The
Buddhist Monastic Code
Volume I
The Patimokkha Training
Rules
Translated & Explained
by
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
(Geoffrey DeGraff)
Part 2
The first rule
in the Patimokkha opens with the statement that it -- and, by extension,
every other rule in the Patimokkha -- applies to all bhikkhus who have not
disrobed by renouncing the training and returning to the lay life. Thus
the Vibhanga begins its explanations by discussing what does and does not
count as a valid act of disrobing. Because this is, in effect, the escape
clause for all the rules, I am discussing it first as a separate chapter,
for if a bhikkhu disrobes in an invalid manner, he still counts as a
bhikkhu and is subject to the rules whether he realizes it or not. If he
then were to break any of the Parajika rules, he would be disqualified
from ever becoming a bhikkhu again in this lifetime.
To disrobe, a
bhikkhu with firm intent states in the presence of a witness words to the
effect that he is renouncing the training. The validity of the act depends
on four factors:
1. The
bhikkhu's state of mind.
2. His intention.
3. His statement.
4. The witness to his statement.
State of mind.
The bhikkhu must be in his right mind. Any statement he makes while
insane, crazed with pain, or possessed by spirits does not count.
Intention.
He must seriously desire to leave the Community. If, without actually
intending to disrobe, he makes any of the statements usually used for
disrobing, it does not count as an act of disrobing. For example, if he
makes the statement in jest or is telling someone else how to disrobe, the
fact that he mentions the words does not mean that he has disrobed. Also,
if he says one thing and means something else -- e.g., if he makes a slip
of the tongue -- that too does not count.
The statement.
The Vibhanga gives a wide variety of statements that one may use to
renounce the training. The most basic one follows the form, "I renounce
x," where x may be replaced with the Buddha, the Dhamma, the
Sangha, the training, the discipline (vinaya), the Patimokkha, the
chaste life, one's preceptor, one's teacher, one's fellow bhikkhus, or any
equivalent terms. Other examples follow similar forms, such as, "I am
tired of x," "What is x to me?" "X means nothing to
me," or "I am well freed of x." A separate form follows the
pattern, "Consider me to be y," where y may be replaced with
a householder, a lay follower, a novice, a member of another sect, an
adherent of another sect, or any other equivalent term.
The Vibhanga
stipulates that the statement may not be put in the conditional
tense ("Suppose I were to renounce the training"), and the Commentary
further stipulates that the "x" statements must be in the
present tense. Thus to say, "I have renounced the training," or "I
will renounce the training," would not be a valid statement of disrobing.
The witness
must be a human being in his or her right mind, and must understand what
the bhikkhu says. This rules out the practice legendary in Thailand of
bhikkhus who disrobe by taking a Buddha image as their witness, or who
disrobe in front of a Bodhi tree on the assumption that the tree deity
counts.
These four
factors cover all that is absolutely necessary for an act of disrobing to
be valid. However, each of the different national traditions has developed
a set of formal ceremonies to surround the act -- such as making a final
confession of all one's offenses and reciting the passage for reflection
on one's past use of the four requisites -- to give psychological weight
to the occasion and to help minimize any sense of remorse one may feel
afterwards.
Because
disrobing is a serious act with strong consequences for one's mental and
spiritual well being, it should be done only after due consideration. Once
a bhikkhu decides that he does want to disrobe, he would be wise to
follow not only the stipulations given in the texts but also any
additional customs dictated by the traditions of his particular Community,
as a sign to himself and to others that he is acting seriously and with
due respect both for the religion and for himself.
Parajika
This term, according to the
Parivara, derives from a verb meaning to lose or be defeated. A bhikkhu
who commits any of the four following offenses has surrendered to his own
mental defilements to such an extent that he defeats the purpose of his
having become a bhikkhu in the first place. The irrevocable nature of this
defeat is illustrated in the Vibhanga with a number of similes: "as a man
with his head cut off... as a withered leaf freed from its stem... as a
flat stone that has been broken in half cannot be put together again... as
a palm tree cut off at the crown is incapable of further growth." A
bhikkhu who commits any of these offenses severs himself irrevocably from
the life of the Sangha and is no longer considered a bhikkhu.
* * *
1. Should any bhikkhu --
participating in the training and livelihood of the bhikkhus, without
having renounced the training, without having declared his weakness --
engage in the sexual act, even with a female animal, he is defeated and no
longer in communion.
Effort. In this rule, the
term sexual act refers to all kinds of sexual intercourse. The Vibhanga
classifies the various types of intercourse by the organs involved -- the
genitals, the mouth, the anus -- and in any of the possible combinations
(except for mouth-to-mouth, which is treated separately under Sanghadisesa
2, below), the sexual act has been performed when one organ enters the
other even if just to "the extent of a sesame seed." This means that a
bhikkhu engaging in genital, oral, or anal intercourse is subject to this
rule regardless of which role he plays. The question of whether there is a
covering, such as a condom, between the organs is irrelevant, as are the
questions of whether the bhikkhu is actively or passively involved, and
whether or not any of the parties involved reaches orgasm.
Object. The full penalty
under this rule applies to any voluntary sexual intercourse with a human
being, a "non-human" being (a yakkha, naga, or peta), or a common animal,
whether female, male, neuter, or hermaphrodite.
Performing the sexual act
with a dead body -- even a decapitated head -- also entails the full
penalty if the remains of the body are intact enough for the act to be
accomplished.
The Vinita Vatthu also
lists two examples of "self-intercourse": A bhikkhu with a supple back
takes his penis into his mouth, and a bhikkhu with an unusually long penis
inserts it into his anus. Both cases carry the full penalty, which shows
that one's own anal and oral orifices can fulfill the factor of object
here.
Knowledge & consent. For the
sexual act to count as an offense, the bhikkhu must know that it is
happening and give his consent. Thus if he is sexually assaulted while
asleep or otherwise unconscious and remains oblivious to what is
happening, he incurs no penalty. If, however, he becomes conscious during
the assault or was conscious right from the start, then whether he incurs
a penalty depends on whether he gives his consent during any part of the
act.
Strangely enough, neither
the Canon nor the Commentary discusses the factor of consent in any
detail, except to mention by way of passing that it can apply to the stage
of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out. From
the examples in the Vinita Vatthu, it would appear that consent refers to
a mental state of acquiescence, together with its physical or verbal
expression. Mere physical compliance does not count, as there are cases
where bhikkhus forced into intercourse comply physically but without
consenting mentally and so are absolved of any offense; but there is some
question as to whether a bhikkhu who consents mentally to letting the
sexual act happen would incur the penalty if he simply lies still and lets
it happen, or if he would have to indicate his consent with a verbal act
or physical motion.
As we mentioned in Chapter
1, the rules contain two patterns concerning what does and does not count
as a physical expression of consent when one is forced into a situation
that would break a rule. In two of the Vinita Vatthu cases mentioned under
this rule, bhikkhus are approached by women who volunteer to fondle them
to the point where they emit semen (%). Both bhikkhus let them go ahead,
and both incur the full penalty under Sanghadisesa 1. In such cases,
simply letting the act happen counts as physical acquiescence. Under
Sanghadisesa 2, however, if a bhikkhu is approached by a woman who fondles
his body, and he consents mentally to what she is doing, he incurs a
penalty if he says something or makes a physical move to indicate that
consent, but no penalty if he remains perfectly still.
None of the texts explain
why there are these two patterns, but two possibilities suggest
themselves: (1) It is physically impossible to emit semen and to enjoy the
emission without the body's moving in one way or another. (2) One is not
necessarily responsible if a woman simply makes contact with one's body,
even if one enjoys the contact; but if one is happy to let her get to the
point where she has one ejaculating, one cannot deny responsibility for
what is happening. In either case, this rule would seem to follow the
pattern for Sanghadisesa 1: If one is sexually assaulted, one is
completely absolved from an offense only if (1) one does not give one's
mental consent at any time during the act or (2) one does feel mental
consent during at least part of the act but puts up a struggle so as not
to express that consent physically or verbally in any way. If one puts up
no struggle and feels mental consent, even if only fleetingly during the
stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling
out, one incurs the full penalty.
This would seem to be the
basis for the Commentary's warning in its discussion of the Vinita Vatthu
case in which a bhikkhu wakes up to find himself being sexually assaulted
by a woman, gives her a kick, and sends her rolling. The warning: This is
how a bhikkhu still subject to sensual lust should act if he wants to
protect his state of mind.
Derived offenses. The only
thullaccaya directly related to this rule is for the unlikely case of a
bhikkhu who attempts intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or
genitals of a corpse. (!) To attempt intercourse with any other part of a
dead body or with any part of an insentient object, such as an inflatable
doll or mannikin, incurs a dukkata.
The Vibhanga states that if
a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being's body
apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the Sanghadisesa rules
-- either Sanghadisesa 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sanghadisesa 2 for
lustful bodily contact. As we shall see below, the penalties assigned in
the latter case are as follows: if the partner is a woman, a sanghadisesa;
if a pandaka (see Sanghadisesa 2), a thullaccaya; if a man or a common
animal, a dukkata. We can infer from the Vibhanga's ruling here that if a
bhikkhu has an orgasm while attempting intercourse with the decomposed
mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse, with any other part of a dead body,
or with any part of an insentient object, the case comes under
Sanghadisesa 1.
The Commentary disagrees
with the Vibhanga on these points, however, saying that the derived
offenses under this rule can include only dukkata and thullaccaya
penalties. In its explanation of Sanghadisesa 1, it sets forth a system of
eleven types of lust in which the lust for the pleasure of bringing about
an ejaculation, lust for the pleasure of bodily contact, and lust for the
pleasure of intercourse are treated as completely separate things that
must be treated under separate rules. Thus, it says, if a bhikkhu aiming
at intercourse takes hold of a woman's body, it is simply a preliminary to
intercourse and thus entails only a dukkata, rather than a sanghadisesa
for lustful bodily contact. Similarly, if he has a premature ejaculation
before beginning intercourse, there is no offense at all.
These are fine academic
distinctions and are clearly motivated by a desire to draw neat lines
between the rules, but they lead to practical problems. As the Commentary
itself points out, if a bhikkhu commits an act that falls near the
borderline between these rules, but cannot later report precisely which
type of lust he was feeling in the heat of the moment, there is no way his
case can be judged and a penalty assigned. At any rate, though, there is
no basis in the Canon for the Commentary's system, and in fact it
contradicts not only the Vibhanga's ruling mentioned above, but also its
definition of "lustful" under Sanghadisesas 2, 3, & 4, which is exactly
the same for all three rules and places no limits on the type of lust
involved. All of this leads to the conclusion that the Commentary's neat
system is invalid, and that the Vibhanga's judgment holds: If a bhikkhu
attempts intercourse with any part of a living being's body apart from the
three orifices, the case falls under the Sanghadisesa rules -- either
Sanghadisesa 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sanghadisesa 2 for lustful
bodily contact -- rather than here.
Blanket exemptions. In
addition to bhikkhus who do not know they are being assaulted or do not
give their consent when they do know, the Vibhanga states that there are
four special categories of bhikkhus exempted from a penalty under this
rule: any bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with
pain, or the first offender (in this case, Ven. Sudinna) whose actions
prompted the Buddha to formulate the rule in the first place. The
Commentary notes that anyone who "goes about in an unseemly way, with
deranged perceptions, having cast away all sense of conscience and shame,
not knowing whether he has transgressed major or minor training rules,"
counts as insane here. It recognizes this as a medical condition, which it
blames on the bile. As for spirit possession, it says that this can happen
either when spirits frighten one or when, by distracting one with sensory
images, they insert their hands into one's heart by way of one's mouth.
(!) At any rate, it notes, insane and possessed bhikkhus are exempt from
penalties they incur only when their perceptions are deranged ("when their
mindfulness is entirely forgotten, and they don't know what fire, gold,
excrement, and sandalwood are") and not from any they incur during their
lucid moments. As for a bhikkhu overcome with pain, he is exempt from
penalties he incurs only during periods when the pain is so great that he
does not know what he is doing.
These four categories are
exempted from penalties under all of the rules, although the first
offender for each rule is exempted only for the one time he acted in such
a way as to provoke the Buddha into formulating the rule. I will not
mention these categories again, but the reader should bear them in mind as
being exempt in every case.
Lastly, the Vinita Vatthu to
this rule includes an interesting case that formed the basis for an
additional rule:
"At that time a certain
monk had gone to the Gabled Hall in the Great Wood at Vesali to pass the
day and was sleeping, having left the door open. His various limbs were
stiff with the 'wind forces' (i.e., he had an erection). Now at that time
a large company of women bearing garlands and scents came to the park,
headed for the vihara. Seeing the bhikkhu, they sat down on his male organ
and, having taken their pleasure and remarking, 'What a bull of a man!'
they went on their way, taking up their garlands and scents."
The bhikkhu incurred no
penalty, but the Buddha gave formal permission to close the door when
resting during the day.
Summary: Voluntary sexual
intercourse -- genital, anal, or oral -- with a human being, non-human
being, or common animal is a parajika offense.
* * *
2. Should any bhikkhu, in
the manner of stealing, take what is not given from an inhabited area or
from the wilderness -- just as when, in the taking of what is not given,
kings arresting the criminal would flog, imprison, or banish him, saying,
"You are a robber, you are a fool, you are benighted, you are a thief" --
a bhikkhu in the same way taking what is not given is defeated and no
longer in communion.
This rule against stealing
is, in the working out of its details, the most complex in the Patimokkha
and requires the most explanation -- not that stealing is a concept
especially hard to understand, simply that it can take so many forms.
The Vibhanga defines the act
of stealing in terms of four factors:
1) Object: anything
belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.
2) Perception: One perceives
that the object belongs to another person, etc.
3) Intention: One decides to
steal it.
4) Effort: One takes
possession of it.
Stealing under any
circumstances is always an offense. However, the severity of the offense
depends on another factor, which is --
5) The value of the object.
Object. For an object to
qualify as what is not given -- the rule's term for anything that may be
the object of a theft -- it must belong to someone else. In all of the
cases that the Canon discusses under this rule, that "someone else" is
either an individual human being or a group of human beings. The question
of property belonging to the Sangha logically fits here, but because the
topic is fairly complex, I will treat it as a special case below.
A further stipulation is
that the owner or person responsible for guarding the object has neither
given nor thrown it away. Thus there is no offense for a bhikkhu who takes
a discarded object, such as rags from a pile of refuse; or unclaimed
things from a wilderness. The Vinita Vatthu mentions an interesting case
in which the groundskeeper in an orchard permits bhikkhus to take fruit
from the orchard, even though he was not authorized to do so. The bhikkhus
committed no offense.
The Commentary, in passing,
mentions objects belonging to a cetiya (e.g., a stupa or a Buddha image)
as also qualifying as "not given" under this rule. Although the Vibhanga
to NP 30 and Pc 81 refers to objects of this sort, for some reason the
Vibhanga to this rule doesn't mention them. Nevertheless, the Commentary's
judgment here reflects a custom that had become widespread by its time,
that of giving very valuable items to a cetiya and dedicating them, not to
the Sangha, but to the Buddha or the cetiya itself. The jewels decorating
the reliquary of the Sacred Tooth in Kandy or the offerings to the Emerald
Buddha in Bangkok would fall under this category.
Items belonging to common
animals or petas are not covered by this rule. Thus there is no offense in
taking the remains of a wolf's kill, regardless of how possessive the wolf
may feel (although the Commentary wisely notes that a bhikkhu should not
take the kill until after the wolf has had a chance to feed on it, for
otherwise he will have trouble keeping the wolf away). The Commentary
classes devas under petas here and states that a bhikkhu may take a deva's
belongings with no penalty. It illustrates this point with two examples,
one reasonable and the other not. In the first, a bhikkhu takes a piece of
cloth left hanging on a tree as an offering to a deva. In the second, a
bhikkhu with clairvoyant powers gains a vision of Sakka, the king of the
devas, who is wearing an expensive cloth. The bhikkhu takes the cloth with
the intention of making a robe for himself, even though Sakka keeps
screaming, "Don't take it! Don't take it!" This latter example may have
been included in the Commentary simply for its shock value in order to
wake up sleepy students in the back of the room. Although the bhikkhu in
question would probably incur no offense, there's no denying that he is a
fool.
The term peta also includes
human corpses. In the early days of the Sangha, bhikkhus were expected to
make their robes from discarded cloth, one source being the cloths used to
wrap corpses laid in charnel grounds. (The bhikkhus would wash and boil
the cloth before using it themselves.) However, they were not to take
cloth from undecomposed bodies, and this was for a reason.
"At one time a certain
bhikkhu went to the charnel ground and took hold of discarded cloth on a
body not yet decomposed. The spirit of the dead one was dwelling in the
body. It said to the bhikkhu, 'Honored sir, don't take hold of my cloak.'
The bhikkhu, ignoring it, went off (with the cloak). The body, arising,
followed closely on the heels of the bhikkhu until the bhikkhu, entering
the vihara, closed the door, and the body fell down right there."
The story gives no further
details, and we are left to imagine for ourselves both the bhikkhu's state
of mind while being chased by the body and his friends' reaction to the
event. As is usual with the stories in the Vibhanga, the more outrageous
the event, the more matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor
lies in the understatement.
At any rate, as a result of
this incident the Buddha laid down a dukkata for taking cloth from an
undecomposed body -- which, according to the Commentary, means one that is
still warm.
Perception. For the act of
taking "what is not given" to count as theft, one must also perceive the
object as being something not given. Thus there is no offense if one takes
an object, even if it is "not given," if one sincerely believes that it is
ownerless or thrown away. Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object
mistaking it for his own or as belonging to a friend who has given him
permission to take his things on trust, there is no offense. Or again, a
bhikkhu who takes things from the Community's common stores, on the
assumption that he has the right to help himself, commits no offense even
if the assumption proves false.
Intention. The act of
taking "what is not given," even when one perceives it as "not given,"
counts as theft only if one's intention is to steal it. Thus if a bhikkhu
takes an object on loan or on trust, he commits no offense. According to
the Commentary, to take something on loan means that one has the intention
that, "I'll return it," or "I'll make compensation."
As for taking an object on
trust, Mv.VIII.19.1 lists five conditions that must be met if a bhikkhu is
rightly to take an object on trust:
a. The owner is a friend.
b. He/she is an intimate.
c. He/she has given one
permission to take from his/her things.
d. He/she is still alive.
e. One is confident that
he/she will not mind.
If any of these factors is
lacking -- for example, the owner is a good friend but has never given
explicit permission to take from his/her things -- one has no right to
take the things on trust. However, the Vinita Vatthu gives the case of a
bhikkhu who takes an item mistakenly thinking that he had the right to
take it on trust; the Buddha termed this a "misconception as to trust" and
did not impose a penalty.
The most common problem
that arises in this area is when one sincerely assumes that the owner will
not mind, but it turns out that he/she does. In cases of this sort there
is no offense, and the matter is left to the bhikkhu and the owner to
settle on their own as amicably as possible.
A bhikkhu who, seeing an
article left in a place where it might be damaged, puts it in safe keeping
for the owner, commits no offense.
For some reason, none of
the texts discuss the case of a bhikkhu taking an object when he is unsure
as to whether it is not given. Because this case is a very real
possibility, I would like to offer the following conjecture. Once the
actual status of the object has been determined, the case should be judged
in line with the bhikkhu's intention. If his intention was, "If this is
not given, I'm stealing it. If it's not not given, I'm taking it rightly,"
then, if the object is actually not given, all the factors for an offense
would be present. He would be guilty of stealing and would incur the
penalty determined by the value of the object. If the object is not not
given, then he would not be guilty of stealing, but would still incur the
dukkata for acting out of uncertainty. If, however, his intention was, "If
this is not given, I will return it,' then regardless of the object's
actual status, the intention to steal would not be present, and he would
incur no penalty.
Effort. Assuming that all
of the above conditions are met -- the object belongs to someone else, one
perceives it as belonging to someone else, and one intends to steal it --
if one then takes it, that constitutes stealing. The question then arises
as to precisely what acts constitute taking. To summarize the Vibhanga's
treatment of this question, we can classify objects into two broad types:
moveable and immovable.
Moveable items are said to
be taken when they are moved entirely from their "base(s)," i.e., the
spot(s) on which they rest. An object such as a box or a trunk lying flat
along the ground or touching its support at a single area has a single
base and counts as "taken" if it has been moved entirely from its base. An
object such as a table or chair touching its support at a number of
separate places has that number of bases. For instance, a stool with three
legs touches the floor at three points and so has three bases. An object
with more than one base is "taken" when it has been moved from all of its
bases. Thus a television set standing on four legs is taken when all four
of its legs have been lifted or slid away from the four spots on which
they were standing.
If a moveable object is
placed on another moveable object, such as a television set placed on a
cart, there are two ways to count it as taken -- either when it is removed
from its base on the cart or when the wheels of the cart have been moved
from all of their bases on the floor -- whichever occurs first.
If person A is carrying an
object, and person B tries to take it from him, it is counted as taken
even if B succeeds only in moving it from one spot on A's body to another.
According to the Vibhanga,
if a person holding an object with the owner's permission then decides to
abscond with it, it counts as taken when he shifts it to another part of
his person (e.g., into his pocket) or places it elsewhere. The Vinaya
Mukha, however, takes issue with this point, saying that cases of this
sort should be treated under the terms of a breach of trust, which is
discussed below.
Animals are reckoned to
have one base (e.g., snakes, any reclining animal) or more (e.g., chickens
or dogs on their feet) in the same way as inanimate objects, and are said
to be taken when they are pulled, chased, etc., completely from their
base(s).
When a bhikkhu takes a
moveable object in theft, the question of whether he makes off with it is
irrelevant as far as the offense is concerned. For example, if he tries to
steal a radio and succeeds in moving it completely from its base, but then
hears the owner coming and so returns it to its original place, the owner
would not even know that the object was in danger of being taken, and the
civil law would regard the act at most as an attempted theft. As far as
the Vinaya is concerned, though, the theft occurred when the bhikkhu first
moved the object, and the fact that he returned it would not erase the
theft. He would still be guilty of an offense.
As for immovable objects --
land or things such as buildings or trees affixed to the land -- these are
taken when the rightful owner unwillingly abandons his claim to them of
his own accord (through fear of intimidation or reluctance to incur the
expense and bother of a court battle) or when he is forced to do so by a
court of law and cannot, or does not, make a further appeal. In the
Buddha's time, a court dispute involving land was considered fully settled
when the winner of the case staked out his claim with the permission of
the court. Thus the Vibhanga states that a bhikkhu who unfairly wins a
court case of this sort has "taken" the land when he formally stakes out
his claim after winning the case. At present we would say that he has
taken the land when he receives the deed.
Immovable objects in the
secondary sense -- trees, buildings, etc. -- are treated in the same light
as ordinary moveable objects if a bhikkhu cuts them down or dismantles
them: They count as taken when removed from their bases.
These are the general
considerations for determining when an object is taken. The Vibhanga,
though, cites a number of additional cases involving special
contingencies, as follows:
a. Fraudulence: Objects are
being distributed by lot to the Community. A bhikkhu desiring the portion
rightfully going to another bhikkhu exchanges his ticket for the other
bhikkhu's ticket. The "taking" is accomplished when the tickets have been
exchanged. The Commentary to Mv.I.62 adds that if a bhikkhu claims higher
seniority than is actually his, in order to obtain better donations, he
should be treated under this rule when, through this ruse, he obtains
donations that should have gone to another bhikkhu.
b. Breach of trust: A person
places goods in trust with a bhikkhu. When the owner comes to ask for
their return, the bhikkhu claims that he does not have them. The taking is
accomplished when the owner stops pressing his claim. If the case goes to
court, the taking is accomplished when the owner loses the case in the
final court to which he appeals.
c. Embezzlement: A bhikkhu
responsible for items kept in a storeroom removes one of the items from
the storeroom. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the
storeroom's boundary.
d. Smuggling: A bhikkhu
carrying items subject to an import duty hides them as he goes through
customs. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the customs area.
If, however, the bhikkhu informs the customs official that he has an item
subject to customs duty, and yet the official decides not to collect the
duty, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. And there is no penalty if the
bhikkhu goes through customs not knowing that he has an item subject to
import duties among his effects.
Special cases cited in the
Commentary include the following:
a. False dealing: A bhikkhu
makes counterfeit money or uses counterfeit weights. The taking is
accomplished when the counterfeit is accepted.
b. Extortion: Using threats,
a bhikkhu compels the owner of an object to give it to him. The taking is
accomplished when the owner complies.
The value of the object. As
stated above, any case of stealing counts as an offense, but the gravity
of the offense is determined by the value of the object. This is the point
of the phrase in the rule reading, "just as when there is the taking of
what is not given, kings...would banish him, saying... 'You are a thief.'"
In other words, for theft to entail a parajika, it must be a case of grand
larceny, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods involved
were worth at least five masakas, a unit of money used at the time. Goods
valued collectively at more than one masaka but less than five are grounds
for a thullaccaya; goods valued collectively at one masaka or less are
grounds for a dukkata, the worth of the articles being determined by the
price they would have fetched at the time of the theft.
This leaves us with the
question of how a masaka would translate into current monetary rates. No
one can answer this question with any certainty, for the oldest attempt to
peg the masaka to the gold standard dates from the V/Sub-commentary, which
sets one masaka as equal to 4 rice grains' weight of gold. At this rate,
the theft of an item worth 20 rice grains' (1/24 troy ounce) weight of
gold or more would be a parajika offense.
One objection to this
method of calculation is that some of the items mentioned in the Vinita
Vatthu as being grounds for a parajika when stolen -- e.g., a pillow, a
bundle of laundry, a robe, a handful of rice during a famine -- would seem
to be worth much less than 1/24 troy ounce of gold, but we must remember
that many items regarded as commonplace now might have been viewed as
expensive luxuries at the time.
In spite of this objection,
there is one very good reason for adopting the standard set by the
V/Sub-commentary: It sets a high value for the least article whose theft
would result in a parajika. Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24
troy ounce of gold or more, there can be no doubt that he has committed
the full offense. When the item is of lesser value, there will be
inescapable doubt -- and when there is any doubt concerning a parajika,
the tradition of the Vinaya consistently gives the bhikkhu the benefit of
the doubt: He is not compelled to disrobe. A basic principle operating
throughout the texts is that it is better to risk letting an offender go
unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.
There is a second advantage
to the V/Sub-commentary's method of calculation: its precision and
clarity. Some people have recommended adopting the standard expressed in
the rule itself -- that if the theft would result in flogging,
imprisonment or banishment by the authorities in that time and at that
place, then the theft would constitute a parajika -- but this standard
creates more problems than it would solve. In most countries the sentence
is largely at the discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of
value is only one among many taken into account when determining the
penalty. This opens a whole Pandora's box of issues, many of which have
nothing to do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken -- the judge's
mood, his social philosophy, his religious background, and so forth --
issues that the Buddha never allowed to enter into the consideration of
how to determine the penalty for a theft.
Thus the V/Sub-commentary's
method of calculation has the benefits that it is a quick and easy method
for determining the boundaries between the different levels of offense in
any modern currency; it involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of
the Vinaya, and -- as noted above -- it draws the line at a value above
which there can be no doubt that the penalty is a parajika.
If a bhikkhu steals several
items on different occasions, the values of the different items are added
together to determine the severity of the offense only if they were stolen
as part of a single plan or intention. If they are stolen as a result of
separate intentions, each act of stealing is treated as a separate offense
whose severity depends on the value of the individual item(s) stolen in
that act. This point is best explained with examples:
In a case given in the
Vinita Vatthu, a bhikkhu decides to steal a spoonful of ghee from a jar.
After swallowing the spoonful, he decides to steal one more. After that he
decides to steal another, and so on until he has finished the jar. Because
each spoonful was stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention,
he incurs several dukkatas, each for the theft of one spoonful of ghee.
If, however, he decides at
one point to steal enough lumber to build himself a hut and then steals a
plank from here and a rafter from there, taking lumber over many days at
different places from various owners, he commits one offense in accordance
with the total value of all the lumber stolen, inasmuch as he took all the
pieces of wood as a consequence of one prior plan.
Derived offenses. In
addition to the lesser offenses related to the value of the object, the
Vibhanga also lists lesser offenses related to two factors of the full
offense under this rule.: effort and perception.
With regard to effort: If a
bhikkhu tries to steal an article that would be grounds for a parajika but
does not succeed -- e.g., he is going to steal a book from a shelf, but
before he can remove it from its place on the shelf he hears someone
approaching and so walks off without taking it -- he commits a lighter
offense in accordance with the effort made. Offenses of this sort are
called offenses committed in the pubbayoga or preliminary steps. In the
case of stealing, they are determined as follows:
Inanimate moveable objects:
If the article is made to budge slightly, but is not moved completely from
its base, or from some but not all of its bases -- thullaccaya. All
actions prior to this, beginning with the act of walking toward the object
with intent to steal it -- dukkata.
Animals: If in driving the
animal along the bhikkhu gets it to move its front feet -- thullaccaya.
All actions prior to this -- dukkata.
Immovable objects and
articles placed in trust: If the bhikkhu creates doubt in the mind of the
owner as to whether he will deprive him/her of the property in question --
thullaccaya. All actions prior to this -- dukkata.
Immovable objects in the
secondary sense (e.g., a tree): If with one more blow of the ax the tree
will fall -- thullaccaya. All actions prior to this -- dukkata, unless
(according to the Vinaya Mukha) there is a training rule imposing a higher
penalty, such as the pacittiya rule concerning injury to plant life.
For ease of remembrance, if
the bhikkhu is one step away from taking the object, he incurs a
thullaccaya; if he does not go that far, he incurs one or more dukkatas.
In offenses of this sort,
when a heavier penalty is incurred, only that penalty is counted, and the
preceding lighter ones are nullified. For example, in the case mentioned
above, if the bhikkhu trying to steal the book simply touches it, he
incurs a string of dukkatas for each step in walking up to the book and
taking hold of it. If he budges the book slightly but not so much as to
move it completely from its spot, the dukkatas are nullified and replaced
with a thullaccaya. If he actually takes the book, that nullifies the
thullaccaya and replaces it with a parajika.
As for the derived offenses
related to the factor of perception, these deal with the situation in
which an article does not qualify as "not given" under this rule -- e.g.,
it has no owner, or the owner has given it up or thrown it away -- and yet
the bhikkhu perceives it as not given. If he takes it with intent to
steal, he incurs a dukkata for each of three stages of effort. In the case
of an inanimate moveable object, these would be: touching the object,
making it budge, moving it from its base. A similar set of offenses would
apply in the stages appropriate for taking any of the other types of
objects listed above.
Shared responsibility. A
bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if he himself steals an object, but
also if he incites another to steal. The offenses involved in the acts
leading up to the crime are as follows:
If a bhikkhu tells an
accomplice to steal an object that would be grounds for a parajika, he
incurs a dukkata. If the accomplice agrees, the instigator incurs a
thullaccaya. Once the accomplice succeeds in taking the object as
instructed -- whether or not he gets away with it, and whether or not he
shares it with the instigator -- the instigator incurs a parajika. If the
accomplice is a bhikkhu, he too incurs a parajika. If the object would be
grounds for a thullaccaya or a dukkata, the only penalties incurred prior
to the actual theft would be dukkatas.
If there is any confusion in
carrying out the instructions -- e.g., if the accomplice, instead of
taking the book specified by the instigator, takes something else instead;
or if he is told to take it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the
morning -- the instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the
theft and persuading the accomplice, and not the penalty for the theft
itself. The same holds true if the instigator rescinds his order before
the theft takes place, but the accomplice goes ahead and takes the object
anyway.
According to the Commentary,
an instigator who wishes to call off the theft before it is carried out,
but who for one reason or another cannot get his message to the accomplice
in time, incurs the full penalty for the completed theft.
If there is a chain of
command -- Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D
to commit the theft -- then once D takes the object as instructed, all
four incur the penalty coming from the theft. If there is any confusion in
the chain of command -- e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D
directly -- neither A nor C incurs the penalty for the theft itself.
If bhikkhus go in a group to
commit a theft, but only one of them does the actual taking, all still
incur the penalty coming from the theft. Similarly, if they steal
valuables worth collectively more than five masakas but which when divided
among them yield shares worth less than five masakas each, all incur a
parajika.
Special cases. As mentioned
above, the notion of stealing covers a wide variety of actions. The texts
mention a variety of actions that border on stealing, some of them coming
under this rule, some of them not.
Belongings of the Sangha.
According to the Commentary to Nissaggiya Pacittiya 30, an item belongs to
the Sangha when donors, intending for it to be Sangha property, offer it
to one or more bhikkhus representing the Sangha, and those bhikkhus
receive it, although not necessarily into their hands. Sangha property
thus counts as "what is not given" as far as individual bhikkhus are
concerned, for it has an owner -- the Sangha of all times and places --
and is guarded by the individual Community of bhikkhus.
Sangha property is divided
into two sorts: light (lahu-bhanda) and heavy (garu-bhanda). Light
property includes such things as robes, bowls, medicine, and food. Heavy
property includes such things as monastery land, buildings, and
furnishings. The Buddha gave permission for individual Communities to
appoint certain of their members to be officials responsible for the
proper use of Sangha property. The officials responsible for light
property are to distribute it among the members of the Community,
following set procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair. Once an
individual member has received such property, he may regard it as his own
and use it as he sees fit.
In the case of heavy
property, though, the officials are responsible for seeing that it is
allotted for proper use in the Community, but the individual bhikkhus who
are allowed to use it may not regard it as their own personal property.
This is an important point. At most, such items may be taken on loan or
exchanged -- with the approval of the Community -- for other heavy
property of equal value. A bhikkhu who gives such items away to anyone --
ordained or not -- perceiving it as his to give, incurs a thullaccaya, no
matter what the value of the object. Of course, if he knows that it is not
his to give or take, then in appropriating it as his own he incurs the
penalty for stealing.
The Buddha was highly
critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy property of the Sangha. In
the origin story to Pr 4, he cites the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to
find favor with a lay person, gives that person some of the Sangha's heavy
property. Such a bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the
world.
A bhikkhu who takes heavy
property of the Sangha donated for use in a particular monastery and uses
it elsewhere incurs a dukkata. If he takes it on loan, he commits no
offense.
Receiving stolen goods.
Accepting a gift of goods, or purchasing them very cheaply knowing that
they were stolen, would in Western criminal law result in a penalty
similar to stealing itself. However, neither the Canon nor the
commentaries mention this case. The closest they come is in the Vinita
Vatthu, where a groundskeeper gives bhikkhus fruit from the orchard under
his care, even though it was not his to give, and there was no offense for
the bhikkhus. Thus the implication is that there is no offense for
receiving stolen goods, even knowingly, although a bhikkhu who does so
would not be exempt from the civil law and the consequent proceedings, in
the course of which the Community would probably urge him to disrobe. (In
Thailand, the civil law empowers the police to force a bhikkhu to disrobe
if he is charged with a criminal case.)
Compensation owed. The
Commentary introduces the concept of bhandadeyya, or compensation owed, to
cover cases where a bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of
another person's property. It defines this concept by saying that the
bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the owner
another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if he abandons
his responsibility to the owner, he incurs a parajika. The Commentary
applies this concept not only to cases where the bhikkhu knowingly and
intentionally destroys the object, but also to cases where he borrows or
agrees to look after something that then gets lost, stolen, or destroyed
through his negligence; or where he takes an item mistakenly thinking that
it was discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.
To cite a few examples: A
bhikkhu breaks another person's jar of oil or places excrement in the oil
to spoil it. A bhikkhu who is charged with guarding the Community
storeroom lets a group of other bhikkhus into the storeroom to fetch
belongings they have left there; they forget to close the door and, before
he remembers to check it, thieves slip in to steal things. A group of
thieves steal a bundle of mangoes but, being chased by the owners, drop it
and run; a bhikkhu sees the mangoes, thinks that they have been thrown
away, and so eats them after getting someone to present them to him. A
bhikkhu sees a wild boar caught in a trap and, out of compassion, sets it
free but cannot reconcile the owner of the trap to what he has done. In
each of these cases, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu in question owes
compensation to the owner of the goods. (In the case of the mangoes, he
must compensate not only the owners but also the thieves if it turns out
that they had planned to come back and fetch the fruit.) If he abandons
his responsibility to the owner(s), he incurs a parajika.
In making these judgments,
the Commentary is probably following the civil law of its day, for the
Canon contains no reference at all to the concept of bhandadeyya, and some
of its judgments would seem to contradict the Commentary's. For instance,
the Vinita Vatthu mentions a case in which a bhikkhu knowingly sets fire
to some grass belonging to the Community, and yet it assigns only a
dukkata to the action without -- as is its custom when discussing
out-and-out theft -- mentioning the value of the grass. When it discusses
cases where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken assumptions, or where he
feels compassion for an animal caught in a trap and so sets it free, it
says that there is no offense at all. Thus it seems strange for an action
that, according to the Canon, carries a dukkata or no penalty whatsoever
to become grounds for a parajika. Of course, in all cases of this sort it
would be a wise policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it
is by no means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal to do so,
and nowhere does the Canon require him to do so. Thus, as the Commentary's
concept of bhandadeyya is clearly foreign to the Canon, there seems no
reason to adopt it.
If, however, a Community
feels that a bhikkhu has acted in a destructive way that deserves more
than the automatic penalty of a dukkata, they can impose a banishment
transaction on him for physical injuriousness, or a reconciliation
transaction for striving for the non-gain and non-benefit of householders.
For details on these transactions, see Volume Two, Chapter 20.
Court actions. As stated
above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts an unfair court case against someone
else and then wins it in the final court to which the accused makes
appeal, he incurs a parajika. The Commentary to the Bhikkhuni's
Sanghadisesa 1, however, states that even if a bhikkhu is actually
mistreated by someone -- defamed, physically injured, robbed, etc. -- and
then tries to take a just court action against the guilty party, he incurs
a parajika if he wins. Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has
no support from the Canon and, as the Vinaya Mukha points out, its
assertion cannot stand. However, the training of a bhikkhu requires that
he view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking after the
state of his mind rather than on seeking compensation in social or
material things.
There is no question in any
of the texts that if a bhikkhu is asked to give evidence in a courtroom
and does so, speaking in accordance with the facts, he commits no offense
no matter what the outcome for the others involved.
Deceit. If a bhikkhu uses a
deliberate lie to deceive another person into giving an item to him, the
transgression is treated not as a case of stealing -- because, after all,
the item is given to him -- but rather as a case of lying. If the lie
involves making false claims to superior meditative attainments, it is
treated under Parajika 4. If not, it is treated under Pacittiya 1. The
Vinita Vatthu gives two examples:
During a distribution of
requisites in the Community, a bhikkhu asks for and is given an extra
portion for a non-existent bhikkhu.
A bhikkhu approaches his
teacher's lay supporter and asks for medicines, saying that they will be
for his teacher, although he actually plans to use them himself instead.
In both of these cases, the
penalty is a pacittiya for lying.
Compassion. The Vinita
Vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu, out of compassion, releases an
animal caught in a hunter's snare. He incurs no penalty.
In another case, a bhikkhu
with psychic powers uses them to retrieve a pair of kidnapped children.
The Buddha states that this entails no penalty because such a thing lies
in the province of those with psychic power. The Vinaya Mukha, in
discussing this case, takes it as a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu
returns a stolen article to its legal owner, there is no offense. The
Buddha's statement, though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus
without psychic powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs
of this sort. If a bhikkhu happens to learn of the whereabouts of stolen
goods, kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the authorities, if he sees
fit, and let them handle the situation themselves.
Modern cases. The modern
world contains many forms of ownership and monetary exchange that did not
exist in the time of the Buddha, and so contains many forms of stealing
that did not exist then either. Here are a handful of cases that come to
mind as examples of ways in which the standards of this rule might be
applied to modern situations.
Breach of copyright. The
international standards for copyright advocated by UNESCO state that
breach of copyright is tantamount to theft. They go on to state, however,
that if one duplicates articles, books, cassette tapes, or video tapes for
private use, for study, or for non-profit distribution, one may copy as
much as one likes. In some countries, though, one is allowed to copy only
small portions of copyrighted material for such purposes, although exactly
how small is only vaguely defined. Thus, as local copyright laws do not
always adopt the UNESCO standard, a bhikkhu should check with the law
before copying anything. In particular, the agreements covering the
copying of commercial computer software usually do not permit the owner to
give copies of the software to anyone for any reason, and limit the number
of copies one may make for one's own use. One should follow such
agreements to the letter.
Credit cards. The theft of
a credit card would of course be an offense. The seriousness of the
offense would be determined by how much the owner would have to pay to
replace the stolen card. NP 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit
card to buy anything even if the card were his to use, although a bhikkhu
who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably not be
dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else use it. At any
rate, each use of a stolen card would also count as a theft, the
seriousness of which would be calculated in line with the principle of the
"prior plan" mentioned above.
Long distance telephone
calls. Unauthorized use of a telephone to place long distance calls would
also count as a theft, and again the seriousness of the offense would be
calculated in light of the principle of the prior plan.
Tax evasion. If a bhikkhu
intentionally does not pay a tax to which he is subject -- say, on an
inheritance he receives -- he is guilty of a theft, which would occur on
the deadline for payment of the tax. Of course, a bhikkhu who fails to pay
a tax out of ignorance would not be guilty of an offense.
Exchanging currency on the
black market is also a form of tax evasion in countries where there is a
tax on currency exchange, so a bhikkhu in such a country who directs his
steward to change money on the black market would be guilty of a theft.
If, however, the steward on his own initiative exchanges money on the
black market for use in the bhikkhu's account, the bhikkhu commits no
offense.
Non-offenses. In addition
to the blanket exemptions mentioned under the preceding rule, the Vibhanga
lists six exemptions to this rule. Two relate to the status of the object,
two to the factor of perception, and two to the factor of intention.
Although we have already discussed these exemptions under their respective
factors, it is convenient to have them gathered in one place:
Object. There is no offense
if a bhikkhu takes an object belonging (1) to a peta (§) or (2) to an
animal (§).
Perception. There is no
offense if a bhikkhu takes an object perceiving it to be (1) his own or
(2) to have been thrown away (§). The Commentary states that if the object
does indeed have an owner, the bhikkhu incurs the penalty for stealing if,
after he refuses to return it at the owner's request, the owner abandons
the idea of trying to get it back. This statement should be qualified,
however, by adding that as long as the bhikkhu still perceives the object
to have been rightfully his to take in the first place, he is under no
obligation to return it.
Intention. There is no
offense if a bhikkhu takes an object (1) on trust or (2) temporarily --
which, the Commentary says, means that he takes it with the intention of
returning it or making amends to the owner.
Summary: The theft of
anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a parajika offense.
* * *
3. Should any bhikkhu
intentionally deprive a human being of life, or search for an assassin for
him, or praise the advantages of death, or incite him to die (thus): "My
good man, what use is this wretched, miserable life to you? Death would be
better for you than life," or with such an idea in mind, such a purpose in
mind, should in various ways praise the advantages of death or incite him
to die, he also is defeated and no longer in communion.
This rule against
intentionally causing the death of a human being is best understood in
terms of five factors, all of which must be present for there to be a
parajika offense.
1) Object: a human being,
which according to the Vibhanga includes human fetuses as well, counting
from the time consciousness first arises in the womb immediately after
conception up to the time of death.
2) Intention: knowingly,
consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wanting to cause that person's
death. "Knowingly" also includes the factor of --
3) Perception: perceiving
the person as a living being.
4) Effort: whatever one does
with the purpose of causing that person to die.
5) Result: The person dies
as the result of one's act.
Object. The Vibhanga defines
a human being as a person "from the time consciousness first becomes
manifest in a mother's womb, up to its death-time." (The concept of
death-time, since it relates most directly to questions that arise in
treating the terminally ill, will be discussed in the section dealing with
that topic, below.) It follows from this that a bhikkhu who intentionally
causes an abortion -- by arranging for the operation, supplying the
medicines, or giving advice that results in an abortion -- incurs a
parajika. A bhikkhu who encourages a woman to use a means of contraception
that works after the point of conception would be guilty of a parajika if
she were to follow his advice.
There is a series of cases
in the Vinita Vatthu in which bhikkhus provide medicines for women seeking
an abortion, followed by two cases in which a bhikkhu provides medicines
to a barren woman who wants to become fertile and to a fertile woman who
wants to become barren. In neither of these two latter cases does anyone
die, but in both cases the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata. From this, the
Commentary infers that bhikkhus are not to act as doctors to lay people,
an inference supported by the Vibhanga to Sanghadisesa 13. (The
Commentary, though, gives a number of exceptions to this principle. See
the discussion under that rule.)
The parajika offense is for
killing a human being aside from oneself. A bhikkhu who attempts suicide
incurs a dukkata.
A bhikkhu who kills a
"non-human being" -- a yakkha, naga, or peta -- or a devata (this is in
the Commentary) incurs a thullaccaya. According to the Commentary, when a
spirit possesses a human being or an animal, it can be exorcised in either
of two ways. The first is to command it to leave: This causes no injury to
the spirit and results in no offense. The second is to make a doll out of
flour paste or clay and then cut off various of its parts. If one cuts off
the hands and feet, the spirit loses its hands and feet. If one cuts off
the head, the spirit dies, and this is grounds for a thullaccaya.
A bhikkhu who intentionally
kills a common animal is treated under Pacittiya 61.
Intention & perception. The
Vibhanga defines intentionally as "having made the decision knowingly,
consciously, and purposefully." According to the Commentary, having made
the decision refers to the moment when one "crushes" one's indecisiveness
by taking an act. Knowingly means being aware that, "This is a living
being." Consciously means being aware that one's action is depriving the
living being of life. Purposefully means that one's purpose is murderous.
Whether one is motivated by compassion, hatred, or indifference is
irrelevant as far as the offense is concerned.
All of the above sub-factors
must be present for the factors of intention and perception to be
fulfilled here. Thus there is no offense for a bhikkhu who causes a death
--
accidentally -- e.g.,
accidentally dropping a rock that kills a person standing below; or toying
with a gun, trying to decide whether or not to kill the person, and the
gun accidentally goes off before he can make up his mind;
not knowing that a living
being was there -- e.g., placing a heavy load on a pile of cloth without
realizing that a person was lying underneath it;
not conscious that his
action is causing death -- e.g., by unwittingly giving poisoned food to
another bhikkhu who eats it and dies;
or when his actions are
motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death -- e.g., giving
medicine to a fellow bhikkhu, sincerely trying to help cure him, but the
sick bhikkhu chokes on the medicine and dies.
One aspect of the
Commentary's definition of knowingly is worth noting here: One does not
need to know for sure that the living being is a human being for the
factor of perception to be fulfilled. Thus if a bhikkhu hears the
threatening noise of a living being in the dark and, not knowing whether
it is man or beast, stabs it with intent to kill, he incurs a parajika if
the being turns out to be human and dies from the wound.
Although this judgment may
seem strange, it is supported by a passage in the Canon: A bhikkhu digs a
pitfall with the thought that whatever living beings fall into it will
perish. The penalty, if an animal dies as a result, is a pacittiya; if a
human being, a parajika. This shows that the intention/perception of
"living being" -- broad enough to cover human beings, even if it is not
limited to them -- fills the relevant factors here.
The Vinita Vatthu contains
an unusual case of a bhikkhu who uses a friend as a guinea pig for testing
poison. The friend dies, and the bhikkhu incurs only a thullaccaya. The
Commentary explains this by distinguishing two types of test: one to see
if a particular poison is strong enough to kill a person; the other, to
see if a particular person is strong enough to survive the poison. In
either of these cases, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya whether or not the
victim dies. If, though, the bhikkhu gives poison to a person with the
desire that it cause that person's death, he incurs a parajika if the
victim dies, and a thullaccaya if not.
Effort. This factor covers
four types of action: taking life, assisting a murderer or suicide,
describing the advantages of dying, and inciting a person to die.
a) Taking life. The Vibhanga
defines taking life as "cutting off the life faculty," and the
Commentary's discussion of this point shows clearly that this means
interrupting the continuity of life before it would reach its "timely" end
through the exhaustion of the victim's merit or life potential The
Commentary lists six means by which one might make such an effort:
-- One's own person. This
includes using not only one's hands or feet, but also such weapons as
knives, sticks, clubs, etc.
-- Throwing: hurling a
stone, shooting an arrow or a gun, etc.
-- Stationary devices:
setting a trap, poisoning food, etc.
-- Magical formulae: calling
on malevolent spirits to bring about a person's death, using voodoo, etc.
-- Psychic powers. using the
"evil eye" or other similar powers.
-- Commanding: inciting
another person to commit a murder. This category includes recommendations
as well as express commands. A few examples:
Telling A to kill B. The way
in which a bhikkhu is penalized for getting another person to commit a
murder can be inferred from the discussion of shared responsibility under
the preceding rule. The Commentary to this rule goes into great detail
concerning the six ways the command to kill can be specified: the object
[the person to be killed], the time, the place, the weapon to use, the
action by which the weapon is to be used [e.g., "Stab him in the neck"],
and the position the victim should be in [sitting, standing, lying down]
when the act is to be done. If the instigator specifies any of these
things, and yet the person following his orders does not carry them out to
the letter, the instigator does not incur the penalty for the actual
murder. For instance, Bhikkhu A tells his student to kill B while B is
sitting in meditation at midnight. The student gets into B's room at
midnight, only to find B asleep in bed, which is where he kills him.
Bhikkhu A thus incurs only the thullaccaya for convincing his student to
accept the command.
Inciting A to kill B. The
Commentary includes a case of a socially active bhikkhu who tells people,
"In such-and-such a place a bandit is staying. Whoever cuts off his head
will receive great honor from the King." If any of the bhikkhu's listeners
kills the bandit as a result of his instigation, the bhikkhu incurs a
parajika.
Recommending means of
euthanasia. The Vinita Vatthu includes a case of a criminal who has just
been punished by having his hands and feet cut off. A bhikkhu asks the
man's relatives, "Do you want him to die? Then make him drink buttermilk."
The relatives follow the bhikkhu's recommendation, the man dies, and the
bhikkhu incurs a parajika.
Recommending means of
capital punishment. Again from the Vinita Vatthu: A bhikkhu advises an
executioner to kill his victims mercifully with a single blow, rather than
torturing them. The executioner follows his advice, and the bhikkhu incurs
a parajika. This judgment indicates that a bhikkhu should not involve
himself in matters of this sort, no matter how humane his intentions.
According to the Vinita Vatthu, if the executioner says that he will not
follow the bhikkhu's advice and then kills his victims as he pleases, the
bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary adds that if the executioner
tries to follow the bhikkhu's advice and yet needs more than one blow to
do the job, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya. As we have mentioned,
though, the best course is to leave matters of this sort to the laity.
b) Assisting a murderer or
suicide. A bhikkhu may commit an offense not only by using any of the six
above-mentioned means of taking life, but also by intentionally assisting
a person who uses any of them to commit a murder or a suicide. This is how
the Vibhanga explains the phrase, "search for an assassin" in the rule.
The act of assisting includes not only finding an assassin, but also
procuring weapons for the would-be murderer or suicide.
c) Describing the advantages
of dying. This, the third type of act covered by this rule, can include
berating a sick person ("Why do you keep hanging on to life like this?
Don't you realize what a burden you are to others?") or simply telling a
person of the miseries of life or the bliss of dying and going to heaven
in such a way that he/she might feel inspired to commit suicide or simply
pine away to death. The Vibhanga notes that these statements fulfill this
factor whether delivered by gesture, by voice, by writing, or by means of
a messenger
d) Inciting a person to die,
the fourth type of act, covers:
-- Recommending suicide.
This includes not only telling a person to commit suicide, but also giving
advice -- whether requested or not -- to a would-be suicide on the best
ways to commit the act.
-- Telling a person to go to
a dangerous place where he/she might die of the dangers.
-- Arranging a terrible
sight, sound, etc. to frighten a person to death, or a beautiful,
"heart-stirring" one to attract a person who will then pine away to death
when it fades.
Command. Giving a command or
recommendation to get another person to perform any of these last three
types of action -- assisting a murder or suicide, describing the
advantages of dying, or inciting another person to die -- would also
fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.
Expressing a wish. According
to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who expresses an idle wish that so-and-so be
murdered would incur a dukkata, whether or not he was overheard. If,
however, the bhikkhu's purpose in expressing the wish is that his listener
take him up on it and commit the murder, his action would come under the
category of "command," mentioned above.
Inaction does not fulfill
the factor of effort here. Thus if a bhikkhu sits idle when seeing a flood
sweep a person down-stream, he commits no offense -- regardless of his
feelings about the person's death -- even if the person then drowns.
Recommending that another person sit idle as well would also not fulfill
this factor, because the category of "command" here covers only the act of
inciting the listener to do any of the four actions that would fulfill the
factor of effort under this rule.
Result. If a bhikkhu
fulfills the factor of effort with the intention of causing a person's
death, and the person dies as a result, he incurs a parajika. This holds
even if the person does not die immediately, but succumbs later, say, to
complications arising from a wound caused by the bhikkhu. If the person
does not die, but experiences pain or injury as a result of the bhikkhu's
efforts, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the bhikkhu's efforts result in
neither pain nor death, the penalty is a dukkata for each separate action
leading up to them.
If a bhikkhu intends simply
to injure the victim or cause him/her pain, and yet the victim dies as a
result of the bhikkhu's actions, the case is treated under Pacittiya 74.
There is an apparent
contradiction in the Vinita Vatthu concerning the penalty for a bhikkhu
who tries to kill one person but ends up killing another instead. In one
passage, it says that a bhikkhu who means to kill X but kills Y instead
incurs a parajika. In another passage, it tells of a bhikkhu who gives
medicine to a woman who wants to commit an abortion near the end of a
full-term pregnancy. The woman takes the medicine but, instead of the
fetus' aborting, the woman dies and the infant survives. In this case, the
bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya, presumably for the pain he caused the
infant.
The Commentary tries to
resolve this contradiction with an illustration: A bhikkhu with a grudge
against A decides to ambush him. He sees B coming down the road and,
mistaking him for A, shoots him dead on the spot. Since his intention was
to kill the person he was aiming at, he incurs a parajika. We can call
this a case of mistaken identity. In cases of this sort, whether the
"right" or the "wrong" person dies is of no consequence to the offense.
If, however, the bhikkhu is
a poor shot, takes aim at B but misses him, and inadvertently kills C
instead, he does not incur a parajika, for he did not intend to kill C
during any part of his action. His only penalties are the dukkatas he
incurs while preparing for B's murder.
If a bhikkhu means to cause
the death of any member of a group, then when any member of the group dies
as a result of his efforts, he incurs a parajika.
Caring for the terminally
ill. Some of the most highly charged issues involving this training rule
concern the duties of a bhikkhu acting as nurse, and his accountability in
the event that his patient dies. Not a few controversies have arisen in
the past when highly respected teachers have died after an illness, for
there is a tendency to blame the nurse either for the teacher's death or
for being so intrusive in his care that he does not let the teacher die in
peace. Recent developments in modern medicine -- such as professionally
mandated care, life-support machines, and organ transplants -- have
further complicated the issue of exactly how far the nurse's
accountability goes. Fortunately, the texts are quite clear on these
issues -- applying rules where rules are called for, and guidelines where
rules would be inappropriate -- but to understand their rationale it is
necessary to have some historical perspective on the subject.
Medical care in the time of
the Buddha was primarily the responsibility of the ill person's family.
Subsidized health care did not exist, and so families had a very real
sense of the exigencies -- their time, their resources, the wishes of the
patient, and the likelihood of his recovery -- that might force them to
provide less than state-of-the-art care, even for a loved one. At the same
time, the current Western system whereby one style of medical care can
establish itself as "standard" -- and can enlist the help of the law to
discredit alternative styles of treatment as bogus -- also did not exist.
Patients and their families had a wide assortment of treatments to choose
from and, given the means to make a choice, might select a particular
style for any number of reasons: belief in the theory that lay behind it,
trust in a particular doctor, rapport with the means of treatment, etc.
As a result, there was none
of the belief, current in some circles, that outside professionals have
the right to monopolize medical care or to impose their standards of
treatment on an unwilling patient or his family. The choice of treatment
was an in-family matter. If a patient balked at a particular doctor's
treatment, the family was free to decide whether to honor his wishes and
forego the treatment, or to force the treatment on him for his own good.
On the other hand, if the patient's condition reached the point where the
family felt that the doctor's treatment was futile, unaffordable, or
otherwise no longer appropriate, it could dismiss the doctor and attempt
treatment on its own, doing whatever was within its ability to offer moral
support to the patient and alleviate his pain and discomfort while waiting
for factors beyond its control -- such as the patient's present and past
kamma -- to decide the outcome of the disease.
The principal ethical
constraints on this arrangement, ancient medical textbooks show, were that
doctors should not use their knowledge to aggravate or prolong illness --
to do so would count as malpractice -- and that no one should subject a
patient to treatment designed to bring on death faster than it would if
the disease were simply allowed to run its course: To defy this principle
would count as murder.
This, in brief, was the
accepted pattern for medical care in the Buddha's time. The only change
the Buddha introduced to the pattern was to point out to the bhikkhus
that, as they had no family to care for them, they were to take on the
role of family for one another. If a bhikkhu falls ill, it is
automatically the duty of his mentor, his students (if he has any), or
fellow students of his mentor to care for him. These people are to stay
with the patient until he either recovers or dies -- although the
Commentary to Mv.I.25.24 points out that they may leave him if they put
him into the care of another. If a bhikkhu happens to fall ill in a place
where none of these people are available, it is the duty of the Community
in that location to care for him. If it doesn't care for him, all the
members of that Community incur a dukkata (MV.VIII.26.3-4).
The Mahavagga contains
guidelines for the ill bhikkhu and his nurses to follow, so that the ill
bhikkhu will be easy to care for, and the nurses will be chosen from among
those best suited to the task. The ill bhikkhu ideally avoids any food,
medicine, or activity that would aggravate his disease; he knows
moderation in the things that will be conducive to his recovery; he takes
his medicine; he reports to the nurse his condition as it actually is; and
does his best to endure his pain (Mv.VIII.26.5).
The nurse ideally is one who
knows how to prepare the proper medicines; knows what is conducive and
unconducive to the patient's recovery; provides the patient with what is
conducive and removes what is not; tends the patient out of kindness, and
not from hope of gain; is not squeamish about cleaning up urine,
excrement, saliva, or vomit; and is competent at encouraging the patient
at the appropriate times with a talk on Dhamma (Mv.VIII.26.5).
There is no offense for a
patient who does not live up to the ideal guidelines for his behavior; and
none for a bhikkhu who, though lacking any of the ideal qualities of
nurse, is pressed into a position where he must care for the sick. The
only penalties mentioned in the Khandhakas are the dukkatas for those who
neglect to care for the ill when they are duty-bound to do so or who
abandon an ill person they are caring for before he recovers or dies.
The Vinita Vatthu to this
rule contains only two basic cases in which a bhikkhu acting as a nurse
for an ill friend incurs a parajika: one in which the friend dies after
the bhikkhu gives him a specific treatment with the purpose of killing him
off; and one in which the bhikkhu, feeling pity for a friend in severe
pain, praises the pleasures that await him after death so that he will
give up the will to live and speed up his death: The friend does so and
dies as a result of the nurse's instigation.
Aside from the parajikas for
such cases of out-and-out murderous action and intent, and the dukkatas
for leaving the patient helpless, the Canon imposes no penalties on a
bhikkhu acting as nurse who provides his patient with less than ideal
care. Instead, within the parameters of those penalties, it offers
guidelines for ideal behavior, together with the encouragement of the
Buddha's remark that, "He who would tend to me should tend to the sick."
(Mv.VIII.26.3) From there it leaves it up to the bhikkhu to exercise his
best judgment, in light of the Dhamma, as to what is most fitting in his
individual case.
A moment's reflection will
suggest some obvious reasons for this. If a particular standard of care
were mandated, it would give rise to countless questions stemming from the
many uncontrollable variables that can surround an illness, questions that
rules are ill-suited to answer: How much must one's resources be depleted
before one can say that a particular type of care is unaffordable? How
should limited resources be allocated when several bhikkhus fall sick at
the same time? What should one do if the patient says that he does not
want to undergo a treatment that a doctor is trying to press on him? If
one follows the patient's request is he assisting a suicide? Should one
follow the doctor's orders and thus risk damaging the patient's
psychological state? The list of questions could go on, but it is obvious
from even these examples that this is an area less suited for rules than
for guidelines that can be adapted to suit particular circumstances.
Decisions here should be based on a reasoned and compassionate assessment
of the particular situation, rather than on fear of hard and fast
penalties and rules.
The commentaries' treatment
of the issue of a nurse's accountability follows the same general pattern
as the Canon's, but we find Buddhaghosa's works -- probably following the
ancient commentaries -- bringing a little more precision to the discussion
by introducing a distinction between timely and untimely death that the
Commentary applies to the Vinita Vatthu cases. The distinction comes from
Ayurveda -- ancient Indian medical science -- although Buddhaghosa
expresses it in purely Buddhist terms, most fully in the Visuddhi Magga:
"Timely death comes about
with the exhaustion of merit, with the exhaustion of life potential (ayu),
or with both. Untimely death comes about through kamma that interrupts
[other, life-producing,] kamma.
"Death through exhaustion of
merit, here, refers to the death that comes about entirely through the
finished ripening of [former] rebirth-producing kamma even when favorable
conditions for prolonging the continuity of the life potential may still
be present. Death through exhaustion of life potential refers to the death
that comes about through the exhaustion of the natural life potential of
human beings, which amounts to only 100 years...
"Untimely death refers to
the death of those whose continuity is interrupted by kamma capable of
causing them to fall from their place [on a particular level of being] at
that very moment... or for the death of those whose continuity is
interrupted by attacks with weapons, etc., due to previous kamma. All
these are included under the [term] interruption of the life faculty..."
(VIII.2-3)
As we saw above, the
Commentary's discussion of cutting off the life faculty refers
specifically to instances where one is bringing about an untimely death.
When it applies thi
