rate:)
"People were offended and
annoyed and spread it about, 'How can these Sakyan contemplatives cut down
trees and have them cut down? They are destroying one-facultied life.'"
This is another offense with
the four factors of object, effort, perception, and intention.
Object. The Pali term for
living plant -- bhutagama -- literally means the home of a being. This the
Sub-commentary explains by saying that devatas may take up residence in
plants standing in place by means of a longing on which their
consciousness fastens (at the end of their previous lives) as in a dream.
This rule is justified, it says, in that the etiquette of a contemplative
precludes doing harm to the abodes of living beings. As the origin story
shows, though, the reason this rule was laid down in the first place was
to prevent bhikkhus from offending people who held to the animist belief
that regarded plants as one-facultied life having the sense of touch.
The Vibhanga defines
bhutagama as vegetation arising from any of five sources:
1) from bulbs, rhizomes, or
tubers (e.g., potatoes, tulips),
2) from cuttings or stakes
(e.g., willows, rose bushes),
3) from joints (e.g., sugar
cane, bamboo),
4) from runners (e.g.,
strawberries, couch grass), or
5) from seeds (e.g., corn,
beans).
According to the Commentary,
a whole plant or part of one that has been removed from its original place
is no longer classed as bhutagama. If it is capable of growing again if
placed in the ground, it is classed as bijagama, which means "home of a
plant." When a seed is sown, it is regarded as bijagama until the first
shoot turns a fresh green color, and the first leaf appears. After that it
is regarded as bhutagama.
In line with this criterion,
the Commentary classifies as bijagama such lower forms of plant life as
mushrooms that still have their spores, fungi, lichens without leaves, and
moulds, in that they do not pass through a fresh green stage, have no
discernible leaves, and yet are capable of regeneration. Mushrooms that
have lost their spores, and parts of any plants that have been removed
from place and will not grow, or that have been cooked or otherwise
damaged to the point where they are incapable of generation, are not
grounds for an offense under this rule.
The Commentary states
further that to damage bijagama entails a dukkata. The Vibhanga makes no
mention of this point, but the Commentary cites as its justification a
passage that occurs in a number of suttas (D.1, D.2, etc.) saying that
bhikkhus refrain from harming both bhutagama and bijagama. The Mahavagga
and Cullavagga give partial justification to the Commentary's assertion in
two passages, dealing with bhikkhus eating fruit, which we will discuss
below. The Jain ascetics follow similar observances, which suggests that
both the Buddhists and the Jains adopted this point from the ancient
Indian ascetics who predated both religions.
Furthermore, according to
the Commentary, there are certain kinds of plants that do not count either
as bhutagama or bijagama under this rule, and to damage them entails no
offense. To justify this point it quotes a passage from the Cullavagga
(VIII.1.2): "If a varnished wall...(or) finished floor has spots of mould
(%), it is to be wiped off with a moistened cloth that has been wrung
out." The Commentary extends the Canon's instructions here to cover not
only mould on walls but also other lower forms of plant life -- such as
algae on the inside of water jars, fungus on toothbrushes, and mould on
food -- that would count as filth if they were allowed to continue
growing.
Effort. According to the
Vibhanga, the term damaging includes such actions as cutting, breaking,
picking, burning, and cooking. The Commentary defines the term as "dealing
with a plant as one likes by cutting it, breaking it, and so on." Although
the word "dealing with," paribhunjati, literally means "making use of,"
the Commentary's illustrations of what this covers include even such
things as shaking a tree limb to get the dry leaves to fall off so that
one can sweep them up. Thus, it says, damaging would include picking
flowers or leaves, uprooting a plant, engraving one's initials in a tree
trunk, etc. Since no exception is made for doing such things with
"benevolent" intentions towards the plant, pruning would be included as
well. Given the catch-all nature of the Commentary's definition, using
herbicides to kill plants would also come under the term "damaging."
Plants growing in water,
such as water hyacinths, whose roots do not extend to the earth beneath
the water, have the water as their base. To remove them from the water is
to damage them, although there is no offense in moving them around in the
water. To move them from one body of water to another without incurring a
penalty, one may take them together with some of the water in which they
originally lived and place them together with that water into the new body
of water.
Plants such as mistletoe,
orchids, and bird vine that grow on trees have the tree as their base. To
remove them from the tree is to damage them and so entails a pacittiya.
Perception. If one damages a
living plant (%) perceiving it to be something else -- say, a dead plant
-- there is no offense. If one damages a plant in doubt as to whether it
is living or dead, then regardless of what it actually is, the offense is
a dukkata.
Intention is discussed in
detail under the non-offenses, below.
Making Fruit Allowable.
Since fruit seeds are bijagama, the question arises as to how bhikkhus
should go about eating fruit. The Commentary to this rule discusses in
detail two passages, one each in the Mahavagga (VI. 21) and the Cullavagga
(V.5.2), dealing with precisely this question. The Cullavagga passage
reads, "I allow you, bhikkhus, to consume fruit that has been made
allowable for contemplatives in any of five ways: if it is damaged by
fire, by a knife, by a nail, if it is seedless, and the fifth is if the
seeds are discharged." The Mahavagga passage reads, "Now at that time
there was a great quantity of fruit at Savatthi, but there was no one to
make it allowable... (The Buddha said,) 'I allow you, bhikkhus, to consume
fruit that is seedless or whose seeds are discharged, (even if) it has not
been made allowable."
First, to summarize the
commentaries' discussion of seedless fruit and fruit whose seeds have been
discharged: According to the Commentary to the Mahavagga, "seedless fruit"
includes fruit whose seeds are too immature to grow. As for fruit whose
seeds have been discharged, the Sub-commentary states that this means,
"Fruit, such as mangoes or jackfruit, which it is possible to eat having
removed the seeds and separating them entirely (from the flesh)."
The question sometimes
arises as to whether bhikkhus may remove the seeds themselves before
eating fruit of this sort, or whether an unordained person has to remove
them first, but given the context of the Mahavagga passage and the wording
of the Sub-commentary's explanation, it seems clear that the bhikkhus
themselves may discharge the seeds before or while eating the fruit. As
the Commentary notes, both these kinds of fruit are allowable in and of
themselves, and need not go through any other procedure to make them
allowable.
Other kinds of fruit,
though, such as those with numerous seeds (such as tomatoes and
blackberries) or whose seeds would be difficult to remove undamaged (such
as grapes) must be damaged by fire, a knife, or a fingernail before a
bhikkhu may eat them. The Commentary's description of how to do this shows
that the damaging need only be symbolic: An unordained person draws a hot
object or a knife across the skin of the fruit, or pokes it with a
fingernail, saying "allowable" (kappiyam) either while doing the damaging
or immediately afterward. The Sub-commentary notes that the word for
"allowable" may be stated in any language.
If a heap of fruit, such as
grapes, is brought to a bhikkhu, he should say, "Make it allowable," (Kappiyam
karohi,) either to the donor or to any other unordained person who knows
how. The unordained person need only make one of the grapes allowable in
line with the above procedures for the entire heap to be considered
allowable, although he/she should not remove the grape from the heap while
doing so.
The Sub-commentary claims
that the ceremony of making fruit allowable must always be performed in
the presence of a bhikkhu, but the Commentary mentions this factor only in
connection with this last case -- making an entire heap of fruit allowable
by "damaging" only one piece -- and not in its basic description of how
the procedure is done.
In Communities that follow
the Sub-commentary, the custom is as follows: When a donor brings grapes,
tomatoes, or similar fruit to a bhikkhu, the bhikkhu says, "Kappiyam
karohi (Make it allowable)." The donor damages the fruit in any of the
three specified ways and says, "Kappiyam bhante (It is allowable, sir),"
while doing the damaging, and then presents the fruit to the bhikkhu.
In Communities that do not
follow the Sub-commentary, the donor may perform the act of damaging the
fruit beforehand, and simply inform the bhikkhu that the fruit has been
made allowable when presenting it to him. In either case, the act of
making a heap of fruit allowable by damaging only one piece must be done
in the presence of a bhikkhu. And we should note again that seedless fruit
or fruit whose seeds may be removed entirely from the flesh of the fruit
are allowable in and of themselves, and do not have to go through any
procedure before a bhikkhu may accept and eat them.
The two passages in the
Mahavagga and Cullavagga that we have been discussing deal specifically
only with fruit, but the Commentary extrapolates from them to say that the
same conditions apply to other forms of bijagama, such as sugar cane and
bean sprouts as well.
Non-offenses. There is no
offense for a bhikkhu who cuts a living plant --
unknowingly -- e.g.,
thinking it to be dead,
unthinkingly -- e.g.,
absent-mindedly pulling grass while talking with someone, or
unintentionally -- e.g.,
inadvertently uprooting grass while raking leaves or grabbing onto a plant
for support while climbing a hill and inadvertently uprooting it.
Also, there is no penalty in
telling an unordained person to make an item allowable; in asking for
leaves, flowers, etc. without specifically saying which leaves or flowers
are to be picked; or in indicating indirectly that, e.g., the grass needs
cutting ("Look at how long the grass is") or that a tree needs pruning
("This branch is in the way") without expressly giving the command to cut.
In other words, this is another rule where one may avoid an offense by
using kappiya-vohara: "wording it right."
The Cullavagga (V.32.1) says
that if a brush fire is approaching a dwelling, one may light a
counter-fire to ward it off. In doing so, one is exempt from any penalty
imposed by this rule.
Also, according to the
Sub-commentary to NP 6, a bhikkhu whose robes have been stolen and who
cannot find any other cloth to cover himself, may pick grass and leaves to
cover himself without incurring any penalty here.
Summary: Intentionally
cutting, burning, or killing a living plant is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
12. Evasive speech and
uncooperativeness are to be confessed.
This rule deals with a
bhikkhu's behavior in a communal meeting when being formally questioned
about a charge made against him. The factors for the full offense here are
two:
1) Intention: One desires to
hide one's own offenses.
2) Effort: One continues
engaging in evasive speech or in being uncooperative after the Community
has brought a formal charge of evasive speech or uncooperativeness against
one.
These factors will be easier
to understand if we discuss effort and intention before going on to the
formal act.
Evasive speech is
illustrated in the origin story as follows:
"Now at that time Ven.
Channa, having misbehaved and being examined about the offense in the
midst of the Community, avoided one question with another: 'Who has
committed the offense? What was committed? With regard to what matter was
it committed? How was it committed? What are you saying? Why do you say
it?'"
The Commentary notes that
evasive speech covers any and all forms of speaking beside the point when
being formally questioned, and not just the ones given in the origin
story. The Sub-commentary agrees and gives an additional example of its
own:
"Have you committed this
offense?"
"I've been to Pataliputta."
"But we're not asking about
your going to Pataliputta. We're asking about an offense."
"From there I went to
Rajagaha."
"Well, Rajagaha or
Brahmanagaha, did you commit the offense?"
"I got some pork there."
As for uncooperativeness:
"Now at a later time Ven.
Channa, being examined about an offense in the midst of the Community,
(thinking), 'By avoiding one question with another, I will fall into an
offense,' remained silent and was uncooperative with the Community."
Thus, the texts say, to be
uncooperative means to remain silent when being formally questioned in the
midst of the Community.
Intention. This factor is
fulfilled only if one is acting out of a desire to conceal one's own
offenses. If one has other reasons for remaining silent or asking
questions while being questioned, there is no penalty. For example, there
is no offense for a bhikkhu who, when being examined, asks questions or
gives answers not to the point because he
does not understand what is
being said,
is too ill to speak,
feels that in speaking he
will create conflict or dissension in the Community, or
feels that the Community
will carry out its formal act unfairly or not in accordance with the rule.
The formal act. If a bhikkhu
speaks evasively or is uncooperative out of a desire to conceal his own
offenses, he incurs a dukkata. If the Community sees fit, it may then
bring a formal charge of evasion or uncooperativeness against him in order
to restrain him from persisting in such behavior. If he then continues
being evasive or uncooperative, he incurs a pacittiya.
Perception is not a factor
here. Once a formal charge of evasion or uncooperativeness has been
rightfully brought against a bhikkhu, and he continues to be evasive or
uncooperative, he incurs a pacittiya regardless of whether he sees the
charge as rightful or not. If the charge has been wrongfully brought
against him -- e.g., the formal act was not carried out strictly in
accordance with formal procedure -- then in continuing to be evasive or
remain silent out of a desire to hide his offenses, he incurs a dukkata
regardless of whether he perceives the charge as wrongful, rightful, or
doubtful. In other words, he is not let off the hook simply because the
Community has not mastered formal procedure.
If, after the Community
rightly brings a formal charge of evasive speech or uncooperativeness
against a bhikkhu, he continues being evasive or uncooperative simply to
avoid revealing his offenses, he may further be subject to a more severe
penalty: a formal act of censure (tajjaniya-kamma) for being a maker of
trouble and strife for the Community (Cv.I.1-8) or -- what is essentially
the same thing -- an act for further misbehavior (tassa-papiyasika-kamma)
for not admitting to a true charge right from the start (see the
discussion under the Adhikarana-Samatha rules, Chapter 11).
Non-offenses. If a bhikkhu
answers not to the point or remains silent for any of the allowable
reasons, he incurs no penalty even after a formal act of evasive speech or
uncooperativeness has for some reason been brought against him.
Summary: Persistently
replying evasively or keeping silent in order to conceal one's own
offenses when being questioned in a meeting of the Community -- after a
formal charge of evasiveness or uncooperativeness has been brought against
one -- is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
13. Maligning or complaining
(about a Community official) is to be confessed.
Community officials. In the
Cullavagga (VI.21), the Buddha gives allowance for a Community of bhikkhus
to designate various of its members as Community officials, to handle such
business as distributing food, deciding who will stay in which lodging,
keeping the rosters that decide who will receive the invitations to which
meals, etc. Ven. Dabba Mallaputta was the first such official and was
well-equipped for the job:
"As for those bhikkhus who
came at night, he would enter the fire-element for them and by that light
would assign them lodgings -- so much so that bhikkhus would arrive at
night on purpose, thinking, 'We will see the marvel of Ven. Dabba
Mallaputta's psychic power.' Approaching him, they would say, 'Friend
Dabba, assign us lodgings.'
"Ven. Dabba Mallaputta would
say, 'Where would you like? Where shall I assign them?'
"Then they would name a
distant place on purpose: 'Friend Dabba, assign us a lodging on Vulture's
Peak. Friend Dabba, assign us a lodging on Robber's Cliff...'
"So Ven. Dabba Mallaputta,
entering the fire-element for them, went before them with his finger
glowing, while they followed behind with the help of his light."
Even with his special
skills, there were bhikkhus who were dissatisfied with the lodgings and
meals he assigned to them -- as we saw under Sanghadisesas 8 & 9 -- and in
the origin story to this rule they malign and complain about him.
Object. Only a bhikkhu who
has been formally agreed upon as a Community official fulfills the factor
of object under this rule. All other people, ordained or not, are grounds
for a dukkata.
Effort. The Commentary and
Sub-commentary give the clearest description of the distinction between
maligning and complaining: To malign means to speak critically of a person
in the presence of one or more other people so as to make them form a low
opinion of him/her. To complain means simply to give vent to one's
criticisms of the person within earshot of someone else.
According to the Vibhanga,
the penalty for maligning or complaining about a Community official is a
pacittiya if one's listener is a fellow bhikkhu, and a dukkata if one's
listener is an unordained person (%). The question of who one's remarks
are addressed to is irrelevant if one is maligning or complaining about an
unordained person or a bhikkhu who is not a Community official: The
penalty is a dukkata, regardless of whether the person to whom the remarks
are addressed is ordained or not.
Non-offenses. The Vibhanga
says that if a Community official acts habitually out of any of the four
causes for prejudice -- favoritism, animosity, stupidity, or fear -- there
is no offense in maligning or complaining about him. For example, if he
assigns the best lodgings to certain bhikkhus simply because he likes
them, gives the poorest food to certain bhikkhus simply because he
dislikes them, habitually sends the wrong bhikkhus to the wrong meals
because he is too stupid to handle the rotating rosters properly, or gives
the best treatment to certain bhikkhus because he is afraid of them or
their supporters, there is no offense in criticizing his behavior in the
presence of others.
However, one should be very
sure of the facts of the case before taking advantage of this allowance.
Disappointment and anger have a way of coloring one's perceptions, making
another person's perfectly blameless behavior look biased and unjust. If
one maligns or complains about an official, thoroughly convinced that he
has been acting out of prejudice, one is still guilty of an offense if it
turns out that in fact the official's behavior has been fair. The same
considerations apply also to complaints or criticisms concerning anyone,
ordained or not.
To criticize a Community
official to his face, simply for the sake of hurting his feelings, would
be an offense under Pacittiya 2, regardless of whether his behavior has in
fact been prejudiced or not.
The job of a Community
official is often a thankless one. The procedures he must follow in
distributing invitations, etc., can be fairly complex and, in large
Communities, quite time-consuming. Since there is no way he can guarantee
equal treatment to all, there may be times when he seems to be acting out
of prejudice when he is simply following standard procedure. If he cannot
receive the benefit of the doubt from his fellow bhikkhus, there is no
incentive for him to undertake these duties in the first place. The Buddha
likened material gains to excrement (see A.V.196), and when excrement is
shared out there is rarely any point in complaining about who gets the
choicest portions.
Summary: If a Community
official is innocent of prejudice: Criticizing him within earshot of
another bhikkhu is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
14. Should any bhikkhu set a
bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community out in the open
-- or have it set out -- and then on departing neither put it away nor
have it put away, or should he go without taking leave, it is to be
confessed.
During the four months of
the rains, furniture belonging to the Community -- when not in use -- is
to be kept in a place where it will not be rained on, such as a
fully-roofed storeroom or lodging. During the remainder of the year, it
may also be kept in a shed roofed with slats or branches, or under a tree
where birds do not leave droppings. The Commentary implies, though, that
this latter allowance holds only in those regions with a distinct dry
season; and, according to the Sub-commentary, even where there is a dry
season, if a bhikkhu sees an unseasonable rain storm approaching, he
should not leave furniture in such semi-open places.
This rule deals with
bhikkhus who set furnishings of the Community out in the open and then
leave without getting them put away in the proper place. The factors for
the full offense are three:
1) Object: any bed, bench,
mattress, or stool belonging to the Community.
2) Effort: One sets such
furnishings out in the open and then departs without taking leave, putting
the furnishings away, or getting them put away in the proper place.
3) Intention: One has set
them out for some purpose other than sunning them (%).
Object. Any bed, bench,
mattress, or stool belonging to the Community is grounds for a pacittiya.
Perception is not an issue here: If the item actually belongs to the
Community, this factor is fulfilled regardless of whether or not one
perceives it as such. Other furnishings belonging to the Community -- such
as carpets, bedspreads, mats, foot-wiping cloths, chairs, even the brooms
-- are grounds for a dukkata, as are furnishings of every type belonging
to another individual. One's own furnishings are not grounds for an
offense.
According to the Commentary,
if one has made an arrangement with someone else to use his/her belongings
on trust, there is no offense in leaving that person's furnishings out in
the open. The Sub-commentary adds that furnishings a donor presents for
the Community to use out in the open -- e.g., stone or concrete benches --
are likewise not grounds for an offense.
Effort. To depart the
furnishings is defined as going further than one leddupata --
approximately 6 meters -- from them. (A leddupata is a unit of measure
that appears frequently in the Canon and is defined as the distance a man
of average stature can throw a clod of dirt underarm.) Taking leave,
according to the Commentary, means informing a bhikkhu, a novice, or a
temple attendant who agrees to take responsibility for the furnishings.
Responsibility. A bhikkhu is
held responsible for putting away furnishings that he has ordered another
person to place in the open, unless the other person is also a bhikkhu, in
which case he is the one responsible. The Commentary states that if a
senior bhikkhu requests a junior bhikkhu to place out in the open any
furnishings that may be grounds for a penalty, then the junior bhikkhu is
responsible for them until the senior bhikkhu sits down on them, places an
article of his use (such as a robe or a shoulder bag) on them, or gives
the junior bhikkhu permission to leave, after which point the senior
bhikkhu is responsible.
If there is to be an
open-air meeting, the host bhikkhus are responsible for any seats set out
in the open, until the visiting bhikkhus claim their places, from which
point the visitors are responsible. If there is to be a series of Dhamma
talks, each speaker is responsible for the sermon seat from the moment he
sits in it until the moment the next speaker does.
Non-offenses. As stated
above, there is no offense if one departs having set furnishings belonging
to the Community or another individual out in the sun with the purpose of
drying them, and thinking, "I will put them away when I come back." (%)
Also, there is no offense if one departs after someone else takes
possession or responsibility for furnishings one has left out in the open,
or when there are dangers of any sort -- the Commentary mentions tigers,
lions, ghosts, ogres, outlaws, and people who might cause one to disrobe
-- that give one no time to put the furnishings away.
The Vinaya Mukha, extracting
a general principle from this rule, says, "This training rule was
formulated to prevent negligence and to teach one to care for things. It
should be taken as a general model."
Summary: When one has set a
bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community out in the open:
Leaving its immediate vicinity without putting it away or arranging to
have it put away is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
15. Should any bhikkhu,
having set out bedding in a lodging belonging to the Community -- or
having had it set out -- and then on departing neither put it away nor
have it put away, or should he go without taking leave, it is to be
confessed.
Here again the three factors
for a full offense are object, effort, and intention.
Object. Bedding here
includes mattresses, pillows, rugs, sheets, mats, sitting cloths,
blankets, bedspreads, animal skins, throw rugs, etc., but not the beds or
benches on which they may be placed. Unlike the previous rule, the
question of whom the bedding belongs to is not an issue in determining the
offense under this rule.
The place where it is left,
though, is an issue. Bedding left in a dwelling belonging to the Community
is grounds for a pacittiya. Bedding left in a dwelling belonging to
another individual is grounds for a dukkata, as is bedding left in the
area around a dwelling, in a meeting hall, or at the foot of a tree --
these last three places belonging to the Community or to another
individual. Bedding left in a dwelling, etc., belonging to oneself is not
grounds for an offense. The same holds true for bedding left in a dwelling
belonging to anyone who has given one the right to use his/her belongings
on trust.
Perception is not an issue
here. If, for example, the dwelling actually belongs to the Community, it
is grounds for a pacittiya regardless of whether or not one perceives it
as such.
Effort. Putting the item
away, having it put away, and taking leave are all defined as under the
preceding rule. The way to determine responsibility for bedding when a
bhikkhu orders someone else to spread it may also be inferred from the
discussion there.
To depart is defined as
going outside the grounds of the monastery. The absence of any reference
to this rule in the duties to be done before one's almsround (pindapata-vatta)
(Cv.VIII.5), however, indicates that temporary excursions outside the
monastery are not counted as "departing." This conclusion is seconded by
one of the no-offense clauses, which says that in the case of a bhikkhu
who goes with the expectation of returning but then changes his mind, if
he then sends word back to the monastery, he avoids any penalty under this
rule. This implies that a bhikkhu who leaves his bedding spread out in a
dwelling belonging to the Community, leaves the monastery temporarily with
the intent of returning, and returns as planned, incurs no penalty as
well.
The question arises, though,
as to how long a temporary period of absence is allowable. The Vibhanga
itself sets no time limit. The Commentary illustrates the no-offense
clause we have just mentioned with the case of a bhikkhu who leaves,
thinking, "I will return today," but makes no specific statement that
longer periods are not allowed.
Since the texts give no
specific guidelines here, this is a matter that each Community should
decide for itself, taking the following considerations into account:
1) The origin story suggests
that the purpose of the rule is to prevent the bedding's being left so
long in an unoccupied dwelling that it attracts ants, termites, or other
pests.
2) Another consideration,
raised by the Vinaya Mukha, is that if a bhikkhu goes for a long
excursion, leaving his bedding and other belongings scattered about in a
dwelling, this might inconvenience the resident bhikkhus in that they
could not easily allot the dwelling to another bhikkhu in the interim.
Intention is a factor here,
in that if one plans to return within the allowable space of time but for
some reason cannot -- examples in the Commentary include flooding rivers,
kings, and robbers -- there is no offense. And as mentioned above, if one
leaves with the intention of returning, but then changes one's mind, one
can avoid an offense by sending word back to the monastery via a
messenger.
Non-offenses. In addition to
the above two cases, the Vibhanga says that there is no offense in
departing having left bedding spread out in a dwelling if someone else has
taken responsibility for the bedding or if one has taken leave of the
resident bhikkhus. With regard to this latter point, though, the duties to
be done when moving out of a monastery (gamika vatta) (Cv.VIII.3) include
putting away the bedding one has been using. To neglect this duty, even
when one takes leave of the resident bhikkhus, entails a dukkata.
Summary: When one has
spread bedding out in a dwelling belonging to the Community: Departing
from the monastery without putting it away or arranging to have it put
away is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
16. Should any bhikkhu
knowingly lie down in a lodging belonging to the Community so as to
intrude on a bhikkhu who arrived there first, (thinking), "Whoever feels
crowded will go away" -- doing it for this reason and no other -- it is to
be confessed.
There are four factors for
an offense here:
1) Object: a bhikkhu who
should not be forced to move.
2) Perception: One perceives
him as such.
3) Effort: One encroaches on
his space in a dwelling belonging to the Community.
4) Intention: One's sole
motive is to force him out.
Object & perception.
Knowingly is defined in the Vibhanga as knowing that the lodging's current
occupant is a senior bhikkhu, a sick one, or one to whom the Community (or
its official) has assigned the dwelling. The Commentary interprets this
definition as a list of examples and generalizes from it to include any
case where one knows, "This bhikkhu shouldn't be forced to move."
Effort. To encroach means to
lie down or sit down in the area immediately adjacent to the bhikkhu's
sleeping or sitting place -- which the Commentary defines as anywhere
within 75 cm. of the sleeping or sitting place -- or on a 75 cm. wide path
from either of those places to the entrance to the dwelling. There is a
dukkata for placing one's bedding or seat in such an area, and a pacittiya
for each time one sits or lies down there. To place one's bedding or seat
in any other part of the dwelling entails a dukkata; and to sit or lie
down there, another dukkata -- assuming in all of these cases that the
dwelling belongs to the Community.
Perception with regard to
the dwelling is not an issue here. If the dwelling actually belongs to the
Community, this part of the factor is fulfilled regardless of whether one
perceives it as belonging to the Community or not.
There is a dukkata in
encroaching on the space of a bhikkhu -- intending to force him out -- in
the area immediately adjacent to such a dwelling, in a place belonging to
the Community that is not the dwelling of a particular person (e.g., an
eating hall), the shade of a tree, in the open air, or in a dwelling
belonging to another individual. To do so in a dwelling belonging to
oneself entails no offense. According to the Commentary, this last
allowance also applies to a dwelling belonging to anyone who has offered
to let one use his/her belongings on trust.
Intention. If there is a
compelling reason -- one is ill or suffering from the cold or heat, or
there are dangers outside -- one may intrude on the space of another
bhikkhu without penalty. The reason for these allowances would appear
obvious -- one is not aiming at forcing the other bhikkhu out -- but it
turns out that the matter is not as simple as that. The Sub-commentary
reports the Three Ganthipadas as saying that because of this allowance,
one may make an excuse of one's illness, etc., as a pretext for intruding
on the other bhikkhu's space so as to force him out of the lodging. The
Sub-commentary tries to argue with this ruling, but the Ganthipadas have
the support of the Vibhanga here: Only if one's sole motive is to force
the other bhikkhu out is one subject to an offense under this rule. If one
has mixed motives, one may take advantage of one's illness, etc., to move
in on the other bhikkhu.
However, once one's illness,
etc., has passed, one would commit an offense each time one continued to
sit or lie down encroaching on his space.
All of this may seem very
strange on the surface, but it is likely that the original occupant would
not feel unduly pressured if an ill bhikkhu or one escaping dangers were
to move into his dwelling, while he would start feeling pressured by the
continued presence of the bhikkhu after the illness or dangers had passed,
which is why the penalties are allotted as they are.
Summary: Encroaching on
another bhikkhu's sleeping or sitting place in a dwelling belonging to the
Community, with the sole purpose of making him uncomfortable and forcing
him to leave, is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
17. Should any bhikkhu,
angry and displeased, evict a bhikkhu from a dwelling belonging to the
Community -- or have him evicted -- it is to be confessed.
"At that time some
group-of-17 bhikkhus were fixing up a large dwelling on the fringes of the
monastery, thinking, 'We will spend the rains here.' Some group-of-six
bhikkhus... seeing them, said, 'These group-of-17 bhikkhus are fixing up a
dwelling place. Let's drive them out.' But others of them said, 'Wait,
friends, while they fix it up. When it's fixed up, then we'll drive them
out.'
"Then the group-of-six
bhikkhus said to the group-of-17 bhikkhus, 'Get out, friends. The dwelling
is ours.'
"'Shouldn't this have been
mentioned beforehand so that we could have fixed up another one?'
"'Isn't this a dwelling
belonging to the Community?'
"'Yes...'
"'Then get out. The dwelling
is ours.'
"'The dwelling is large,
friends. You can stay here, and we'll stay here, too.'
"'Get out. The dwelling is
ours.' And, angered and displeased, taking them by the throat, they threw
them out. The group-of-17 bhikkhus, having been thrown out, began to cry."
The three factors for the
full offense here are:
1) Object: a bhikkhu.
2) Effort: One evicts him
from a dwelling belonging to the Community.
3) Intention: One's prime
motivation is anger.
Object. A bhikkhu is grounds
for a pacittiya here, while the following are grounds for a dukkata: a
bhikkhu's belongings, an unordained person, and an unordained person's
belongings.
Effort. According to the
Commentary, this rule covers both physical eviction -- picking up the
bhikkhu and throwing him out -- as well as verbal eviction -- ordering him
to leave. The penalty in both cases is the same. (The Mahasanghikas and
Sarvastivadins write this point into their version of the rule.)
There is a dukkata in
telling someone else to evict the bhikkhu -- no allowances for
kappiya-vohara are given here -- and, assuming that all the other factors
are fulfilled, a pacittiya once the bhikkhu has been evicted.
To evict a bhikkhu from a
dwelling belonging to the Community entails a pacittiya. (Again,
perception with regard to the ownership of the dwelling is not an issue
here.) To evict anyone -- bhikkhu or not -- from an area immediately
adjacent to a dwelling belonging to the Community, from a place belonging
to the Community that is not the dwelling of a particular person, from the
shade of a tree, from a spot in the open air, or from a dwelling belonging
to another individual entails a dukkata. There is also a dukkata for
throwing a person's belongings out from any of these places. (In all the
cases mentioned in this paragraph, the assumption is that one is motivated
by anger.)
To evict anyone or anyone's
belongings from one's own dwelling -- or from one that belongs to an
individual who has offered to let one use his/her belongings on trust --
is not grounds for an offense.
Intention. There is no
offense in evicting anyone when one's primary motive is not anger.
Examples given in the no-offense clauses include evicting anyone -- or the
requisites of anyone -- who is insane, shameless in his/her behavior, or a
maker of quarrels, strife, and dissension in the Community. The Commentary
adds here that one also has the right to throw the person out of the
monastery as a whole if he/she is a maker of quarrels, strife, and
dissension, but not if he/she is simply shameless.
Also, one may without
penalty evict one's student from his dwelling if he is not properly
observing his duties.
In all of these cases, the
Sub-commentary notes, if anger happens to arise in one's mind in the
course of evicting the person, there is no offense as long as it is not
the primary motive.
Summary: Causing a bhikkhu
to be evicted from a dwelling belonging to the Community -- when one's
primary motive is anger -- is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
18. Should any bhikkhu sit
or lie down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an (unplanked) loft
in a dwelling belonging to the Community, it is to be confessed.
Object. A bed or bench with
detachable legs on an unplanked loft is grounds for a pacittiya if it is
in a dwelling belonging to a Community, a dukkata if in a dwelling
belonging to another individual, and no offense if in a dwelling belonging
to oneself or to anyone who has offered to let one use his/her belongings
on trust. Perception of the ownership, as in the preceding rules, is not
an issue here.
The purpose of this rule, as
indicated by the origin story, is to guard against injury to a bhikkhu
living under the loft: He might get hit on the head if any of the
detachable legs fall down through the floor of the loft. Thus there is no
offense if the loft is not high enough off the ground for a man of medium
height to stand under it without hitting his head; if the floor of the
loft is completely planked; if there is no one under the loft; if the area
under the loft cannot be used as a dwelling (e.g., it is used solely for
storage space, says the Commentary); if the bed or bench with detachable
legs is on the ground; or if the legs of the bed or bench are securely
fixed to their frame.
Effort. There is a question
as to whether sitting and lying down would include standing as well, since
the no-offense clauses allow one "to stand there and hang things up or
take them down." The Commentary interprets "there" as a bed or bench with
detachable legs, but standing on such a thing would seem to be even more
dangerous than sitting or lying down on it. More probably, "there" refers
to the unplanked loft.
Some people have noted that
although the bhikkhu in the origin story sat down hurriedly, the word
"hurriedly" does not appear in the rule, and they speculate that it may
have been dropped by mistake. If one is not allowed at all to sit or lie
down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft, they
say, there would be no reason to have one there. Actually, beds with
detachable legs do not sound like wise things to have on an unplanked
loft, and perhaps the Buddha's purpose in formulating this rule was to
discourage their being placed there in the first place.
Summary: Sitting or lying
down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft in a
dwelling belonging to the Community is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
19. When a bhikkhu is
building a large dwelling, he may apply two or three layers of facing to
plaster the area around the window frame and reinforce the area around the
door frame the width of the door opening, while standing where there are
no crops to speak of. Should he apply more than that, even if standing
where there are no crops to speak of, it is to be confessed.
"Now at that time a chief
minister who was Ven. Channa's supporter was having a dwelling built for
Ven. Channa. Ven. Channa had the finished dwelling covered with roofing
material again and again, plastered again and again, so that the dwelling,
overloaded, caved in. Then Ven. Channa, collecting grass and sticks,
despoiled the barley field of a certain brahman. The brahman was offended
and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can revered ones go around
despoiling our barley field?'... Bhikkhus... were offended and annoyed and
spread it about, 'How can Ven. Channa have a finished dwelling covered
with roofing material again and again, plastered again and again, so that
the dwelling gets overloaded and caves in?'"
This rule is an extension of
Sanghadisesa 7, giving further directions for how a bhikkhu should go
about building a dwelling for his own use when sponsored by another
person. Since it deals with techniques used in building wattle and daub
dwellings 2,500 years ago, both the rule and its explanations in the Canon
and commentaries contain terms whose meaning is uncertain at present. The
syntax of the rule suggests one interpretation, the Commentary another,
while the Vibhanga is non-committal on the points where the two
interpretations differ. Since both interpretations make sense, we will
present them both here.
What the rule seems to say.
The area 1.25 meters around the door frame is to be covered with up to
three layers of plaster or roofing material to reinforce it so that when
the door is blown open or shut it will not damage the wall or be loosened
from its hinges. Five kinds of roofing material are mentioned in the
Vibhanga: tiles, stones, lime (cement), grass, and leaves.
Similarly, around the
windows, an area the width of the window shutters is to be reinforced with
up to three layers of plaster to protect it from being damaged when the
shutters are blown open or shut. Three kinds of plaster were used in the
Buddha's time -- white, black and red-chalk -- and bhikkhus were allowed
to apply them in a number of geometrical patterns, but not to use them to
make obscene pictures of men and women on the walls (!) (Cv.VI.3.1-2).
Although the bhikkhus were allowed to cover the entire walls and floor
with this plaster, this rule gives directions only for the minimum area
that should be covered to keep the walls strong.
What the Commentary says.
Because the rule refers to roofing material, the Commentary assumes that
it must refer to the roof of the dwelling, even though this assumption
does violence to the syntax of the rule. Its interpretation: One may
reinforce the door and window frames with as much plaster or roofing
material as one likes, but may cover the roof with only three layers of
roofing material. A relevant point from the Canon is the passage at
Cv.VIII.3.3 stating that if at a later date the roof begins to leak, the
resident bhikkhu -- if he can -- should re-roof it himself or arrange for
someone else to do it for him. If he can do neither, though, there is no
offense.
The reasons for this rule.
The origin story suggests that the Buddha imposed the three-layer limit in
order to prevent the dwelling from collapsing under the weight of too much
roofing material, but the no-offense clauses show clearly that the rule is
aimed at preventing bhikkhus from abusing the generosity of the person
sponsoring the building work by using too much roofing material. In either
case, the Commentary's interpretation has its logic, in that an overloaded
roof would be more burdensome to the dwelling and to the sponsor than an
overloaded window or door frame would be.
A supplementary regulation
arising from the origin story is that one should not perform any building
operations, including supervising, where grain is growing.
The offenses here are as
follows: a pacittiya for each piece of roofing beyond the allowable three
layers, and a dukkata for doing or directing the work while standing where
crops are growing. These offenses apply regardless of whether one is doing
the work oneself or having it done. They also apply whether one is
building a new dwelling or having an old one repaired.
Perception is not a factor
here. If one happens to miscount the number of layers of plaster or
roofing material, one is still not immune from an offense.
Non-offenses. According to
the Vibhanga, these regulations do not apply to "an abode in a cave, a
grass hut, (a dwelling) for the use of another, (a dwelling built) by
means of one's own resources, or anything other than a dwelling." The
Sub-commentary argues from the wording of the rule -- the fact that it
refers to "a large dwelling" -- that the regulations also do not apply to
small dwellings built to the standard measurement specified under
Sanghadisesa 6: i.e., no larger than 3 by 1.75 meters.
Summary: When a bhikkhu is
building or repairing a large dwelling for his own use, using resources
donated by another, he may not reinforce the window or door frames with
more than three layers of roofing material or plaster. To exceed this is a
pacittiya offense.
* * *
20. Should any bhikkhu
knowingly pour water containing living beings -- or have it poured -- on
grass or on clay, it is to be confessed.
This is an offense with four
factors.
Object: water containing
living creatures. The K/Commentary's contribution to the next factor shows
that this includes things like mosquito larvae, but not beings so small
they cannot be seen.
Perception. One knows that
the living creatures are there (from having seen or heard them, says the
K/Commentary) and that they will die from the factor of effort, defined
below.
If one is in doubt as to
whether water contains living beings, then to use it in a way that would
cause their death if they were there is to commit a dukkata.
Effort. Because of a
peculiarity of Pali syntax, this rule can also be interpreted as reading,
"Should any bhikkhu knowingly pour grass or clay -- or have it poured --
in water containing living beings, it is to be confessed." The Commentary
states that both readings are correct. It also states that grass and clay
includes any material that would cause death to living beings in the
water. Thus actions covered by this rule would include such things as
emptying old water from a flower vase onto the ground, using water to make
cement, or pouring a toxic chemical or heavy pollutant into the water.
Unlike some of the other
rules that deal with giving orders, simply giving the order to pour is
enough to fulfill this factor. Thus, for example, a bhikkhu who tells
someone else to dump an aquarium of fish on the floor incurs a pacittiya
for giving the order and another pacittiya when the other person does as
told.
Intention. This factor is
fulfilled simply by the desire to pour the water or to have it poured (or
to pour "grass and clay" into the water or to have it poured). As the
K/Commentary notes, one need not have murderous intent towards the living
beings in order to fulfill this factor. For example, if after perceiving
that the water contains insects, one chooses to ignore their existence and
pours the water on a burning log -- not to kill the insects, but to put
out the fire -- one commits an offense all the same.
Result is not a factor here.
Whether or not the living beings actually die is of no consequence in
determining the offense.
Non-offenses. There is no
offense in using water containing living beings in any of the ways covered
by this rule --
unknowingly -- e.g., not
knowing that it contains living beings; pouring a toxic chemical into the
water thinking it to be harmless;
unthinkingly -- e.g.,
heating a kettle of water on the stove, seeing that it has tadpoles in it
and in a knee-jerk reaction dumping the water out on the ground so that
they won't be boiled to death; or
unintentionally -- e.g.,
accidentally knocking over a goldfish bowl.
However, a bhikkhu should
always check water before using it. One practical method for checking
large amounts of water is to look at two or three cupfuls as samples: If
no living being are visible in the samples, the water may be used without
further check. An alternative method is to use a filter, being mindful to
return any living beings caught in the filter to some other water in good
time.
Watering plants. The topic
of watering plants comes up in the Commentary's discussion of the bad
habits of the bhikkhus at Kitagiri mentioned under Sanghadisesa 13. There
it says that even if the water has no discernible life, to use it or have
someone else use it to water plants with the purpose of corrupting
families with gifts from the plant, entails a dukkata. In cases of this
sort, one is not allowed to use kappiya-vohara or any other way of
indicating one's desire that the plant be watered.
If one wants to use the
fruits or flowers of the plant in other ways -- to eat the fruit oneself,
to make a gift of fruit to the Community, to use the flowers as an
offering to a Buddha image, etc. -- one may not water it oneself, but
there is no offense in getting someone else to water it if one uses
kappiya- vohara ("Look at how dry this plant is!" "If it doesn't get any
water, it's going to die.")
If one wants the plant to
grow for other reasons -- for the sake of its shade or as part of a
decorative garden or forest -- there is no offense in watering it oneself
as long as one uses water with no discernible life in it. Two of the
ancient commentaries add that if one simply desires shade, a garden, or a
forest, one may plant the plant oneself as long as one places it in earth
that would not count as "soil" (jata-pathavi) under Pacittiya 10.
Summary: Pouring water that
one knows to contain living beings -- or having it poured -- on grass or
clay is a pacittiya offense. Pouring anything that would kill the beings
into such water -- or having it poured -- is also a pacittiya offense.
Part Three: The Exhortation
Chapter
21. Should any bhikkhu,
unauthorized, exhort the bhikkhunis, it is to be confessed.
"Now at that time, elder
bhikkhus, having exhorted the bhikkhunis, became recipients of robes,
alms, lodgings, and medicines for the sick. (According to the Commentary,
if a bhikkhu gave a good exhortation to the bhikkhunis, they would tell
their supporters, who in turn would provide the exhorter with requisites.)
The thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus: 'At present, elder
bhikkhus, having exhorted the bhikkhunis, have become recipients of robes,
alms, lodgings, and medicines for the sick. Let's exhort the bhikkhunis,
too.' So, having approached the bhikkhunis, they said, 'Approach us,
sisters, and we too will exhort you.'
"So the bhikkhunis went to
where the group-of-six bhikkhus were staying and, on arrival, having bowed
down, sat to one side. Then the group-of-six bhikkhus, after giving just a
trifling Dhamma talk and spending the day with 'animal talk,' dismissed
the bhikkhunis: 'You may go, now, sisters.'
"Then the bhikkhunis went to
where the Blessed One was staying and, on arrival, having bowed down,
stood to one side. As they were standing there, the Blessed One addressed
them: 'Was the exhortation effective, bhikkhunis?'
"'Venerable sir, since when
was the exhortation effective? The group-of-six bhikkhus, giving just a
trifling Dhamma talk, dismissed us after spending the day with animal
talk.'"
When Mahapajapati Gotami,
the Buddha's aunt and stepmother, asked him to establish an order of
bhikkhunis, he did so on the condition that she and all future bhikkhunis
accept eight vows of respect (garu-dhamma). In short:
1) Even a bhikkhuni who has
been ordained over a century must pay homage to a bhikkhu ordained that
very day.
2) A bhikkhuni must not
spend the rains in a residence where there is no bhikkhu (within half a
league, says the Commentary).
3) Every half month a
bhikkhuni should expect two things from the Community of bhikkhus: the
date of Patimokkha recitation and an exhortation.
4) At the end of the Rains
Retreat, every bhikkhuni should invite criticism both from the Community
of bhikkhunis and from the Community of bhikkhus.
5) A bhikkhuni who has
broken any of the vows of respect must undergo penance (manatta) for half
a month under both Communities.
6) A woman may become
ordained as a bhikkhuni only after becoming female novice, and then, as a
probationer, observing the first six precepts without lapse for two full
years.
7) A bhikkhuni is not to
insult or abuse a bhikkhu in any way.
8) A bhikkhuni may not
instruct a bhikkhu, although a bhikkhu may instruct a bhikkhuni.
This rule deals with the
bi-weekly exhortation mentioned in vow #3. The pattern for the exhortation
was that once a bhikkhu had been chosen by the bhikkhus to exhort the
bhikkhunis, he was to clean and prepare the place for the exhortation
within the monastery where he was dwelling, then find a companion and wait
for the bhikkhunis to arrive. When they had come, he was to ask if all the
bhikkhunis were present and if they were observing the eight vows of
respect. If they were, he was then to exhort them on any topic dealing
with the Dhamma. If they weren't, he was to exhort them on the eight vows.
Since the eight vows form
the heart of the exhortation, the two factors for the full offense under
this rule are defined as follows:
1) Object: a bhikkhuni or
group of bhikkhunis.
2) Effort: A bhikkhu exhorts
her/them concerning the eight vows of respect when he has not been
properly authorized to do so, or when he has not been invited by the
bhikkhuni(s) to give them instruction.
Object. A bhikkhuni had to
undergo a double ordination, first in the Bhikkhuni Sangha and then in the
Bhikkhu Sangha, before she was considered fully ordained. Thus only a
bhikkhuni with the full double ordination is grounds for a pacittiya here.
A bhikkhuni who has received only her first ordination, from the Bhikkhuni
Sangha, is grounds for a dukkata, while female probationers and female
novices are not grounds for an offense.
Effort. A bhikkhu, not
properly authorized, who exhorts the bhikkhunis on any topic other than
the eight vows incurs a dukkata.
The authorization. When
this rule was still newly-formulated, some group-of-six bhikkhus simply
authorized one another to continue exhorting the bhikkhunis. This forced
the Buddha to establish stringent standards for the type of bhikkhu who
could properly be authorized. They were, in short:
He is scrupulously
virtuous.
He is very learned.
He thoroughly understands
the qualities of the celibate life.
He has mastered both the
bhikkhus' Patimokkha and the bhikkhunis' Patimokkha.
He has a pleasing voice and
delivery.
He is well-liked by the
bhikkhunis.
He never, before his
ordination, violated a bhikkhuni, female probationer, or female novice.
He has been a bhikkhu for at
least 20 years.
As the Commentary notes,
these are qualities that the group of six never possessed even in their
dreams.
If a bhikkhu has been
improperly authorized -- e.g., he does not meet with these qualifications
-- then even if he perceives himself as properly authorized, his
perception is not a mitigating factor: He does not count as authorized
under this rule.
Non-offenses. Although this
rule grew from a time when bhikkhus were eager to exhort the bhikkhunis,
times changed. The Cullavagga (X.9.5) deals with a period when the
bhikkhus tried to avoid exhorting the bhikkhunis, and Cv.X.9.4 tells what
should be done when there is no bhikkhu qualified to exhort them. (The
bhikkhus were to tell them, "Continue striving in good faith.")
In cases such as these,
though, the bhikkhunis were not left adrift. They could approach any
bhikkhu they admired and ask him for instruction. Thus the no-offense
clauses here say, "There is no offense in giving an exposition (the
Commentary interprets this as chanting the eight vows in Pali), giving an
interrogation (this, according to the Commentary, means reciting the
ancient commentary, which is hardly likely; more probably, it means
questioning the bhikkhunis as to whether or not they are observing the
eight vows), and then, after being requested by the bhikkhunis, giving
instruction. There is also no offense if, on being asked a question by a
bhikkhuni, one answers her question, or if a bhikkhuni happens to overhear
any instruction one is giving for the sake of another person.
Summary: Exhorting a
bhikkhuni about the eight vows of respect -- except when one has been
authorized to do so by the Community -- is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
22. Should any bhikkhu, even
if authorized, exhort the bhikkhunis after sunset, it is to be confessed.
"Now at that time it was Ven.
Culapanthaka's turn to exhort the bhikkhunis. The bhikkhunis said, 'Today
the exhortation won't be effective, for Ven. Culapanthaka will simply
repeat the same old stanza over and over again.'
"Then the bhikkhunis
approached Ven. Culapanthaka and, on arrival, having paid homage to him,
sat to one side. As they were sitting there, Ven. Culapanthaka said to
them, 'Are you all present, sisters?'
"'Yes, sir, we are all
present.'
"'Are the eight vows of
respect being observed?'
"'Yes, sir, they are being
observed.'
"'This, sisters, is the
exhortation.' And having given it to them, he repeated it over and over
again:
Exalted in mind,
uncomplacent,
The sage, trained in
sagacity's ways:
He has no sorrows, one such
as this,
Calmed and ever mindful.
"The bhikkhunis said,
'Didn't we say so? Today the exhortation won't be effective, for now Ven.
Culapanthaka will simply repeat the same old stanza over and over again.'
"Ven. Culapanthaka heard
the bhikkhunis' conversation. Rising up into the air, he walked back and
forth in space, in the sky, stood, sat, lay down, emitted smoke, emitted
flames, and disappeared, repeating the same old stanza and many other
sayings of the Buddha. The bhikkhunis said, 'Isn't it amazing? Isn't it
astounding? Never before has there been an exhortation as effective as
this!'
"Then Ven. Culapanthaka,
having exhorted the bhikkhunis until nightfall, dismissed them: 'You may
go, sisters.' So the bhikkhunis -- the gates of the city being closed --
spent the night outside the city walls and entered the city only at
morning. People were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'These
bhikkhunis are unchaste. Having spent the night with the bhikkhus in the
monastery, only now are they entering the city.'"
The factors for the full
offense here are two:
Object. As with the
preceding rule, a bhikkhuni or group of bhikkhunis who have received the
double ordination are grounds for a pacittiya here. A bhikkhuni who has
received only her first ordination, from the Bhikkhuni Sangha, is grounds
for a dukkata, while female probationers and female novices are not
grounds for an offense.
Effort. One teaches the
bhikkhuni(s) any topic related to the Dhamma after the sun has set.
Non-offenses. Although the
origin story suggests that it is not wise in any case to teach bhikkhunis
after sunset -- because of the suspicions such an action may provoke --
the no-offense clauses give more respect to the bhikkhunis' desire for
instruction than to the fear of gossiping lay people. As under the
preceding rule, a bhikkhu may instruct bhikkhunis after sunset if they
request it or if a bhikkhuni asks him a question. And as before, if a
bhikkhuni happens to overhear any instruction he is giving for the sake of
another person after sunset, no offense is entailed.
Summary: Exhorting
bhikkhunis on any topic at all after sunset -- except when they request it
-- is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
23. Should any bhikkhu,
having gone to the bhikkhunis' quarters, exhort the bhikkhunis -- except
at the proper occasion -- it is to be confessed. Here the proper occasion
is this: A bhikkhuni is ill. This is the proper occasion here.
Here again there are two
factors for the full offense:
Object. A bhikkhuni who is
not ill. Ill means that she is unable to go to an exhortation or to a "samvasa,"
which none of the texts define but which probably means any official
communal meeting of the bhikkhunis.
As with the preceding rule,
a bhikkhuni or group of bhikkhunis who have received the double ordination
are grounds for a pacittiya here. A bhikkhuni who has received only her
first ordination, from the Bhikkhuni Sangha, is grounds for a dukkata,
while female probationers and female novices are not grounds for an
offense.
Effort. One goes to her
residence -- any place where a bhikkhuni has spent at least one night --
and exhorts her concerning the eight vows of respect. Exhorting about any
other topic is grounds for a dukkata.
Non-offenses. As the rule
states, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who goes to the bhikkhunis'
quarters to exhort an ill bhikkhuni. Otherwise, the no-offense clauses are
identical with those for the preceding rule. Here again, a bhikkhuni's
desire for instruction is considered more important than the wagging
tongues of the laity.
Summary: Going to the
bhikkhunis' quarters and exhorting a bhikkhuni about the eight vows of
respect -- except when she is ill or has requested the instruction -- is a
pacittiya offense.
* * *
24. Should any bhikkhu say
that the bhikkhus exhort the bhikkhunis for the sake of personal gain, it
is to be confessed.
Here the factors for the
full offense are three:
Object: a bhikkhu who has
been properly authorized to teach the bhikkhunis and who is not teaching
for the sake of personal gain. If the bhikkhu has not been properly
authorized, he is not grounds for an offense.
Perception is not a
mitigating factor here: The bhikkhu's actual status -- properly or
improperly authorized -- is what determines whether or not this factor is
fulfilled. And although the texts do not touch on this point, it would
seem that if the bhikkhu actually does not aim at personal gain, one would
incur a pacittiya in saying that he does, regardless of how one perceives
the case.
Intention. One wants to
criticize, discredit, or shame him.
Effort. One accuses him of
teaching for the sake of personal gain: either material gain -- gifts of
robes, almsfood, etc. -- or immaterial gain, such as respect, homage, or
veneration.
Non-offenses. If the
bhikkhu does actually teach for the sake of personal gain, there is no
offense in stating the facts of the case.
Summary: Saying that a
properly authorized bhikkhu exhorts the bhikkhunis for the sake of
personal gain -- when in fact that is not the case -- is a pacittiya
offense.
* * *
25. Should any bhikkhu give
robe-cloth to a bhikkhuni unrelated to him, except in exchange, it is to
be confessed.
This rule is the counterpart
to NP 5. The full offense is composed of two factors: object and effort.
Object: any piece of
robe-cloth of the six suitable kinds, measuring at least four by eight
fingerbreadths. Other requisites are not grounds for an offense.
Effort. The bhikkhu gives
the cloth to an unrelated bhikkhuni and does not receive anything from her
in exchange.
Unrelated bhikkhuni here is
defined in the same terms as under NP 5: a bhikkhuni who has received the
double ordination and is not related to the bhikkhu back through their
great x 7 grandfathers. A bhikkhuni who has received only her first
ordination, from the bhikkhunis, is grounds for a dukkata. Female
probationers and female novices are not grounds for an offense.
Perception is not a
mitigating factor here: According to the Vibhanga, even if a bhikkhu
perceives an unrelated bhikkhuni as related, he is still subject to the
penalty.
The Commentary states that
the giving need not be hand-to-hand. If a bhikkhu simply places the cloth
near a bhikkhuni as his way of giving it to her, and she accepts it as
given, this factor is fulfilled.
As for the item given in
exchange for the cloth, the Vibhanga states that it can be worth much more
then the cloth or much less. Buddhaghosa quotes the Mahapaccari, one of
the ancient commentaries, as saying that even if, in return for the cloth,
the bhikkhuni gives the bhikkhu a piece of yellow myrobalan -- a medicinal
fruit, one of the cheapest things imaginable in India -- he escapes the
penalty under this rule.
Non-offenses. There is no
offense if:
the bhikkhuni is a relation;
the bhikkhuni is not
related, but she gives one something in exchange;
the bhikkhuni takes the
cloth on trust;
she borrows the cloth;
one gives her a non-cloth
requisite;
one gives robe-cloth to a
female probationer or female novice.
Summary: Giving robe-cloth
to an unrelated bhikkhuni without receiving anything in exchange is a
pacittiya offense.
* * *
26. Should any bhikkhu sew a
robe or have it sewn for a bhikkhuni unrelated to him, it is to be
confessed.
"Now at that time Ven.
Udayin had become skilled at making robes. A certain bhikkhuni went to
where he was staying and on arrival said, 'Be so good, Ven. sir, as to sew
me a robe.' So Ven. Udayin, having sewed a robe for the bhikkhuni, having
made it well-dyed and well-finished, having embroidered an obscene design
in the middle (a man and woman in mid-intercourse, done in full color,
says the Commentary), and having folded it up, placed it to one side. Then
the bhikkhuni went to him and on arrival said, 'Where is the robe, Ven.
sir?'
"'Here you are, sister. Take
this robe as it is folded and place it aside. When the Community of
bhikkhunis comes for exhortation, put it on and come at the back of the
line.'
"So the bhikkhuni took the
robe as it was folded and placed it aside. When the Community of
bhikkhunis came for exhortation, she put it on and came at the back of the
line. People were offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How brazen
these bhikkhunis are, how shameless and sly, in that they embroider
obscene designs on a robe!'
"The bhikkhunis said, 'Whose
work is this?'
"'Master Udayin's,' the
bhikkhuni answered.
"'A thing like this should
not adorn even those who are brazen, shameless, and sly. It is Master
Udayin's, isn't it?'"
The full offense here has
three factors:
1) Effort: One sews -- or
gets someone else to sew --
2) Object: a robe
3) Intention: for the sake
of a bhikkhuni unrelated to oneself.
Effort. The Vibhanga says
that there is a pacittiya for every stitch one makes in the robe. If one
gets someone else to sew the robe, there is a pacittiya in giving the
command or making the request, and another pacittiya when the other person
does as commanded/requested, no matter how many stitches he/she makes.
Object. Robe here means any
of the six kinds of robe-cloth made into a robe that can be worn. Other
cloth requisites are not grounds for an offense.
Intention. Unrelated
bhikkhuni here is defined in the same terms as under the preceding rule: a
bhikkhuni who has received the double ordination and is not related to the
bhikkhu back through their great x 7 grandfathers. A bhikkhuni who has
received only her first ordination, from the bhikkhunis, is grounds for a
dukkata. Female probationers and female novices are not grounds for an
offense.
Perception is not a
mitigating factor here: According to the Vibhanga, even if a bhikkhu
perceives an unrelated bhikkhuni as related, he is still subject to the
penalty.
The Commentary states that
if Bhikkhu X is sewing a robe for a bhikkhuni related to him, and Bhikkhu
Y -- who is not related to her -- helps him sew it, Bhikkhu Y incurs a
pacittiya for every stitch he sews in the robe. The Sub-commentary adds,
though, that if Bhikkhu Y does not know that the robe is for the bhikkhuni,
he is exempt from the offense.
Non-offenses. There is no
offense in sewing a cloth requisite other than a robe for an unrelated
bhikkhuni, in sewing anything for a bhikkhuni who is a relation, or in
sewing anything for a female probationer or female novice, related or not.
Summary: Sewing a robe -- or
having one sewn -- for an unrelated bhikkhuni is a pacittiya offense.
* * *
27. Should any bhikkhu, by
arrangement, travel together with a bhikkhuni even for the interval
between one village and the next, except at the proper occasion, it is to
be confessed. Here the proper occasion is this: The road is to be traveled
by caravan (%), and is considered dubious and risky. This is the proper
occasion here.
Here the full offense has
two factors.
1) Object: a bhikkhuni
2) Effort: (a) One makes an
arrangement together with her to travel together; (b) one actually travels
together with her as arranged (c) from one village to another (d) except
at the allowable time.
Object. A bhikkhuni who has
received the double ordination is grounds for a pacittiya here. Any other
woman would come under Pacittiya 67.
Making an arrangement.
According to the Vibhanga, the bhikkhu must give his verbal consent to the
arrangement for this part of the factor to be fulfilled. In other words,
if the bhikkhuni proposes the arrangement, and he agrees; or he proposes
it, regardless of whether or not she agrees, this part of the factor is
fulfilled. The penalty for fulfilling it is a dukkata.
If the bhikkhuni proposes
the arrangement but the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent, then ev
